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Major League

baseball, alone

among

industries

M. Mileur

of its

size in the

United States,

operates as an unregulated monopoly. This twentieth century regulatory anomaly has

become known simply

Major League Baseball developed

as the "baseball anomaly."

a major commercial enterprise without being subject to antitrust

interstate

the

liability.

Long

into

after the

commercial character of baseball had been established, and even recognized by

Supreme Court,

baseball's

monopoly remained

free

from federal regulation.

regulatory status
This study explains the baseball anomaly by connecting baseball's
fate through four different
to the larger political environment, tracing the game's

of institutional, ideological and
regulatory regimes in the United States. The constellation
political factors within

persistence of
each regulatory regime provides the context for the

the baseball anomaly. Baseball's unregulated

of institutional, ideological and

monopoly

political factors

baseball's antitrust exemption to date.

persists

because of the confluence

which have prevented the repeal of

However, both

the institutional and ideological

factors,

which have

in the past protected baseball's unregulated

monopoly, are

fading.

Baseball's owners can no longer claim special cultural significance in
defense of the

exemption, nor can they claim that the commissioner system approximates government
regulation sufficiently.

in baseball

over the

Both of these

last

While baseball

have been discredited by the labor unrest

decade.

is

likely retain the aspects

strategies

one labor

strike

away from

losing part of its exemption,

of the exemption which cover the contractual

it

relationship

will

between

the major and minor leagues, as well as the part of the exemption which allows Major

League Baseball

to regulate the migration

of individual

baseball's exemption with likely be codified and

leagues.

part

The eventual

partial repeal

franchises.

expanded

to

all

These aspects of

professional sports

of baseball's exemption and the

of baseball's exemption to other sports makes

harbinger of sports antitrust policy in the twenty

vi

it

first

likely

expansion of

both an outdated anomaly and a
century.
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INTRODUCTION

It is

said that

few things

in life are certain.

Americans would probably have

Until the

summer of 1994 most

said that, in addition to death and taxes,

could be counted on was the World Series. Every

fall

the world championship of baseball. In 1994, this

was not

one thing

since 1904 Americans had enjoyed

to be. This grand tradition

not interrupted by economic depression, world war, or even natural disaster
Fall Classic canceled

inferior talent.

player strike, baseball's ninth

The 994
1

more

in the

Nor was

the

victim to a labor/management dispute.

since 1970,

place in the American psyche.

the culmination of three

highest levels of government.

treasure.

side of our national pastime

of the shine off

its

special

separated from discussions of politics and industrial

In this

of serious public policy debates

more somber atmosphere,

antitrust

laws acquired a

new

antitrust

at the

the long dormant issue of

life.

of the players and owners to come to an agreement, many,

began pushing for repeal of the

bit

Indeed, baseball seemed to be losing

at the center

from federal

wholesome

The business of baseball took a

Long

was suddenly

baseball's exemption

was

The

business of baseball.

vividly than anything before.

failure

fell

work stoppage

what most considered a national

out,

Series

baseball strike exposed the less

relations, baseball

was

by an arrogant pennant winning manager unwilling to play against

The 1994 World

decades of unrest

that

Disgusted with the

inside

government and

exemption as a way to pressure owners

reflected
an agreement with the players. The popular concern with baseball was

1

in

into

both

the appointment of a mediator by the
President of the United States to bring
baseball's

"labor" and

management together and by a renewed

interest in the

exemption by Members

of Congress.
This dissertation will examine what has

come

to be

known as

anomaly." Major League Baseball's exemption from federal

the "baseball

antitrust

laws represents a

regulatory paradox in American political development,
which the most recent unrest in the

game has brought once more
including

all

to the fore. Baseball

other professional sports, by

its

decisive question animating this dissertation

this

is

set apart

from most other

exemption from federal
is,

"why?"

immunity from the laws of the land? And, why has

industries,

antitrust law.

The

Why has baseball been granted
this regulatory

anomaly been

maintained for three-quarters of a century?

Analyses of this phenomenon have heretofore lacked comprehensiveness. They

have been too narrow

in their

methodology and

focus.

Scholarly inquiries into the

baseball anomaly have generally fallen into one of three categories.

histories, unsystematic cultural studies, or interest

literature is

group

studies.

They

Not

are either legal

present in the

a systematic attempt to integrate these approaches and theories into a

comprehensive examination of baseball's unregulated monopoly.
Legal analyses chronicle the history of antitrust

litigation in baseball,

with the 1922 Supreme Court decision that granted baseball
exemption. Subsequent challenges to

survival

is

this decision are

its

sweeping

beginning

antitrust

examined and the exemption's

attributed to historical accident, originating with a

Supreme Court whose

Progressive politics and sentimentality for America's national pastime led

it

to look

away

from the true commercial nature of the game. Legal analyses of the exemption focus on

2

the

power of precedent, or Stare

Decisis, and the Court's insistence that the Congress

is

the appropriate venue for removing the exemption. Such analyses
are uncritical in
attributing the origin

of the exemption to sentimentality and then focus too narrowly on

the "rules" of the judicial branch to explain

systematically the impact of ideas

inertia

its

long

This approach

life.

on the exemption's

survival

and

fails

to address

treats institutional

too narrowly, focusing on the judicial branch to the exclusion of the legislature and

the executive.

1

Several studies have traced the cultural significance of baseball, connecting
larger social

and economic trends. None, however, attempts to distinguish the

baseball's cultural significance in

its

monopoly

integrate cultural ideas and the struggle of interests but

of attention to

institutional contexts

fall

and

Legal analyses of baseball's exemption are found only

1

are no

book

of

insofar as they connect

baseball's cultural significance to the attitudes of legislators and fans.

their lack

role

to

retention of the antitrust exemption. These studies

are useful in explaining baseball's continued unregulated

due to

it

2

short of the

In

this,

full

they

explanation

detail.

in

law reviews or journals. There

length studies of this kind. Noteworthy examples include: Rogers, Paul

"Judicial Reinterpretation

Houston Law Review

C,

of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws,"

14 (1977), p. 61 1-634; Berger, Robert, "After the Strikes:

A

Reexamination of Professional Baseball's Exemption from the Antitrust Laws,"
University of Pittsburgh
Historical

Law Review

Review of Litigation

45 (1983),

in Baseball,"

p.

209-226; Irwin, Richard

Marquette Sports Law Journal

L.,
1

:2

"A
(1991),

Exemption," Hastings
p. 283-300; and, Juarez, Michael H., "Baseball's Antitrust
Communication and Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1995), p. 737-762.
2

Such

studies include: Johnson, Arthur T., "Public Sports Policy,"

American Behavioral

Scientist 21:3 (January/February, 1978), p. 319-344; Lipsky, Richard E., "Toward a
Behavioral Scientist 21:3
Political Theory of American Sports Symbolism," American

(January/February, 1978), p. 345-360; and, Johnson, Arthur T., "Congress and
of Political and
Professional Sports: 1951-1978," Annals of the American Academy

Social Science 445 (September, 1979),

p.

102-115.

3

Political/economic analyses of the anomaly conclude that
powerful interests

preserve

by applying continuing

it

exemption.

3

This pressure

is

political pressure

on Congress

credited with chastening

to protect the

Members of Congress who might

support repeal of baseball's anomalous status. Warren Freedman
sums up the logic of the
interest

group theory approach when he

businesses of professional sports
4

interests.'*

is

"The

writes,

an absorbing

tale

history

of antitrust application to the

of sentimentality and of special

While the interest-group explanation of the exemption's continuation

without merit,

it

also tends to be reductionist and too narrow, as

systematically the impact of institutions and ideas

The primary
for the persistence

objective of this study

fails

not

to consider

public policy.

an integrated and comprehensive explanation

is

of the "baseball anomaly."

ideological, as well as the political

on

it

is

It will

and economic

explore the institutional and

factors, that

have contributed to the

paradoxical regulatory status of the business of baseball since 1922. Building on the work

of numerous scholars,

this

study examines the impact of institutional and ideological

structures and environments, as well as the interplay of interests, to provide a

comprehensive explanation of baseball's unusual commercial

more

status.

"Law, Economics, and Organized
Baseball: Analysis of a Cooperative Venture." (Ph.D. Dissertation, George Mason
University, 1987). Ellig attributes the preservation of Major League Baseball's antitrust
exemption to the game's vertically integrated governance structure, which enables MLB
legislative repeal of the
to utilize the lobbying power of the minor leagues to prevent the
3

Noteworthy

game's

in this regard is Ellig,

antitrust exemption.

professional sports leagues,

Jerome

R.,

This lobbying advantage

who

either rely

is

on colleges

not shared by other major
for player development, or have

under-developed minor league systems.
4

Greenwood
Freedman, Warren, Professional Sports and Antitrust (Westport, CT:
,

1987), p. 31.

4

Press,

This study employs an historical

methodology, which

institutionalist

emerging approach

in political science that falls loosely

institutionalism" or

"American

Political

is

part of an

under the heading of "new

Development." This newer

institutional focus

seeks to expand the narrower "scientific" focus of political
scientists since the behavioral
revolution in the discipline that emerged in the 1940s and 50s.

The new

institutionalism

aspires to synthesize the behavioralist/pluralist approach with an
earlier institutional

approach to the study of government, broadening the
institutions in

The

an

historical

of traditional

methodology grew up

institutional constraints.

is

criticized for being descriptive

was grounded

man an economically rational

assumption that behavior

in reaction to the rigid

which was

political science,

rather than analytical. Behavioral/pluralism

nature that finds

of

and developmental context.

behaviorist/pluralist

institutionalism

analytical focus to the interplay

shaped by rational

animal.

in

an understanding of human

The methodology operates on

self interest, not

by

ideals, values, or

This assumption leads to the conclusion that public policy

outcome of the competition between

rationally defined interests.

New institutionalists charge that

the

is

the

5

behavioral/pluralism has overvalued the

explanatory significance of societal forces in the analysis of politics and the making of
public policy, with the result that institutions as explanatory variables have been greatly

under- valued. Scholars, such as Theda Skocpol, Stephen Krasner, James March, John
Olsen, Eric Nordlinger, and Stephen

behavioral/pluralism

fails

Skowronek

to account for the role

to

name only

a few, argue that

of institutions and ideas

in the

See Somit, Albert, The Development of Political Science: From Burgess to
Behavioralism, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon Publishing, 1967).

5

5

process of

policy formation and political change.

March and Olsen

deftly catalogue the indictment

of

behavioral/pluralist political science as follows:

[T]he basic vision that has characterized theories of politics
since about 1950 is (a) contextual, inclined to see politics as

an integral part of society,
polity

from the

see political

rest

less inclined to differentiate the

of society;

phenomena

(b) reductionist, inclined to

as the aggregate consequences of

individual behavior, less inclined to ascribe the
politics to organizational structures

outcomes of
and rules of appropriate

behavior; (c) utilitarian, inclined to see action as the

product of calculated self interest,
political actors as

less inclined to see

responding to obligations and duties; (d)

functionalist, inclined to see history as an efficient

mechanism

for reaching uniquely appropriate equilibria, less

concerned with the

possibilities for

maladaptation and non-

uniqueness in historical development; and (e)

making and the
allocation of resources as the central concerns of political

instrumentalist, inclined to define decision

life,

less attentive to the

ways

political life is

organized

around the development of meaning through symbols,
rituals

and ceremonies.

6

Behavioral/pluralist political science

is

also charged with being society-centered, an

orientation in which institutions, like the state, have no

public policy.

The causal arrow goes one way, from

autonomy

in the

formulation of

society to polity, with the state being

merely a neutral referee of societal forces that compete with one another to shape public
policy decisions. These decisions are thus understood as allocations of benefits

competing groups. In explaining policy decisions,

political scientists

among

focus on societal

policy
"inputs" to government and then examine the distributive effects of government

("outputs")

6

on

7

societal actors.

March, James G. and Johan

in Political Life,"
7

The government, or

P. Olsen,

The American

See Easton, David, The

System:

is

seen as the "black box"

New Institutionalism:

Political Science

Political

(New York: Knopf Publishing,

"The

the state,

Review (September, 1984),

An Inqu iry

1953).

6

Organizational Factors

into the State

p. 735.

of Political Science,

that merely processes social interests,

government are accorded no causal

which

is

role in the

to say that institutional arrangements in

making of public

policy.

8

A key difference between the behavioral/pluralist approach and the historicalinstitutional

approach

lies in their differing

public policy making. Behavioralism

is

conceptions of the influence of rationality on

reductionist and utilitarian.

It

sees politics as the

aggregate consequences of individual behavior, ignoring the effects of
organizational
structures.

Behavioral/pluralism also sees

of duties, obligations or

interest irrespective

at best constraints

action as the product of calculated

rules.

upon exogenously defined

defined by institutions.

The

all

From this perspective

self-interests.

self-

institutions are

The goals of actors

are not

9

historical institutional perspective sees institutions as structuring behavior

more completely.

Institutions provide

strategies are formulated.

more than the context within which rational

They provide

the context that shapes the actual goals and

preferences of actors. In other words, historical-institutionalism sees actors' self

definitions

of their

interests as being

rational calculation.

From the

as an attempt to "satisfice"

deeply embedded

do not

8

initiate

10

in cultural,

shaped by

institutional arraignments, as well as

historical-institutionalist perspective,

and thereby

fulfill

action

is

seen

expectations that are context specific and

socioeconomic, and

political fields or structures.

decision making by asking themselves

Skocpol, Theda, Bringing the State Back In,

human

by

how

to

maximize

(New York: Cambridge

Individuals

their utility in a

University Press,

1985), p. 4.

See Schweers Cook, Karen and Margaret Levi, The Limits of Rationality (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990).
Press,
10
See Simon, Herbert, Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford: Stanford University

9

,

,

1983).

7

given situation. They ask instead, what
situation given their position

rational calculation

of their

and

is

the appropriate response to a particular

responsibilities?

own or their

group

People

may make

decisions based

self interest, but the calculus

is

on a

weighted

heavily by the historical, institutional, and ideological context in
which that decision

occurs.

The
institutions,

behavioral/pluralist perspective detaches law, history, and values, as well as

from the study of politics. The assumed

universality

of rationality

effectively

diminishes the importance of rules, history, ideas, and values. The historicalinstitutionalist orientation

seeks to reintegrate these variables in a study of politics without

simply abandoning the description of American politics offered by the behavioral/pluralist
theory of democracy.

11

In adopting an historical-institutionalist methodology, this study makes particular

use of the work of Marc Allen Eisner, whose concept of regulatory regimes provides an

historical

backdrop

for the analysis

of baseball's unregulated monopoly. Eisner defines

these regimes as "historically specific configuration[s] of policies and institutions which

establish certain broad goals that transcend the problems specific to particular
12

industries."

Eisner shows

how

interests, institutional contexts,

regulatory policy results from the interaction of societal

and the prevailing philosophy of government regulation.

Eisner posits four regulatory regimes in the United States spanning the decades

from 1880 to the 1990s. He

11

identifies the first

such regime as the "market" regime, which

March, James and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering

1989).

8

Institutions ,

(New York:

Free Press,

began inl880 and ended

in the 1920s.

The market regime was characterized by

the

implementation of government regulation of the economy
with the goal of reproducing
market-like results in the industrial age. The Progressives
dominated the market of ideas.

The

institutions

of the

state

were struggling

to

emerge from

their nineteenth century

under-development. The politics of the era was marked by the struggles
of the
Progressives to seize power from the political party bosses and urban political
machines.
Baseball's important place in American society, as well as the game's promotion
of

progressive values, allowed

its

peculiar commercial character to escape scrutiny during

this period.

This Progressive Era regime was followed by the

New Deal Era from the

the early 1960s, which Eisner calls the "associationalist" regime.

synthesis

describes this era as a

of "New Nationalist" Progressivism and the experience of economic planning

World War
1920s

He

1920s to

I.

in the

economic

in

Cooperative arrangements between government and industry during the

form of government supervised trade associations were designed

stability.

Franklin Roosevelt's

corporatist arrangements in order to

lift

to foster

New Deal programs would expand these quasi-

the nation out of economic depression. Baseball's

unregulated monopoly, with Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis

at the

helm, thrived

in this environment.

This regime was followed in the 1960s and 70s by the "societal" regime, which

was marked by

the proliferation of direct government regulation of the economy. This

new era of regulation differed from the

past in

two important

respects. It

was not

see
For a thoughtful critique of New Institutionalism and a defense of behavioralism
Science Review,
Almond, Gabriel, "The Return of the State," The American Political
12

9

governed by the desire to reproduce market

Government regulation
Politics

in the

was dominated by

larger environment.

It

results or to stabilize a faltering

1960s and 70s was designed to promote

rebellion to authority and baseball

was

economy.

social justice.

was not immune from

this

1

in this era that baseball s

unregulated monopoly would face

its

most severe challenges. Although the game continued to avoid government regulation
during this period,

Finally, the

it

did so by transforming

began to

find

political

comfort

was and

is

largely a reaction to

ideology became fashionable

potency

what came

in the 1980s.

consensus on regulatory

in the shifting

cartel has lost considerable

in the

internal policies significantly.

1980s and 90s are characterized as the "efficiency" regime. Like

predecessor, this regime

economic and

its

in relation to

before.

its

Conservative

Baseball's monopolists

politics.

Although

their

the players, they continue to stand alone

enjoyment of the benefits of monopoly control.
This study will trace the evolution of baseball's unregulated monopoly through

Eisner's four regimes, identifying the institutional, ideological and political factors that

have shaped the evolution of this regulatory anomaly. Chapter one describes the
history of baseball,

and

its

its

evolution from fraternal recreation to major commercial enterprise,

place in American society as

of baseball's special commercial

New Deal Era.

we

entered the twentieth century. The compatibility

status with the ideas, institutions and politics of the

Progressive Era's "market" regime

baseball in the

early

The

is

analyzed. Chapter

institutions, ideas,

two examines the

and

politics

place of

of Eisner's

insulation from government
"associationalist" regime are linked to baseball's continued

regulation during the Depression and

82:3 (September, 1988),

p.

World War

853-874.

10

II

years.

The

stability within baseball

1

created by the commissioner system

environment

in the

country

is

contrasted to the turbulent political and economic

at large.

Chapter three examines the onset of instability within baseball,
exploring the
effects

of shifting

political

winds from the 1960s to the 1980s. The

players union, as well as unionism across professional sports,

is

rise

of the baseball

analyzed.

The

third

chapter also looks at the challenges faced by baseball with the emergence of
television and
the rise of other professional sports to rival the popularity of the national pastime.
effect

of these changing technological and

profound. In a period

special place in

when

political

phenomena on

The

baseball has been

old values were questioned and even ridiculed, baseball's

American culture was

also questioned, and possibly lost.

The

forth

chapter brings the story of baseball's unregulated monopoly up to the present. The impact

of the game's most recent and most severe labor

strike is analyzed.

The study concludes with an examination of the immediate
special commercial status.

last several

analysis

The heightened

interest in baseball's antitrust

years by the Congress and the courts has introduced

of baseball's

future.

institutional, ideological

and

The

final

future of the game's

new

exemption

in the

variables into the

chapter will attempt to identify the larger

political trends that

have determined the

fate

of baseball's

unregulated monopoly for nearly a century. Also examined are the long term future
prospects of baseball's antitrust exemption, as well as antitrust policy

in general, in light

the current transformation of American society from the industrial age to what

called the "information" or "technological" age.

1

is

of

variously

CHAPTER I
PROGRESSIVISM AND THE BASEBALL ANOMALY

Federal antitrust law

is

a significant legacy of the politics and the political thought

of American Progressivism. Antitrust law represents an approach to the
regulation of the

economy born

in the last

industrialization.

fraternal "clubs "

and fellow

By
grown

Baseball

It

was

toilers in the

1890,

decades of the nineteenth century

when

was bora

in

in the face

Jacksonian America.

It

was

of burgeoning

a sport played

a recreational activity that created camaraderie

by

among neighbors

new urban workplace.
the

Sherman

Antitrust Act

into a professional commercial enterprise.

became the law of the

land, baseball

had

The National League had already

replaced the National Association of Professional Baseball Players as Organized Baseball's

dominant

institution

and the game had already experienced the turmoil of strained

labor/management relations that would be commonplace

new

dawned American

century

in the industrial age.

turmoil in

its

visible strife,

further definition to the rules

realm of interstate commerce, baseball had weathered considerable

ranks as a result of player revolts and inter-league wars. Despite

its

highly

Major League Baseball, unlike any other industry of its scope, would never

be forced to comply with federal

13

the

unchecked by the laws of

commerce. By 1912, when the Clayton Antitrust Act gave
in the

As

industry flowered in the soil of Progressivism' s vision of

industrial regulation, while baseball's evolution continued

of the game

13

See Pearson, Daniel

M,

antitrust law,

nor would

Baseball in 1889: Players

Bowling Green State University Popular

vs.

Press, 1993).

12

it

fall

under the jurisdiction of

Owners (Bowling Green, OH:
,

any federal regulatory agency. The celebrated Holmes decision of 1922 would suspend

Major League Baseball

The Early History
What

in

a seemingly pre-industrial

state.

of Baseball

historians call the "baseball fraternity" dates to the early decades of the

nineteenth century.

Historian Benjamin Rader traces the origins of this fraternity to

shared childhood experiences playing various ball games as well as the "peculiarly

American penchant

for forming voluntary associations."

widely discussed by most historians of baseball was the

founded

in

1

14

The

first

fraternal baseball club

New York Knickerbockers,

845 by a bank clerk named Alexander Cartwright. Typical of pre-professional

baseball clubs the Knickerbockers

were a

social as well as athletic club.

These clubs provided a diversion for the workers of the young

Industrial Age.

Baseball historian Warren Goldstein describes the atmosphere of mid-nineteenth century

baseball as "not very far

He

removed from the world and

writes of the Eckford Club of Brooklyn,

made up of ship

the nearby Eckford shipyards. In Washington,

the

membership of several

By
Sixteen

13

culture of the urban workplaces."

builders

DC, government

and mechanics from

clerks

made up most of

15

local clubs.

the 1850's baseball

was already being touted

New York area clubs banned together in

See Pearson, Daniel M., Baseball

in

1

as America's national sport.

857 to form the National Association of

1889: Players vs.

Owners (Bowling Green, OH:
,

State University Popular Press, 1993).

Bowling Green
14
Rader, Benjamin G., Baseball:
Illinois Press,
15

A History of America's Game

,

(Chicago: University of

1992), p. 2.

Goldstein, Warren, Plaving for Keeps:

A Histo ry of Earlv Baseball, (Ithaca:

University Press, 1989), p. 24.

13

Cornell

Base Ball Players. By 1861, the

NABBP had member clubs in New Haven, Detroit,

Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington,

The purpose of the

sixty-two.

DC,

raising the

number of member clubs

to

NABBP was to create uniform rules of play and to

bring

organization and order to inter-club competition. The association was also intended to
cultivate

and preserve the

The

Civil

War

is

fraternal character

the

men throughout

war and

game

is

start their

16

also generally thought to have contributed to the expansion

baseball's popularity nationally.

introduced

of the game.

of

New York area troops are often credited with having

the country to baseball, inspiring

own clubs. The

them to return home

after

contention that the war helped nationalize the

occasionally supported with unconfirmed stories such as the one about a

game

played on Christmas day, 1862, by two teams of New York volunteer infantrymen
Hilton Head, South Carolina, which

is

said to have attracted

at

more than 40,000

17

spectators.

The

NABBP 's founding devotion to

amateurism and genteel

erode even before the war. As competition on the

The dynamic of the

desire to win.

clubs

became

members from
club's nine

baseball fraternity

less interested in leisure

victories for the

field

grew more

fraternity

began to

intense, so too did the

was being transformed. Gradually

and more interested

in competition.

The quest

for

honor and prestige of the club began to transform most of the club

players to boosters. Only the most skilled

on game

day.

The

members would comprise

the

increasing competitiveness of inter-club baseball also

brought out the commercial potential of the game. Clubs began to charge admission to

16

Rader,

p. 12.

14

spectators of the

game

receipts to be divided

By 1859

to be used for club expenses.

between the

players.

the competitive rivalry

It

was

also

common for

surplus gate

18

was so

intense that the

NABBP was forced to

adopt a rule prohibiting the practice of luring players from
one club to another to gain a
competitive edge. The association hoped to curb this
requiring

all

players participating in a

clubs for at least thirty days. 19

The

game

rule

tactic,

to have been a

was not enough

known as

"revolving," by

member of their

to

stem the

tide

respective

toward

professionalism Other National Association rules of similar intent, such as the
prohibition

of playing for "money, place, or emolument,"20 were seldom enforced.
At

first,

the wealthy backers of club teams

would

offer

good jobs

hours and duties that would allow for significant practice time. In

example,

many of the

players

on the

to players with

New York City,

for

New York Mutuals team were given patronage

positions in city government. In 1867, the

young Albert Spalding was hired by a Chicago

wholesale grocery and paid forty dollars a week with the understanding that his nominal
duties

would not

interfere with his play.

outright pay for play.

payments for

17

As

early as

their services

on

1

This thinly veiled pay for play soon gave

way

862 the top players were reportedly receiving cash

the diamond. Future sporting

Voigt, David Q., American Baseball:

System (Norman:

21

From Gentleman's

Sport to the Commissioner

University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), p.

18

See Voigt,

19

U.S., Congress, House, Committee

goods magnate Al Reach

1 1.

p. 14-22.

on

Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball

(

the Judiciary, Subcommittee

H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82

nd

on the Study of

Cong., 2

nd

Sess.,

1952), p. 16.
20

U.S., Congress, House. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of

Monopoly Power, Organized

Baseball ,

(

H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82

1952), p. 17.
21

Rader,

p. 22.

15

nd

Cong., 2

nd

Sess.,

is

to

widely reported to have been one such player. Reach was offered a straight
salary by the

Club of Philadelphia

Athletic

caved

in to the inevitability

amateurism

power
in

to enforce

its

22

The embattled National Association

of professional

baseball.

of declining membership

rules

even on

member

its

The NABBP, unable

in the

much

year before the

that the Cincinnati

NABBP

folded

to preserve

National Association and without

clubs, finally

its

succumbed

tent the issue

Red Stockings were

salaried professional baseball

team One

advocates of professionalism

in baseball

to professionalism

of professionalism had

able to put forth the

year after the demise of the

formed

their

considered by most historians as the

first

NAPBBP

membership

governed baseball for

of the United States."

The

Financial ruin had cut the

By

which

fee for each club,

of these made a

profit.

NABBP the

1

871

.

The

five years.

The

qualified that club to

compete

for the

"Championship

last

to fourteen in the

first

year.

season, only four of the original teams remained and none

In a speech years later about the failure of the association, A.G.

preceding winter and the habit was general on the part of

17-18.

"Goldstein,

first

professional association limped through five seasons.

[E]ach summer's campaign was planned during the

p.

NAPBBP is

association had a ten dollar

Mills remarked:

Voigt,

all-

23

number of teams from twenty-five

1875, the association's

admittedly

professional baseball league and the

organized attempt to structure the business of baseball.

The

first

shifted

own organization. The National

Association of Professional Base Ball Players began operation in

22

gradually

1870.

One
so

in the face

in 1863.

p. 134.

16

on obligations in the way of players' salaries
were not justified, as the spring games would inevitably
demonstrate that the majority of such clubs could have no
hope of winning even a respectable number of games.
Moreover, this condition was greatly aggravated by the

clubs to take
that

on the part of the richer clubs, of stripping
weaker ones of their best playing talent. Then would
follow the collapse of a number of these clubs in mid-

general practice
the

season, leaving their players unpaid, while the winning
clubs,

owing

to the disbandment

also frequently

of games.

Mills' description

fail

from

of the weaker ones, would

inability to

arrange a paying number

24

of baseball's dilemma reflected the

frustration in

and around

professional baseball with the difficulty of managing competition between clubs both
the field and in the marketplace. In addition to

its

financial

woes

on

the National Association

had allowed baseball to become associated with ungentlemanly conduct such as gambling,
drinking, and sundry other unscrupulous behaviors.

In

1

876, William A. Hulbert, president of the Chicago Base Ball Club, mindful of

the failings of the

NAPBBP,

convinced the owners of seven eastern professional clubs to

break away from the fledgling National Association to create a

The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs
league of baseball.

team a

territorial

The league would

limit the

new

professional league.

aspired to be the premier major

number of teams allowed

monopoly, and honor an inter-league agreement not to

player rosters during the season.

to join, give each

raid

each others

The new league's fewer number of teams was intended

of
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study
nd
nd
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball , (H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82 Cong., 2 Sess.,

24

1952),p. 18.

17

to reduce

demand

monopolies and

for players, reduce salaries

restrictions

and enhance

25

profits.

of mid-season revolving were intended

The

territorial

to help stabilize

competition between clubs.

Another goal of the creators of the National League was to return

respectability to

the game. In the years prior to the formation of the National League the sport's

popularity with the nation's

more

sophisticated classes had waned. Hulbert and his fellow

National League owners sought to

sensibilities

then ascendant

gentry, the National

play

in the

prohibited at the ball park.

baseball

more compatible with

the Victorian

United States. In an effort to market the sport to the

League enacted

on Sundays. Gambling,

upscale crowd.

make

strict

drinking,

codes of player conduct. They would no longer

and other ungentlemanly behavior would be

A standard 50 cent admission price would ensure a more

26

The National League was created with two goals
profitable professional baseball,

in

mind;

1) to create stable

and 2) to bring respectability and Victorian

and

sensibilities to

the game. Historians are mixed in their assessments of the second goal's achievement, but

there

is

unanimity on the question of economic

stability in the first

few

years.

None of the

National League clubs showed a profit in 1876, 1877, or 1878, and only one club profited

in 1879.

27

The National League's concerted

attempt the

25

Zimbalist,

strict

enforcement of its

Andrew, Baseball and

rules,

effort to gain respectability forced

which created considerable turbulence

Billions:

A Probing Look

Our National Pastime (New York: BasicBooks,
,

26

it

1992),

I

to

in the

nside the Big Business of

p. 3.

Voigt, p. 60-80.

Study of
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the nd
nd
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball ( H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82 Cong., 2 Sess.,

27

,

1952), p. 20.

18

Of the

league.

original eight National

League teams, two were expelled

for failing to

complete their schedules after just one season, three more went out of business due to
financial difficulty after the

1877 season, and one was expelled from the league

liquor at the ball park in 1878.

afloat

the

By

for selling

1882, the only original National League teams

still

were Boston and Chicago, both of which were helped by very successful teams on
28

field.

One of the most
fact that

it

was an

the National

distinctive features

of the National League

association of clubs, not players.

League was

in fact a business

The

in

many

was

of this distinction was

new

industrial atmosphere,

that

which

other enterprises, the blame for economic distress was

placed by the owners squarely on the backs of the players. The owners believed that

was

the

with very distinct and separate roles for the

players (labor) and the owners (management). In this

was by then common

effect

at its inception

essential to reign in player salaries in order to

make National League teams

it

viable.

While the National League had avoided the destructive effects of mid-season movement of
players between teams,

rules allowed for the free competition for player talent in the off

its

season.

The owners' need

was put

to reduce salaries led

in to effect for the

1880 season. The

them to enact

the

first

reserve rule, which

rule allowed each club to reserve five

players for the following season in order to reduce the

of its

number of players on the market

each year. The number of players each club could reserve would increase to eleven
1883, twelve in 1885, fourteen in 1887, and by the 1890's

all

in

players were covered by the

the Study of
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
nd
nd
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball ( H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82 Cong., 2 Sess.,

28

,

19

reserve rule. In addition to the reserve rule, the owners adopted a standard
player contract
in

The purpose of the standard

1879.

player contract

was

to "enforce newly adopted

[league] rules giving each club authority to suspend indefinitely any player
guilty

who was

of drunkenness, insubordination, or dishonorable conduct." 29 These new

found

rules

were

backed up by the extra-legal practices of blacklisting and boycotting. All National League
clubs agreed not to hire any player

also agreed not to play any

The reserve

rule did help

improved inter-league

door

for

backers

discipline

a National League contract, and the clubs

that hired a contract jumper.

stem the

rising tide

of salaries, and the standard contract

and communication, yet these innovations also opened the

competing leagues that could entice players away by offering them

contracting.

founded

team

who jumped

in

30

The

first

November

successful rival major league

was

the

free

American Association

1881. The American Association was organized by financial

in six cities that

were not part of the National League, including

Cincinnati,

which

had a club that had been expelled from the National League for allowing alcohol to be

consumed

31

at the ball park.

The Association was

originally

comprised of teams from

St.

Louis, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Louisville, as well as Cincinnati. Most of

the teams that

would play

in the

new

league were

The American Association sought
allowing alcohol to be sold

1952),

owned by

to lure fans

at the ball park, playing

Breweries.

from the National League by

on Sundays, and charging only 25

p. 20.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
nd
nd
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball ( H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82 Cong., 2 Sess.,

29

,

1952), p. 24.
30
31

Zimbalist, p. 4.
Zimbalist, p. 4.

20

cents for admission. These measures were intended
to attract those fans

abandoned by the National League's campaign

The Association sought
contracting. There

to lure players

was no

By

1

instill

Victorian values and standards. 32

from the National League by offering

reserve rule in the American Association.

commercially successful, allowing
player talent.

to

it

to

free

The new league was

compete with the National league

for the best

883, the competition between the two leagues expanded from players

to territory. Resigned to the viability

of the upstart league, the National League president

A.G. Mills decided to negotiate with the American Association
result

who had been

of these negotiations was the

first

in the spring

of 1883. The

national agreement. Historians point to this

first

inter-league pact as the birth of Organized Baseball.

The National Agreement of 1883 extended
Association.

The new

after the truce

the reserve rule to the American

universal reserve rule had the

same

effect as the old one.

between the American Association and the National League a

began operation without a reserve

rule.

One

year

third league

The thirteen-team Union Association was

founded with the backing of railroad magnate Henry Lucas

in 1884.

However, the Union

Association lacked the fan luring innovations of the American Association and also had

difficulty

competing with the two major leagues

commercial

failure but

it

was

successful

enough

for talent.

to garner

The new league was a
its

founder, Henry Lucas, a

National League franchise. Essentially, Major League Baseball had fended off its
challenge by co-opting

its

first

challenger.

In 1885, with no upstart leagues on the horizon, the owners in both leagues got

together and announced that they would impose a salary

32

Rader,

p. 47.

21

limit

of $2,000. The imposition

of Organized Baseball's

first

salary cap inspired the players to

form the National

Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Payers under the leadership of John Montgomery

Ward.

The

A New York player,

salary cap

was merely

Ward charged

that the

owners had abused the reserve

the straw that broke the camel's back.

Among

rule.

the abuses

alleged were the buying and selling of players without their permission, the threat of
blacklisting to force players into unfavorable contracts,

to others clubs without the consent

Initially,

the

of the

and the practice of lending players

33

players.

owners negotiated with and appeased the players organization by

agreeing to disregard the salary cap and include a negotiated form of the reserve rule in

every standard contract. However, one year

later the

"salary classification scheme." According to this

owners adopted what they

called a

"scheme" players would receive

salaries

ranging from $1,500 to $2,500 depending upon their length of service. Despite the

owners assurances

that the

revolt by the players.

scheme would not apply

34

On November 6,

1889, Ward's Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Players and a
the creation of the Players' League.. With trust

number of financial backers announced
busting rhetoric, the

to current players, the issue sparked a

new

league announced

it

would not abide by the

national agreement.

Desperate to stop the flow of star players to the Players' League, Organized Baseball
turned to the courts

in

an attempt to enforce player contracts. In the case of Metropolitan

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
nd
nd
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball ( H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82 Cong., 2 Sess., 1952)
33

,

p. 32.
34

U.S., Congress, House, Committee

on the

Monopoly Power, Or ganized Baseball

(

Judiciary,

Subcommittee on the Study of

H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82

1952), p. 33.

22

nd

Cong., 2

nd

Sess.,

Exhibition Co.

v.

Ward in 1890

was unenforceable due

to

its

failed to

New York Supreme

Court held that the reserve clause

lack of definiteness and mutuality.

reserve clause unconscionable

Having

the

The court

also called the

35

use the courts to destroy the Players League, Major League

Baseball returned to the use of extra legal methods. All clubs in the American Association

and National League were prohibited from playing teams

were induced with large

in the Players'

salary offers to renounce the Players'

League. Players

League and return

to their

former employers. National League and American Association games were scheduled
the

same times as

these measures

Players'

was

lost

League games so as

revenue for

all

to

compete

for attendance.

fact that after

selling out

is

into

and others being added to the established

was concluded

tension broke out between the

National League and the American Association over the division of players

to the Players League.

The inter-League

agreement resulted

in bitter

who had

dispute resulted in the withdrawal of the

American Association from the national agreement. The

35

of

37

Shortly after the Players League war

jumped

result

This conclusion

one season the Players' League was absorbed

Organized Baseball with some teams
leagues.

The

concerned. However, most baseball historians

agree that the Players League slightly outdrew Organized Baseball.

supported by the

36

at

wars for players causing

nullification

of the national

salaries to skyrocket.

The

fierce

and
Rogers, C. Paul, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball

Houston Law Review 14:3 (1977), p. 614.
Study of
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the nd
nd
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball ( H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82 Cong., 2 Sess., 1952)

the Antitrust Laws,
36

p. 35.
37

Zimbalist, p. 6.
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unregulated competition for players caused the 1891 season to be a financial disaster
for

both leagues. Following the 1891 season the National League absorbed the American
Association and became the only major league. In 1892, the National League and various

minor leagues drew up a new national agreement which included the

way of bringing

players

up to the big

league.

However,

in

1

player draft as a

38

The National League monopolized major league
century.

first

baseball for the rest of the

892 Ban Johnson created a minor league

called the

Western

League. During the 1890' s Johnson's Western League grew. The National League
attempted to co-opt the upstart minor league by allowing them to put teams

cities,

in

two of its

Cleveland and Chicago. In 1900, Johnson changed the name of his league to the

American League and sought

further concessions

from the National League. The National

League's refused to deal with Johnson touching off yet another baseball war. In 1901,

Johnson proclaimed
fact that the

League.

his league to

be a Major League. His contention was supported by the

American League had lured more than 100 players away from the National

39

One such

player

was Napoleon

Lajoie, the second

baseman

for the National

League's Philadelphia club. The owner of the National League Philadelphia club sued to
block Lajoie' s attempt to play for the American League Philadelphia club

suit

was heard by

the Court

of Common Pleas

in Philadelphia

in 1901.

The

with Judge Robert Ralston

presiding. Ralston, echoing earlier precedents found Lajoie' s contract lacked mutuality

the Study of
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
nd
nd
2 Sess.,
Cong.,
Monopoly Power, Or ganized Baseball ( H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82

38

,

1952), p. 36.
39

Zimbalist, p. 7.
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and was unenforceable. 40 The National League owner of the Philadelphia
club appealed
the lower court's decision to the Pennsylvania
against Lajoie, barring

Justice Potter

him from playing

for the

irrelevant

by Lajoie's

He

injunction

American League Philadelphia

of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used a

overturning the lower court.

made

Supreme Court and won an

partial

club.

performance argument

in

held that the mutuality of Lajoie's contract had been

partial

performance. That

season under the terms of the contract and the

Phillies

is,

because Lajoie played one

had paid him

in full for that

performance, mutuality was established. 41

The Supreme Court's

decision

owner of the American League club

was muted by a

in Philadelphia.

swift

He

maneuver on the

part

of the

sold Lajoie to the American

League's Cleveland team where he was outside the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts.
Justice Potter's opinion, however,

would have

far greater implications.

In

it,

Potter

characterized professional baseball as a business with a "peculiar nature and

circumstances." Its production processes, distribution techniques and commercial

practices

were distinguished from conventional business

"game," a "sport,"

ground work

for

that

was deserving of special

practices of the day.

It

was a

consideration. Potter's opinion laid the

Major League Baseball's anomalous treatment

42

in the courts thereafter.

In January 1903, the American League war ended with the signing of a third

national agreement.

Under

the terms of the agreement the American and National

Leagues formed the organization of Major League Baseball. The two leagues agreed

40

See Metropolitan Exhibition Co.

41

White, G. Edward, Creating the National Pastime: Baseball Transfo rms

v.

to

Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (1890).

1953) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996),
,

25

p.

56-57.

Itself (1903-

recognize each other's reserve clauses and to form a three-man
commission to oversee

Organized Baseball. The commission would be made up of the two league
presidents and
a third

member chosen by them The

of the commission was to

role

between the two major leagues and the various minor leagues. 43

would see

little

conflict in

Major League

Baseball.

The only

arbitrate disputes

The ensuing ten years

incident

of note was a one

day walk out by the members of the Detroit Tigers over the suspension of Ty Cobb. The
period

is

also

remembered

for Albert Spalding's creation

of the Doubleday origins myth.

Organized Baseball's new found serenity was disturbed
league called the Federal League declared

1913, the

new

the Federal

itself a

league attracted only a hand

League earned huge

handed down a ruling with

far

1913 when an upstart

major league for the 1914 season. In

of big league

talent,

but those

who went

to

In the 1914 and 1915 seasons hundreds of

salaries.

players defected to the Federal League.

full

in

44

In 1914, the

New York State

Supreme Court

reaching implications.

In the case of Hal Chase, a player

overturned the Lajoie precedent

who

in finding

defected to the Federal League, the court

Chase's contract lacked mutuality and was

unenforceable. However, the court's language echoed the sentiments of the Pennsylvania

court in terms of its treatment of Organized Baseball as a peculiar and exceptional

enterprise. Building

baseball

42

on

Justice Potter's logic, the Court in the

was not a commodity or

article

White, G. Edward, Creating the National Pastime: Baseball Transforms
,

44

Rader,

that

of merchandise subject to the regulation of

1953) (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996),
43

Chase case declared

p. 81.

Zimbalist, p. 9.

26

p. 58.

Itself

(1903-

Congress.

of the

It

was a

sport,

antitrust laws.

In 1915,

violation

an amusement, and as such was

explicitly outside

of the purview

45

The Federal League sued Major league

of section one of the Sherman

Antitrust

Baseball for restraint of trade in

Act of 1 890. The case was heard

in the

U.S. District Court of Illinois by future baseball commissioner Judge Kenesaw Mountain
Landis. Judge Landis

made

several friendly

comments about Major League Baseball from

the bench, then encouraged settlement while he took the case under advisement. During
the nearly one year wait for Landis' decision a settlement

was reached between Major

League Baseball and the Federal League.

Not

all

the teams of the Federal

League were content with the

settlement,

consisted of either a $50,000 buy out, or absorption into Major League Baseball.

Federal League team from Baltimore refused the buy out offer and

against

Major League Baseball

in

filed

an

which

The

antitrust suit

1916. In the restraint of trade suit under sections one

and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Baltimore club was awarded
$240,000 by the Indiana State Supreme Court. In April 1921,

triple

this decision

damages of

was reversed

by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
In

its

opinion, the

DC

Court of Appeals held

subject to federal antitrust laws because

it

that

Major League Baseball was not

did not constitute interstate commerce.

court's opinion read in part; 'the players travel from place to place

commerce, but they are not the game [which]
fact that the

45

Markham,

(Lexington,

is

local in

its

[is]

The

interstate

beginnin g and

in its end.

The

[owners] produce baseball games as a source of profit, large or small, cannot

Jesse

MA:

W. and Paul

Teplitz, Baseball

D.C. Heath and Co., 1981),

Economics and Public Policy

p. 7.
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,

change the character of the game. They are
upheld on

may

Baltimore

v.

29, 1922, in the U.S.

National League.

still

46

sport, not trade."

This decision was

Supreme Court case of Federal Baseball Club of

47

While the Federal League controversy occupied the courts Major League Baseball

went through a

crisis

of a

different type.

league wars and player/management

The

early history

Also, the

strife.

of baseball saw numerous

shadow of impropriety, gambling

and sundry other ungentlemanly pursuits had occasionally darkened the glow of Organized
Baseball.

The creation of the National League was,

desire to "clean

up" the game. But,

the integrity of the

game was

it

was not

in fact, partially

until the

truly jeopardized. Eight

Black Sox Scandal of 1919

stemming from the "big

fix," as

it

all

that

members of the 1919 Chicago

White Sox team conspired to throw the World Series to Cincinnati
paid by gamblers. Despite the fact that

motivated by the

eight players

in return for

cash to be

were acquitted of charges

became known, the scandal exposed

bitter divisions in

Major League Baseball as well as the impotency of the National Commission, the
governing body of Major League Baseball.

48

The Black Sox scandal forced Major League Baseball
the

to get

its

house

in order.

new National Agreement of 1921, Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis was named

In

the

lone Commissioner of Baseball, replacing the ineffectual National Commission. Landis

would

rule

Organized Baseball with an iron hand, assisted by Justice Holmes'

1

922

decision granting sweeping immunity from federal antitrust law to Major League Baseball.

46
47
48

Quoted in Zimbalist, p. 10.
Holmes' decision will be fully discussed and analyzed
Rader,

p.

100-110.
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in

a later chapter.

Major League Baseball came of age

in the

Progressive era. However, the

preceding history of baseball's economic structure, labor relations, and

economic

principles

seems

drastically out

of step with the those existing

Progressive Era American industries. Antitrust policy

is

its

is

legal

in

and

other

the creation of Progressivism.

It

a cornerstone of Progressive industrial regulatory policy. In order to examine the

compatibility of the "baseball anomaly" with the

understand the place of antitrust policy

of Progressivism

spirit

in Progressive

it

is

necessary to

thought as well as action.

Antitrust Policy and the Political Philosophy of the Progressives
Antitrust policy developed after the Civil

business organization.

especially

among

The

War

in

response to developments

in

creation of large business firms produced hostility and fear,

the agricultural communities.

The

first

manifestations of these fears

took the form of state regulation. Farmers of the South and West, who

felt

the Eastern

sponsored railroads had taken advantage of them, formed the Granger movement. These
granges became powerful interest groups

at the state

and

local level.

They lobbied

for the

passage of state anti-monopoly statutes which protected them from exorbitant railroad

rates

among

By

other things.

1887, the variety of these state regulations had propelled the issue to the

federal level.

The

railroads themselves

were eager

for federal regulation as a

bringing uniformity to the various state requirements.

Commission Act of 1887, directed

at the railroads,

government to regulate the national economy.

29

The

Interstate

became

the

first

means of

Commerce
attempt by the federal

By

1890, the fear of spreading cartels, the plight of Western farmers, the
size of

Eastern banks, and above

all

the activities of the Standard Oil

of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 49 In addition, the same forces
of the various

state

Company

led to the passage

that motivated the

anti-monopoly statutes were unquestionably important

of the Sherman Act. One study supports

this

view by pointing out

enactment

in the

that at that time U.S.

Senators were elected by state legislatures and the Sherman Act was introduced
Senate.

passage

in the

50

While the passage of the Sherman Act made

power had a prominent place on the Progressive

movement around

it

clear that the issue

public policy agenda,

it

of corporate

was

the merger

the turn of the century that elevated the issue of unfair corporate

combinations to the forefront. Between 1895 and 1904 more than 1,800 firms were
consolidated into fewer than 160 holding companies. The vast majority of these

corporations would control at least 40 percent of their market shares.

Antitrust enforcement

was

limited prior to 1905, but

during this period would lay the ground

wake of the merger movement.
held that the

work

In 1899,

Sherman Act prohibited

all

51

two Supreme Court

decisions

for vigorous antitrust enforcement in the

mAddyston Pipe

cartel

& Steel Co.

v.

U.S., the court

agreements to divide markets or

fix prices.

This decision meant that federal courts would treat cartels as unlawful conspiracies

without regard to arguments of equity or efficiency. In 1904,

49

Dewey, Donald, The

Antitrust Experiment in

in the case

of Northern

America, (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1990), p. 4.
50

Boudreaux, Donald, Thomas DiLorenzo,

Sherman Act

in

McChesney

& Steven Parker, Antitrust before the

& Shughart's The Causes and Consequences of Antitru

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995),

30

p.

256.

st,

Securities Co.

U.S., the Court's ruling

v.

government the power of corporate

had the

effect

The Court's holding was based upon the

divestiture.

Sherman Act's authorization of the Attorney General
proceedings in equity.

of conferring upon the federal

to seek enforcement through

52

The period between 1906 and 1920 saw vigorous enforcement of antitrust under
the

Sherman Act. With the notable exception of baseball, no

The Court's holdings on

and

cartels

government to challenge the big
DuPont, as well as the nation's

its

conferral of divestiture

trusts including Standard Oil,

five leading

Antitrust Act

of 1912, which declared

and therefore

is

exempt from federal

would have important implications
policies

Clayton Acts, as well as

Commissions,

reflect

would be

that the labor

antitrust law.

power enabled

of the

clarified

between Progressive scholars and public

of baseball

Interstate

is

not a commodity

in the courts.

in the

Commerce and
to the role

resulting debate

officials

this

by the Clayton

of a human being

two strands of political thought as

The

the federal

American Tobacco,

of the Progressive Era, manifested

regulation of an industrial economy.

scrutiny.

This provision of the Clayton Act

for the treatment

in the creation

was spared

meat packing companies. Also during

period, the application of antitrust to labor unions

The regulatory

industry

Sherman and
Federal Trade

of government

was among

in the

the most important

and produced a mixed public policy

response.

The two
and the

strands of Progressivism

"New Freedom"

came

to be

known

as the

"New Nationalism"

While these were the slogans of Theodore Roosevelt and

Morton, Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change
America. 1900-1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 24.

51

Keller,

,

31

in

Woodrow

Wilson

in the

been developed years

1912 presidential campaign, the substance of these programs had

earlier

by Herbert Croly and Louis Brandeis. Indeed, the 1912

campaign was a watershed event. Wilson and Roosevelt's
government's role

in

alternate visions

of the

an industrial economy would define the schizophrenic legacy of

Progressivism, leading generations of scholars to search in vain for a unified Progressive
political philosophy.

Many have argued

development of the administrative
election, Roosevelt

Wilson's

won the

industrialization

New Deal,

with

Wilson

its

won the

debate.

a concerted effort to construct a Jeffersonian

liberty for the industrial age.

had created a permanent employee

compete equally to become

his

own boss. The

provided tremendous advantages to a few
Brandeis'

coming of the

state, signaled the fact that, while

"New Freedom" was

concept of individual

that the

New Freedom sought to

Wilson recognized that
class.

No

longer could every

man

advent of corporate combinations had

at the

expense of the many. Wilson and

recreate a level playing field for economic competition,

giving the small entrepreneur the ability to compete just as he had in the nineteenth

century prior to the advent of the corporation. The goal was to restrain corporations from

abusing their power without

stifling their

economic freedom

Wilson's program was animated by the Jeffersonian suspicion of a centralized

state.

This sentiment

made

the use of antitrust policy particularly appealing.

antitrust law, casting policy as

competition was encouraged

Dewey,

By

using

law enforcement rather than direct regulation, market

in

a

way

that

fit

nicely with the Jeffersonian

p. 6.
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norms of limited

government intervention. 53 The name
that the nineteenth century concept

Industrial

method

Age by way of the

among

least intrusive

its

mechanism

participants."

carefully

chosen to indicate

of individual freedom was to be adapted

to restore the "conditions in

than the political

"New Freedom" was

to the

means. Antitrust policy was seen as the best

which the

freely operating

market mechanism rather

disinterestedly distributed material wealth

and

life

chances

54

While Wilson campaigned using the powerful and populist rhetoric of "trustbusting," Roosevelt

was championing a more

Inspired by Herbert Croiy's

the

"New Nationalism" and

government's role

in the

radical

approach to economic regulation.

The Promise of American

Life , Roosevelt

advocated a sharp departure

dubbed

in the direction

his

program

of American

economy. Abandoning Jefferson's suspicion of centralized

government, Roosevelt championed a strong national government, which would take on
the responsibility of regulating the economy.

While the

"New Freedom"

aspired to recreate the nineteenth century

spirit

of

competition, Roosevelt's program sought to allow and even welcome the concentration of

industry, subjecting

power of these

it

to direct

industrial

government regulation. The government would

combinations to further the national

interest.

The

utilize the

creation of a

permanent employee class would be mitigated by conferring special benefits on
disadvantaged groups.

53

Eisner,

Marc

Allen, Antitrust

north Carolina Press, 1991),

and the Triumph of Economics (Chapel
,

Hill:

University of

p. 1.

Abrams, Richard, (ed.), The Issue of Federal Regulation
(Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1989), p. 25.
54

33

in the

Progressive

E ra,

Roosevelt did not propose to repeal the Sherman Act, although
he favored
"continuous administrative action" over "necessarily intermittent law
that the act should be

interest

would be

amended so

prohibited,

55

suits."

He argued

that only corporate combinations injurious to the public

making a

distinction

between "good" and "bad"

trusts.

Roosevelt proposed giving government supervisory power over businesses engaged
interstate

in

commerce, as well as a to require comprehensive reporting of all business

To some

activities to the

government.

to the activities

of the Bureau of Corporations, which was created by the Roosevelt

Administration in 1902.

degree

this

was

already occurring voluntarily due

56

Roosevelt viewed Wilson's program as a reactionary attempt to reverse the
consolidation movement, which meant breaking up the mechanism ottering the greatest

potential for national collective action. Wilson

saw

the

"New Nationalism"

as too intrusive

and as an abandonment of American principles of limited government. Often overlooked
is

the third candidate in the 1912 presidential election, William

Howard

Taft.

Unlike Wilson and Roosevelt, Taft's position on the government's role

economy was not
a record

in the

the product of a pre-conceived program. During the Taft administration

number of prosecutions were secured under

the

Sherman Act,

despite the

President's reported disbelief in the economic soundness of antitrust laws. Ultimately,

Taft abandoned the hope of distinguishing between

good and bad

forceful advocate for the vigorous enforcement of the

55

Keller, p. 28.

56

Abrams,

p. 23.
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trusts

Sherman Act.

and became a

Writing about the Supreme Court's role in constructing the
parameters of the

Sherman Act, Taft

praises the Court for

interpretation [of the

in the

law

gives

it

and workable

sincere attention can

methods of his business." 57 This endorsement of both the

and the judicial construction of it meant that Taft's view was ultimately closer to

Wilson than to Roosevelt. However,
distinct

role in creating a 'Valuable

Sherman Act] which any one who

understand and can follow
statute

its

from Wilson
58

suits."

in that

it is

also important to note that Taft's position

was

he was content with what Roosevelt had called "intermittent

Wilson, on the other hand, advocated the use of the power of the Attorney

General to enforce the antitrust laws. Although Taft's view of antitrust was quickly

drowned out by

the antitrust enforcement mechanisms of the Justice Department and the

Federal Trade Commission,

of Progressive thought on

it

may be

fair to

characterize his perspective as a third strand

antitrust.

Despite their differences on specific means, the

Nationalism were united
regulatory legacy

is

in their objectives

in the policies

of the

New Freedom and the New

and ultimately the measure of Progressivism's

era.

Marc Allen Eisner has

skillfully

teased out

the unifying themes of the competing visions of regulatory policy in the Progressive Era,

subsuming them within what he

calls the

"Market Regime." Eisner's Market regime

contains elements of both Wilson's and Roosevelt's visions.

57

Taft, William

Howard, The

& Bros. Publishing,

1914), p.

Antitrust Act and the

Supreme Court (New York: Harper
,

5.

58

Keller, p. 28.

59

See Eisner, Marc Allen, Regulatory

Hopkins University

59

Politics in Transition, (Baltimore:

Press, 1993).
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The Johns

The Market regime (1880-1920) was
governance.

60

This

is

characterized by the promotion of market

reflected in Wilsonian support for antitrust law,

which attempted to

recreate market-like results through administrative means. Roosevelt's vision
found
realization in the

Era.

numerous independent regulatory commissions created

The goal of both

strategies

was

in the Progressive

to ameliorate the harmful conditions brought

on by

the industrial revolution and the advent of concentrated commercial power, without
stunting the nation's economic growth.

concurrently, sought to prevent

With the
Baseball found

antitrust laws

navigated

its

fateful

itself the

monopoly control of markets.

1922 Federal Baseball Supreme Court decision, Organized
only industry of its size in the United States subject to neither

nor any government regulatory agency supervision. Organized Baseball had

way through the

Progressive Era without being touched by affirmative

government intervention. The high
including

its

Both approaches, which were pursued

profile

of Major League Baseball throughout the

frequent labor/management squabbles,

intervention in the business of baseball

makes the absence of government

seem unusual.

Organized Baseball's early history seems to be

at

odds with the

spirit

of either of

Progressivism's major strands of political thought regarding the government's role

economic regulation.

era,

How did Organized Baseball slip through the cracks,

in

avoiding the

The exact years of the Progressive Era are a matter of scholarly debate. Some bracket
the first two decades of this century. Others locate Progressivism more broadly in the four
decades from 1880 to 1920. This study finds the latter interpretation more instructive and
Politics
useful. Studies using the broader period include Marc Allen Eisner's Regulatory
60

in Transition, (Baltimore:

The Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1993);

and Eldon

J.

Kansas,
Eisenach's The Lost Promise of Progressivism (Lawrence: University Press of
,

1994).
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subjection to antitrust law envisioned by Wilson as
well as the direct regulation advocated
in the

"New Nationalism"?

The Compatibility of the Baseball Anomaly with Progressivism
Historians often link the exploding popularity of baseball in the 1880's and
1890's

synergy with the culture of the Progressive Era, 61 but scant attention has been paid

to

its

to

how this cultural affinity contributed to

Organized Baseball's

ability to

business without any government supervision or intervention. In an era
intervention into the regulation of commerce

professional baseball, with

all

conduct

when

its

state

became the norm, how did the business of

of its highly publicized

difficulties,

such as player

revolts,

league wars and gambling scandals, escape federal regulation?

Progressivism had

part

many

of the movement which

faces.

Political scientists tend to concentrate

drastically altered the political process.

upon that

The Progressives

transformed our politics from a Jacksonian party system of representative democracy and
a government of the

"common man"

the electoral process and a

structure.

in

more

to a system

grounded

in direct citizen participation in

rationalized, bureaucratized

and professional governing

Legal scholars probe the opinions of the nation's jurists, searching for the ways

which Progressive jurisprudence guided and structured the

of its day. Historians and sociologists view the Progressives

politics

and

social relations

differently, studying the

broader social movement and changing social and economic relations of which the

political

61

liberal

reforms were only a part.

See Riess, Stephen, Touching Base: Professional Baseball and American Culture

Progressive Era, (Westport, CT:

Greenwood

Press, 1980).
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in the

This broad social movement, which grew up

in reaction to the rapidly

changing

character of life and community, had a deep and lasting
effect on the culture of America in
the Industrial Age.

Above

all,

Progressives were reformers

country through a transition from

Most profound perhaps was

its

the impact of this period

pastoral feel of the

when

life

was

sterile

game

simpler.

sought to guide the

agrarian adolescence into an urban, industrial age.

historians have argued that baseball provided turn

escape from the harsh,

who

upon American

Many

culture.

of the century Americans with an

atmosphere of the urban

industrial

work

place, as the

linked Americans to a romanticized, possibly mythical, rural past

The "good old days" phenomenon seems

sentimental lexicon of every generation. In the increasingly

to find

its

way

into the

modern atmosphere of the

Progressive Era baseball clearly helped fuel romantic sentimentality for a bygone era.

To
that

it

say that baseball had great cultural significance in the Progressive Era

held special meaning and significance for individuals, especially for the

would shape the

culture of America in the

new

1890's resulted from the popularity of playing baseball

earlier generation

businessmen and social and

political

to say

men who

century. Historian Ronald Story has

argued that the explosion of baseball's popularity as a spectator sport

young men of this

is

would become

in the

in the

1880's and

1850's and 1860's.

62

The

the parents, teachers, public officials,

reformers of the Progressive Era. In essence, the

opinion makers and cultural trend setters were

men who grew up

playing a

game

that their

fathers neither understood nor approved. Their love for the game, forged in the

camaraderie and fellowship of the sand

lot,

would dispose them

38

to protect and spread this

game, the cultural significance of which approached

that

of family

traditions

and ethnic

heritage for their generation.

For the leaders and reformers of the Progressive Era, baseball was a tool of reform
not the object of reform. Baseball was a

game

that

would be used by these

social

reformers to inculcate certain values into American society. Fair play, teamwork, sound

minds and bodies; these were the buzz words of a

social

movement. Baseball was a prop,

a metaphor used in the social gospel of Progressivism. The

Age were
was a

in the complexities

social

and

of the dawning Industrial

and intrigues of a changing commercial landscape, baseball

cultural institution that served as a

The

ills

political

bulwark of values from a simpler time.

reformers of the Progressive Era were not the only ones

initiated to baseball's cultural significance.

The owners and promoters of Major League

Baseball were well aware of the sentimental hold the

game had on

this generation.

In a

highly organized campaign throughout the era, baseball marketing touted the special

nature of the business of baseball. In developing

its

Organized Baseball was keenly aware of the need to
prevailing cultural attitudes about the game.

internal regulatory structure,

link its

commercial strategies with the

6

G. Edward White argues that Organized Baseball exploited the cultural

significance

of the game

for the Progressive generation

by translating these cultural

attitudes into fundamental assumptions about baseball's largest constituency, the fans.

See Story, Ronald, The Country of the Young: The meaning of Baseball in Early
American Culture, in Hall, Alvin (ed.), Cooperstown Symposium on Baseball and
62

American Culture (Westport, CT: Meckler Publishing, 1991).
Many historians have made a big deal of the partnership between the sports press and
Organized Baseball, arguing that the press and baseball had a quid pro quo type
,

63

39

These assumptions were:
satisfaction

from

hometown team

1) fans appreciate close competition, 2)

identifying with a

is

enhanced

hometown team, and

if the identity

they get vicarious

3) their attachment to a

of the players on the team remains

relatively

64

stable.

These

cultural assumptions

would govern the development of "Baseball Law"

which has ruled Major League Baseball since
from external

social

and

political entities.

its

The

inception, with only occasional prodding

three fundamental tenets of baseball law

are: 1) a universal reserve clause to stabilize rosters

field,

2) territorial

autonomy

for

major league clubs, which preserves the economic

of clubs and enhances the hometown

viability

and ensure better competition on the

monopsony, or one buyer market

loyalties

for top player talent.

of fans, and
65

The

3) the maintenance

cultural salience

to the Progressive generation allowed Organized Baseball to preserve

entrepreneurial character.

By

constructing

its

its

of a

of baseball

peculiar

governing assumptions around the cultural

expectations of the fans, or the people, Major League Baseball was able to insulate

itself

from government intervention.

The

idea that the experience of playing baseball as children in the 1850's and

1860's contributed to the popularity of baseball as a spectator sport in the 1880's and
1890's must be clarified in order to see

its

role in linking culture to Organized Baseball's

anomalous commercial development. In the 1880's and 1890's, when professional
baseball

was weathering

arrangement that

severe commercial turbulence in the form of player revolts and

facilitated the highly effective baseball

marketing that was instrumental

preserving the peculiar nature of the Business of baseball.
64

White,

p. 59.

65

White,

p.

66-82.
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in

inter-league wars, political leaders in the states and
nation

were seeking ways

to curb the

abuses of corporate combinations that threatened the
competitive heart of our free
enterprise

it

system These same

became, saw

it

leaders,

whose generation made

not as a business, but as a child's

game

baseball the cultural icon

that could be

used to

instill

proper values in America's youth. 66 The leaders of the Progressive Era were
predisposed
to see baseball as having special cultural significance. This,

Baseball's exploitation of the cultural appeal of the
principles

and structure,

left

game

combined with Major League

in creating its internal

governing

very few advocates for government intervention into the

operation of the sport.

The

difference

Progressive Era

baseball

seem

is

between

striking.

attitudes within baseball

and outside of baseball

While the owners, promoters and players

in the

in professional

to have developed business-like attitudes as early as the 1870's with the

formation of the

first

professional leagues, the fans of baseball,

among them the

political

leaders of the day, maintained a general ignorance of or indifference to the commercial

implications of the game.

The concerted marketing campaign of Organized Baseball

combined with a generation's personal experience of playing the game undoubtedly
contributed to the preservation of baseball's unique entrepreneurial character. This

apparent blindness to the commercial

some of the judicial

difficulties

of Organized Baseball

is

most

vivid in

decisions of the day involving professional baseball.

In the 1902 case of Napoleon Lajoie, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court managed to

treat baseball

more

like

other commercial enterprises even as they provided the grounds

for future courts to treat baseball differently. In addition to ordering Lajoie to honor his

Story, p. 325.
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National League contract, Justice William P. Potter's opinion for the
Court explicitly held
that baseball

was not

"light hearted"

to be regarded as a conventional business enterprise.

and "more

trivial" asserting that the business

culturally significant than other

American

Justice Potter's conferral

decision in the

Hal Chase

enterprises."

of special

it

of baseball was "more

67

cultural significance

case. In Chase, the

He called

was echoed

in the

1914

Court held that Major League Baseball,

although clearly a monopoly, was a peculiar and exceptional enterprise. The Court also
clarified Justice Potter's

commerce

opinion holding that baseball

subject to regulation by Congress.

was a "sport" and an "amusement,"
business.

is

not a commodity or article of

The Court took pains

indicating that

it

to say that baseball

was something other than big

68

In the 1915 suit by the Federal League against Major League Baseball, Judge

Kenesaw Mountain Landis of the
"any blows

at

69

institution."

because you

.

.

.

baseball

Illinois

would be regarded by

Landis added

that, "as

suit

was

this

court as a blow to a national

a result of thirty years of observation,

call playing baseball labor"

during which time the

U.S. District Court declared from the bench that

70

settled out

He

I

am

shocked

then sat on his decision for nearly a year,

of court. Landis' declarations make

it

clear that

he perceived baseball as very different from other commercial enterprises.

The Court holdings
the ground

work

White,

p. 58.

White,

p.

Rader,

p. 109.

in Lajoie

and Chase, as well as the Landis pronouncements

for the 1921 District

of Columbia Court of Appeals decision

56-58.

Zimbalist, p. 10.
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that

set

overturned the antitrust verdict

in the

Federal League's suit against Major League

Baseball. This Court accepted the cultural significance language
of the Lajoie case as well

as the contention advanced by the Court in the Chase case that
baseball

commodity or

article

of trade subject

of being transferred."

a

to federal regulation. Furthermore, the court held,

an opinion written by Chief Justice Constantine Smyth,
susceptible

was not

that the

game of baseball

"is

in

not

71

This apparent denial of the commercial nature of Organized Baseball would be

echoed

in the

Holmes opinion of 1922. Holmes wrote: "But

the fact that in order to give

the exhibitions [of baseball] the leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and

must arrange and pay for

He went on to

business."

That to which
trade or

it

their

doing so

is

not enough to change the character of the

say, ''the transport

is

a mere incident, not the essential thing.

incident, the exhibition, although

is

commerce

in the

made

for

money would

commonly accepted use of those words."

not be called

72

Holmes' reference to the terms "trade" and "commerce" are

significant.

of baseball on the aforementioned jurists was not the only factor

cultural grip

The

in these

seemingly unrealistic appraisals of the enterprise of Organized Baseball. Progressive Era
jurisprudence was shaped in

many

These antiquated

definitions.

cases by pre-industrial, nineteenth century legal

definitions

of terms such as "trade" and "commerce"
73

retained their nineteenth century associations into the 1930s.

71

White,

72

Waller, Spencer W., Cohen, Neil B.

p. 73.

Legal Mind
73

Justice

Hooper

,

(New York: Garland

Holmes

v.

relied

on

& Paul Finkelman, (ed.).

Baseball and the American

Publishing, 1995), p. 208-209.

the very limited understanding of "commerce" set forth in

California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
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When Holmes

wrote

his

1922 opinion for the court the term "trade" was

associated with the buying and selling of products.

and

selling

of personal

services.

was not

It

The term "commerce" was

associated with the buying

associated with the traffic of

goods, but not the goods themselves. Nor was commerce associated with the production
or manufacture of goods. These more restrictive definitions were also applied
arising out

of the Sherman Act unrelated to

combinations

it

liable

under Sherman

if they

baseball.
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The courts

in cases

did not hold business

could show that their business was local or that

involved manufacture, production or personal effort not related to production. The

logic

of the Holmes Federal Baseball opinion was consistent with Progressive Era

jurisprudence regarding the treatment of "incidental" interstate transportation.

consistency has been overlooked by virtually

The now accepted notion
birth to

that

all

is

This

commentators who examine the opinion.

Holmes' opinion was mere "sentimental

an "historical accident" that

75

folly"

76

which gave

the "baseball anomaly" ignores this consistency

between the Holmes opinion and Progressive jurisprudence.
Baseball's peculiar commercial development

is

less peculiar after considering the

synergy between baseball and Progressive culture, the marketing campaign of Organized
baseball that exploited that synergy, and the limitations of Progressive jurisprudence. Yet

the question remains whether the prevailing public policy assumptions

virtual self government rested

74

See Paul

U.S.

v.

v.

on which

baseball's

were consistent with Progressive regulatory policy?

Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869),

Hooper

v.

California^ 55 U.S. 648 (1894),

E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. (1895).

75

White,

76

A noteworthy exception to this

p.

74-75.

BasebaU Transforms

Itself.

is

G. Edward White's Creating the National Pastime:

1903 1955 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
,
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&

At

first

blush one would be hard pressed to find consistency
between the

development of Major League Baseball's apparently unregulated
monopoly and
the

two dominant

the

"New Nationalism"

The former would use

law, while the latter

abuses of the trusts

jurist,

William

of

strands of Progressive thought regarding economic regulation.
Both the

"New Freedom" and
action.

either

sought to check such abuses with state

the government's law enforcement mechanisms via antitrust

would empower independent regulatory agencies

In addition, the views of the Progressive Era President and

directly.

Howard

to regulate the

Taft,

who advocated

the Antitrust statutes, sheds no light

on

the judicial construction and enforcement of

the situation. Organized Baseball's immunity from

any of these types of state action, despite

its

obvious monopolistic nature, seems to

indicate that Progressive public policy cannot be squared with Organized Baseball's

commercial development.

To examine

this

question more

fully,

however, requires that

we

determine what the

goals of Progressive regulatory policy were and what the parameters were of "state"

action as the Progressives understood them. If "state" action refers only to the

enforcement by the federal government of antitrust law and the creation of independent
regulatory commissions, then, indeed, Organized Baseball's commercial development

cannot be squared with Progressive public policy.

League Baseball's
goals,

and

that

understood
with the

it,

spirit

it

If,

however,

self government furthers the attainment

we can show

that

Major

of Progressive public policy

does so within the parameters of "state" action as the Progressives

then

we can

square the commercial development of Major League Baseball

of Progressivism.
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Two

goals of Progressive public policy are well known: 1)

harmful social and economic effects of the Industrial Age, and 2)
individuals through political reforms that

it

it

sought to mitigate the

sought to liberate

would bring down the corrupt

political party

machines, whose pure patronage politics had weakened the moral fabric of the nation.
In
the

economy,

trusts

and other large commercial combinations threatened the values of the

free market, sponsoring instead the incubation

of a "might makes

right" mentality.

The

pursuit of narrow, local and sectional interests by party machines had effected the

same

type of depravity in the political arena.

Stephen Skowronek describes the pre-Progressive regime as
demonstrated by state courts and

parties.

"localist,"

"These two nationally integrated

institutional

systems tied together the state's peculiar organizational determinants and established
effective

mode of operations." 77 The

of checks and balances and

its

U.S. Constitution created a fragmented government

institutional conflicts.

Soon

after the

enactment of the

Constitution, political parties (not mentioned in the Constitution) were formed as a means

of coordinating the operations of this unwieldy arrangement.

Political parties

allowed the

separated institutions of the government to be brought together behind one electorally

accountable agenda while the courts gave meaning and effect to the law. The

Progressives

saw

the need to create stable government institutions that were not

dependent upon electoral coalitions for

were such

that a

their continuity.

The needs of the

Industrial

Age

permanent administrative structure was necessary.

Skowronek, Stephen, Building A New American State: The Expansion of National
Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988),

77

,

24-35.
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p.

Herbert Croly's Progressive Democracy makes clear that the hegemony
of political
parties

and powerful commercial combinations has greatly weakened the

pursue substantive democracy.

By

state's ability to

destroying the party system and guiding the efforts of

large commercial entities, Progressive reformers

the "state" to pursue truly national interests. 78

hoped

The

to enhance the collective

pursuit of narrow sectional interests,

which flourished under the nineteenth century hegemony of the courts and the
which was shrouded

in constitutional

law and the

power of

spirit

parties,

and

of Jeffersonian individualism, was

a major obstacle to the realization of the Progressives' vision of democracy.

Through

illegitimate

actors pursued their

own

combinations

selfish interests

in

both

politics

and the economy, powerful

without regard for the national

interest.

Progressives were agreed on the necessity of "state" action in the pursuit of the national

interest or public

good. The question that remained was the nature of the "state." For

"most of the Progressives, the
role

state is first Tocated' in the

and location, spontaneously

the public good.

larger public

...

good

citizen

acts according to consciously held

A good citizen is
in his actions in

According to

good

state-oriented' in the sense

every sphere of life."

this interpretation, the "state"

-

good and who

78

whatever

and shared

ideas of

-

79

must be "located" prior to any external

who

share a

80

The

existence of a

common vision of the

integrate that vision into their individual purposes.

Such a people

public

are said

See Croly, Herbert, Progressive Democracy (New York, MacMillan Publishing, 1914).
Press of
Eisenach, Eldon, The Lost Promise of Progressivism (Lawrence: University
,

79

in

of seeking to achieve a

expression in "an internalized idea of membership and shared values."
"state" presupposes the existence of a "people"

who,

Kansas, 1994),

,

p. 132.
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to be governed, both individually

realization

and

of "social justice." 81 In

of the public good, which
in the pursuit

is

collectively,

by a "social

ethic,"

this formulation, the "state" is

state.

to the

equated with the pursuit

normatively agreed upon by the people.

of the public good they are acting as the

which leads

When

individuals act

This construction of the

"state" implies that non-governmental entities and individuals can act in a state capacity to

the degree that their actions pursue the public good, or national interest. Eldon Eisenach
labels

such public spirited

entities "parastates."

Seen as a "parastate" the

82

political question

"national interest," or in accord with the "public

is;

has Organized Baseball acted in the

good" and was

it

a good citizen

in the

Progressive Era? In Eisenach's formulation, parastates were private entities that pursued
the public good. Included

among them were

the family, settlement houses, churches,

schools and universities. These institutions in society were "parastates" because they were

"supportive of government both by producing good citizens and by themselves carrying

out the substantive ends that would be desired by an ideal state."

institution or individual

who pursued

It is

clear that any

the Progressive vision of democracy

was seen by

the

Progressives as an agent of the "state." Organized Baseball's peculiar commercial

development

80

is

82

University Press of

p.

The Lost Promise of Progressivism (Lawrence:

University Press of

132-133.

Eisenach, Eldon, The Lost Promise of Progressivism, (Lawrence: University Press of

Kansas, 1994),
83

sought to produce

p. 132.

Eisenach, Eldon,

Kansas, 1994),

it

The Lost Promise of Progressivism, (Lawrence:

Eisenach, Eldon,

Kansas, 1994),
81

therefore consistent with Progressivism insofar as

p. 131.

Eisenach, Eldon,

Kansas, 1994),

The Lost Promise of Progressivism (Lawrence:

p. 135.
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University Press of

good progressive

citizens

and to govern

be desired by an ideal "Progressive"

itself according to the substantive

state.

Baseball's use by Progressive social reformers as a tool of reform

documented. The ostensibly native American game was used to
traditions.

It

was

ends that would

is

well

socialize disparate ethnic

instrumental in bringing the Protestant ethic of the reformers to the

urban immigrants and other beneficiaries of the party machines that they were attempting
to destroy. Baseball's

reformers

made

The
in

it

symmetry with the

League Baseball during the Progressive Era were

the mirror image of the substantive goals of Progressive reformers.

the formation of the National

installation

of the Progressive

a "special enterprise."

substantive goals of Major

many ways

nativist, Protestant culture

League with the goal of "cleaning up" the game

From

to the

of Progressive Republican Kenesaw Mountain Landis as Commissioner of

Baseball, Organized Baseball shared with the Progressive reformers the substantive goals

of displacing lower

class, ethnic

Protestant morality in the

work

behavior and ways of life with an upper

place, the voting booth,

The Progressive reformers sought
citizenship,

ball park.

promote an enlightened and

which would be ever mindful of the national

Major League Baseball's

ones.

to

and the

class, nativist,

interest

structure for self regulation

84

far sighted

over narrow, sectional

was designed with

the

communitarian ethos. The monopoly practices of Organized Baseball produced,

most

part, internal fairness.

and

same

for the

In addition, these commercial practices, which were

noteworthy that the creation of the Commissioner system in baseball was similar to
the efforts of the Hays Commission in Hollywood. The Hays Commission was created to
"clean up" the content of movies during the 1920s, bringing them more into line with

84

It is
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prohibited in other industries, were necessary to produce
the kind of baseball that

Americans wanted to see and to patronize.
In a open and free baseball market there
sided competition

on

the

field.

In essence, there

understanding of self interest that

is

good

for state-minded citizens

in baseball

no way

is

to enforce in baseball a broader

consistent with the public, or national interest, than to

allow Major League Baseball to regulate

campaign

no way to control costs or prevent lop-

is

itself.

The connection between

the Progressives

and Major League Baseball's attention to the greater

through the enforcement of Baseball

of the Progressives vision of the national

interest

Law

is

evidenced by the congruity

and Major League Baseball's vision of

the interests of baseball.

Major League Baseball's development as a

legal

monopoly, while inconsistent with

the regulatory policies of the Progressive Era national government,

wholly consistent with the

both the

spirit

engage

and substantive goals of the Progressive movement. In

New Nationalism and the New Freedom

to curtail the harmful effects

was

Baseball's commercial development

Progressivism, but because

it is

clear that the substantive goal

of corporate combinations without

in collective action that

it

was nonetheless

was

was

stifling their ability to

consistent with the public good, or national interest.

was anomalous, not because

it

was out of step with

the only industry of its size and scope that

was not

subjected to regulation by the federal government.
Baseball's birth and early development as a professional spectator sport coincided

with and helped

Progressive
the

fulfill

certain cultural needs existent in the decades surrounding the turn of

Hays became the "Czar" of the movie business
Landis became the Czar of baseball.

sensibilities.

same way

that

Will H.
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in

much

the century. In a time of instability and uncertainty baseball provided continuity and
a

sense of shared identity to a generation that was charged with ushering the nation through
its

most profound

brought with

it

transition.

The

transition

from an agrarian to an

explosions of immigrant migration to America's

industrial society

cities

and the awkward

integration of these disparate immigrant cultures with an American culture that

was

itself

in transition.

Those who controlled Major League Baseball

in the

Progressive Era, from William

Hulbert to Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, were vocal advocates of the Progressives
social, cultural

and

political

agenda. The owners and promoters of Organized Baseball

exploited both the cultural significance of the

federal

government

in their

game and

the institutional frailties of the

development of Baseball Law. Progressive jurisprudence and

the cultivated ambiguity of the commercial nature of Organized Baseball combined to

affect the preservation

of Baseball's unregulated monopoly. Moreover, the harmony of

Major League Baseball's substantive goals with those of the Progressive reformers

overshadowed the inconsistency between the regulatory
and Major League Baseball's exempted

status.
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policies affecting other industries

CHAPTER II
THE NEW DEAL ERA AND THE BASEBALL ANOMALY

Organized Baseball's peculiar entrepreneurial character was forged
institutions

in

the interests,

and ideas of the Progressive Era. In the decades around the turn of the

century Organized Baseball preserved

its

unique entrepreneurial character by exploiting

the ideas of the Progressives' social gospel as well as the limited institutional capacities of

the federal government.

was transformed.

With the onset of the Depression, American regulatory

Instead of ameliorating the harmful effects of corporate combinations,

the goal of New Deal regulatory policy in the

wake of market

these highly volatile economic conditions stability

collapse,

was valued over

The Progressive Era regulatory regime, designed

new

way

of the Great Depression. Marc Allen Eisner

calls the regulatory

Era the "associational" regime. This regime

is

to a

rooted

recovery. In

all else.

wake

regulatory regime in the

regime of the

in a synthesis

New Deal

of "New Nationalist"

Progressivism and the experience of economic planning during World

New Freedom,

was

to preserve market conditions

amidst the growth of corporate power, gave

the Wilsonian, or

politics

War

strand of Progressivism sought to recreate the

market conditions of the pre-industrial age, Theodore Roosevelt's

While

One.

fair

New Nationalist

economy
Progressivism sought to use the institutions of the state to guide and manage the
The quasithrough cooperative arrangements between government and industry.
corporatist arrangements envisioned by Croly and Roosevelt
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would become

a prominent

feature of Franklin Roosevelt's

New Deal recovery program,

and they would also provide

philosophical justification for the continuation of baseball's unregulated
monopoly.

The consistency between the

public policy goals of the Progressive Era and

"Baseball Law," which spawned baseball's unregulated monopoly, would be
extended to
the

New Deal Era.

While other industries were increasingly becoming subject to

government regulation
Baseball

was seen

as a

in

an

effort to stabilize

model of stability,

and improve the economy, Major League

effectively coping with

economic hard times

while at the same time carving out a special niche in American culture and society. The
turmoil of economic depression and world war overshadowed baseball's anomalous

commercial development. The unprecedented

combined with the game's self-conscious

internal stability

of Major League Baseball

of a troubled nation

role in uplifting the spirits

during this era contributed to Major League Baseball's

ability to

avoid government

regulation

While the
the Civil War,
85

stability.

politics

of the nation was undergoing

its

most profound upheaval since

Major League Baseball was enjoying what might be

From January

presided over a sport that

called a golden age

of

1921, to his death in 1944, Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis

saw no

player revolts and no challenges from outlaw leagues.

Prior to Landis, baseball had hardly enjoyed a single decade without having to cope with

an outlaw league or disgruntled

players. Landis presided over the

roaring '20s, the depressed '30s and the Second World

much as a whisper about government

85

game through

War of the

the

early '40s without so

intervention in the governance of the baseball.

A more complete and detailed treatment of the politics of the New Deal Era will be

undertaken

in section III

of this chapter.
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With the close of the Landis era and the end of World War

II,

baseball began to

experience adversity. The national pastime, which had served
as a

window

during the nation's most troubling decades, begin to reflect the

of society rather than

ills

to better times

provide a pristine escape from them. Having just fought a war for freedom
Americans

began

to grapple with oppression at

would

find expression in the triumphs

The

home.

A new activism among minority Americans

of Jackie Robinson and the integration of baseball.

ugliness that greeted Robinson in the big leagues ended forever the days

baseball

evoked only the joys of a

child's

when

game. As the post-war economy picked up

professional baseball players began to realize that they deserved a bigger slice of the pie.

Eventually

it

would be

the players pursuit of workers rights that

would erode

the pillars of

baseball law and threaten the game's unregulated monopoly.

The Golden Age of Stability: The Landis Years

From 1 903

to

1

920, baseball was governed by the National Commission made up

of the National and American League Presidents and a

third

member chosen by them. The

National Commission enjoyed about ten years of stability before
Federal League war. While

many

dissolved as a result of the Black

its later

began to

historians charge that the National

Sox

scandal, historian Harold

argues that the Commission would have been replaced

In

it

years, the National

in

with the

Commission was

Seymour

any event.

falter

disagrees.

He

86

Commission was weakened by

scandal. In 1918, the

National League President, John K. Tener, was forced to resign amidst charges of

86

Seymour, Harold, Baseball: The Golden Age (New York: Oxford University
,

1971), p. 311-312.
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Press,

corruption.

The members of the Commission were often accused of allowing

financial interests to interfere with their duties

their

on the Commission. In the summer of

1920, the Commission's Chairman, August Herrmann, resigned under pressure, leaving
the

Commission without a chairman

for the remainder

of its existence.

87

Organized Baseball foresaw the end of the National Commission. The so-called
Lasker plan for a governing structure

in baseball

was

circulating a full year before the

Black Sox scandal. Albert D. Lasker, a Chicago advertising executive and prominent

member of the Republican

party,

was

create a commissioner of baseball and

authority

would be vested

men who had no

to

part

owner of the Chicago Cubs. His plan was

two associate commissioners

in

to

whom total

govern the game. These commissioners would be prominent

financial interest in the

game. The idea was

that the

owners should not

and could not govern themselves. They needed an impartial governor. The owners were
not attracted to this plan for obvious reasons, however, the Black

much more

Sox scandal made

it

88

palatable.

On November
Congress Hotel

in

12, 1920, the

owners of the 16 major league clubs met

at the

Chicago, where they created the governing structure of baseball that

continues to this day. With the Lasker plan as a benchmark, the owners unanimously

chose to have a single commissioner. They dropped the associate commissioners, fearing
that they

would

commissioner a

dilute the authority

virtual "czar"

of the commissioner. They

also chose to

of baseball, vesting him with absolute authority

make

the

to rule in the

Study of
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on thend
nd
Sess., 1952),
2
Cong.,
82
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball (H.R. Rep. No. 2002,

87

,

p.
88

57-59.

Seymour,

p.

311-312.
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of the game

interests

in its

in the

time of profound

incorruptibility

hope

crisis.

that his strong

hand could restore the

The confidence of the American people

integrity

of baseball

in the

of baseball was badly shaken and was thought to require

swift, decisive

action.

The commissioner's post was
adopted on January

J.

game

new National Agreement

and Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis was named

Chosen over such notables as former President William Howard

position.

John

12, 1921,

officially created in the

Pershing and Senator Hiram Johnson, Landis had illustrated his

to the

Taft, General

affinity for the

as the federal district court judge. In 191 5, Landis hastened the settlement of the

original Federal

League challenge by delaying

his decision

from the bench and encouraging

an out of court settlement.
Baseball's

first

commissioner was born

in Millville,

Ohio, in 1866, the son of

Doctor Abraham Landis, who had served as a Union Army surgeon

in the Civil

Landis got his distinctive name from the battle of Kennesaw Mountain, which

had experienced only two years
idol

and family

friend, President

earlier.

famous

fining

Landis was appointed to the federal bench by

He

with his storied resolve

of the

his

distinguished himself as a "trust buster" in

Standard Oil company $29,240,000

antitrust decision

his father

Theodore Roosevelt. As a jurist, Landis was not shy

about imposing his Progressive values.

1907 by

War.

era.

in the face

in

what would become the most

His widely acknowledged love of baseball combined

of the mighty "trusts" made Landis appear

to be the

perfect choice for the job of restoring baseball's image and preserving the game's

unregulated monopoly.
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The owners created a

much

like the

quasi-public post by constructing the office of commissioner

independent regulatory commissions of government.

By empowering

Landis to rule in the best interests of baseball free from the influence of
the owners,

Organized Baseball had effectively regulated

itself in

a manner consistent with the

Nationalism principles that would animate regulatory politics
the terms of the National

was

that in the event

New Deal Era. One of

Agreement of 1921, which created the commissioner's

of the commissioner's death or

United States would choose a
the

in the

owners conscious attempt

regulatory philosophy of the day.

make

position,

incapacity, the President of the

new commissioner of baseball. 89
to

New

the governance of the

This provision

game

illustrates

consistent with the

90

The commissioner would be

the final judge in

all

disputes.

The owners and

the

leagues surrendered their rights to appeal rulings of the commissioner to the courts. 91

Landis quickly exercised his sweeping power by banning the eight Chicago Black Sox
players from baseball for

life,

despite the fact that they were acquitted of wrong doing in a

court of law. This established both his authority and his authoritarian

style.

appearance of impropriety would not be tolerated. Landis would impose

sensibilities

Even

the

his Progressive

and values on the game for a quarter of a century.

Baseball historian David Voigt describes the chagrin of the majority of owners

when they

89

realized

what they had done

in the face

of the Black Sox scandal. Their

fear

of

Voigt, David Q., American Baseball Vol. IT (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,

1970), p. 140.
90

The provision

Landis'

first

for Presidential appointment

of the next commissioner was dropped

seven year term.
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after

losing the game's status as the "national pastime" caused

them

once the "guilty season" was

had

past, they realized that they

to appoint a dictator.

left

it

But

to the dictator to

decide what was and was not "detrimental to the game." Voigt writes:

Landis quickly consolidated his power. His best weapon

own image as the personification of baseball
integrity. He used publicity masterfully and kept himself in

was

his

the

news along with

his

own

style

the swashbuckling

Babe Ruth. Each

in

grabbed headlines, and together they

epitomized the baseball revolution that produced the
92
golden age.

new

Voigt goes on to describe Landis and Ruth as "two poles of attraction" for Americans,
with Ruth representing "the nation's

faith in skill

and power" as well as "the yearning

for

unrestricted pleasure," while Landis epitomized "lingering Protestant values" and served

as "the antidote to Ruthian excess."

saved baseball

discipline

in the

of Landis; others contend

in the

Baseball historians are mixed on the question of who

wake of the Black Sox

about the past. Undoubtedly, both

image

93

scandal.

that the Sultan

men

Some

argue that

it

was

the hard line

of Swat simply made everyone forget

contributed to the rehabilitation of baseball's

1920s

Landis' job

was

to restore the

good name of baseball. He was not involved

creating or changing the rules of the game, unless there

was a

conflict, in

in

which case he

acted as arbitrator. First and foremost, Landis was charged with putting the shadow of

the Black

Sox scandal behind and

forging a

new wholesome image

for the

game. To

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
nd
nd
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball (H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82 Cong., 2 Sess., 1952),
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,

p. 59.
92
93

Voigt,

p. 140.

Voigt, p. 140.
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accomplish

Landis imposed the severest punishments, often quite disproportionate to

this,

the offense.

In his

first

year of 1921, Landis banned more than a dozen players from baseball,

including the infamous eight.

Upon banning the eight Black Sox players Landis

announced: "Regardless of the verdicts of juries, no player
player that

sits in

who throws

a

ball

game, no

conference with a bunch of crooked players and gamblers where the

ways and means of throwing a game

are discussed and does not promptly

about h, will ever play professional baseball."94

tell his

Among the other players banned

club

in

1921

were Hal Chase and Ben Kauff. Chase was repeatedly linked to gamblers, and Kauffwas
banned for consorting with car
including

Babe Ruth,

95

thieves.

for barnstorming in the off-season,

Stoneham and John McGraw of the
interests in race tracks in

On May 29

In addition, Landis suspended three Yankees,

and also ordered Charles

New York Giants to divest themselves of their

New York and Cuba. 96

1922, the Supreme Court, ruling on a case lingering from the Federal

League challenge gave baseball an exemption from the

federal antitrust laws. This gave

government sanction to what some have called baseball's private self-government, with
Landis as an independent and chief executive.
Oliver Wendell

was

therefore

Holmes argued

that baseball

beyond the reach of federal

97

In his opinion for the Court, Justice

was not engaged

antitrust law.

in interstate

Based on the

logic that the actual

White, G. Edward, Creatine the National Pastime: Baseball Transforms
1953) . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 104-105.

94

"Voigt,
96

Rader, Benjamin G., Baseball:

Rader,

Itself (1903-

p. 144.

Illinois Press,
97

commerce and

A History of America's Game

1992), p. 109-110.

p. 111.
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,

(Chicago: University of

playing of a

He

game was

within one state,

Holmes held

baseball to be a "purely state affair."

held further that the interstate travel necessary for
games

essential thing."

With

this,

baseball

was

officially "special."

that baseball

significance as our national pastime.

in the case

of Hart

v.

One

is

Many commentators

special, or that

year after the Federal Baseball decision,

Keith Vaudeville Exchange Holmes ruled that traveling

shows were engaged

in interstate

commerce." By

vaudeville

shows were engaged

in interstate

commerce, despite the

appeared to be "purely state

affairs" for

which

inadvertently signaled that baseball

In the Federal Baseball decision,

effect not a matter

reserve clause

not trade.

By

was indeed

Holmes took

distinction

was not an unreasonable

incident,"

special.

pains to mention in his opinion that
100
it

right."

This endorsement of

restraint

of trade and

in

specifically that the

that baseball

was

sport,

and

endorsing the appeals court decision, Holmes was therefore endorsing the

its

specific language about baseball's reserve

between sport and

system as well as

trade.

self-government without regard for

99

shows

important because, in addition to holding that baseball was

With the blessing of the highest court

98

fact that the

was "merely

of interstate commerce, the lower court held

entire decision, including

its

is

ruling that traveling

interstate travel

the appeals court "went to the root of the case" and "got

the appeals court decision

argue that the

has special cultural

it

vaudeville

Holmes

incident, not the

98

Holmes decision does not say

however,

was "mere

trifling

in the land,

Landis ruled baseball's private

concepts such as due process. Landis

fined,

See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
See Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 (1923).
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suspended and banned anyone who,
national pastime.

temper

his

game's

living

in his estimation,

At the same time, Landis'

ability to

wrath when the situation called for greater

endangered the image of the

gage public opinion enabled him to
subtlety. In 1927,

legends-Ty Cobb and Tris Speaker-were linked to

fixing

two of the
games

in the

1919

season. Landis chose not to expel these popular players. Instead, he chose merely to

move them to

other teams and justified this lenient punishment on the fact that the alleged

infraction occurred before he took office.

mercy was motivated by

would have

his desire to protect

reflected badly

David Voigt argues
tactics.

Most

on

baseball historians agree that Landis'

two

baseball legends

baseball as a whole.

that the

from a scandal

that

101

Cobb/Speaker decision marked a

shift in

Landis'

Because the public was beginning to forget the Black Sox scandal, Landis

transformed himself from stern disciplinarian to "efficient priest."

102

Landis' rulings during

the remainder of his tenure were no less arbitrary, but they were less harsh.

The 1 920s was a decade of prosperity

The Age of Babe Ruth brought renewed
was growing and
prosperity

in the nation

league games rose

was

Organized Baseball.

The American economy

rising precipitously. National

prosperity in baseball. Average attendance at major
103

fifty

in

popularity to the game.

the standard of living in the nation

was matched by economic

and

percent in the 1920s.

helped by the rapid growth of urban areas

in the

Baseball's economic prosperity

was

1920s as well as the explosion of

100

White,

101

Spink, J.G. Taylor, Judge Landis and Twenty-five Years of Baseball

p. 77.

Thomas Y. Crowell

Co., 1947), p. 154-163.

102

Spink, p. 154-163.

103

Seymour,

p.

343.

61

(New York:

also

industry.

Factory production almost doubled

in the 1920s.

104

Indeed, the "roaring '20s"

brought prosperity to a growing nation and provided an excellent
environment for
refurbishing baseball's tarnished image.

It

was easy

to forget the troubled past amidst the

rosy present.

The most

lively

debates

in baseball in the

1920s

may have been about

the minor

leagues. Before reaching a stabilizing agreement in 1931, the issue of the minor league
draft

was

hotly debated.

On one

were minor league owners who saw the

side

antithetical to their property rights.

They wanted

to

buy and

sell

draft as

players at will.

On the

other side, Commissioner Landis and the big league owners advocated a universal draft

wherein any minor league player could be taken by a major league

club.

patchwork compromises during the 1920s the Landis position won out
Another minor league controversy

in the

in effect

in

1931.

1920s revolved around the

Cardinals President Branch Rickey's farm system. Rickey's team

minor league clubs and thus

After several

St.

105

Louis

owned and operated

controlled large numbers of minor league players

from the outset of their careers. Commissioner Landis opposed farm systems arguing,
a

good Progressive,

that they created

monopolies of talent inimical

competition for players. They were, he

left

insisted, a perversion

to free

and

of the reserve

like

fair

rule,

which

player fortunes in the hands of a single club instead of a free market or player draft.

Throughout
he attempted to

were

his tenure

utilize his

in clear violation

104

Seymour,

p.

105

White,

278-284.

p.

Landis fought farm systems. Unable to outlaw the practice,

power

of the

to discourage

spirit

them and

to scuttle their use

when

they

of free competition. Landis repeatedly chastised the

343.

62

owners

for their covert support

of the practice of farming. 106 In 1921, Landis got wind of

four players being purchased by big league clubs and sent to
minor league teams with

whom gentleman's agreements were

struck to return the players to the majors at the end

of the season. Landis immediately condemned the clubs involved

for having failed "to

obtain waivers from other clubs or use option agreements, the only recognized and
carefully restricted exception to the no-farming rule." 107 Landis declared the players free

agents able to sign with any team they pleased. Despite the Commissioner's persistent and
active opposition to farm systems, the practice continued. In 1932, the

owners

by voting unanimously to adopt a

officially rejected Landis' position

specifically permitted

farm systems.

lose their

bloom with the onset of the Great

Depression. Although big league attendance maintained

it

its

high level through the 1930

declined precipitously thereafter, not returning to pre-depression levels until the

1940s. In 1933, the national

indicators

rule that

108

The rosy days of the 1920s would

season,

Major league

economy was

were down. Unemployment

hit

at its

lowest point. All the economic

record

levels.

Throughout the decade baseball

struggled to get by. While attitudes in politics were shifting toward support for

cooperative recovery measures, baseball remained consistent with

attitudes.

106

its

more

laissez faire

Historian Benjamin Rader quotes Yankee owner Jacob Ruppert as saying, "I

Spink, p. 190-192.
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Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball (H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82 Cong., 2 Sess., 1952),
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found out a long time ago that there

government

interference,

burgeoning welfare
ticket prices never

is

no charity

in baseball."

Organized Baseball was able to

state.

Perhaps most

109

Shielded from

resist the effects

telling is the fact that,

of the

throughout the 1930s,

went down.

In baseball, the richer clubs like the Yankees and Giants were able to

make ends

meet, while the poorer clubs became caught in a vicious cycle. Because attendance was

down, poorer

clubs, such as

Connie Mack's Philadelphia

Athletics,

were forced to

generate revenue by selling off players, which meant ability to win on the

field declined, in

turn causing a further drop in fan interest and attendance. In other words, the rich got

richer

and

better, while the

the depressed

poor got poorer and worse. While

economy made

it

particularly egregious in the 1930s.

for profit sharing arrangements to help alleviate this cycle

field

were scuttled by the

was not new,

Numerous

proposals

and improve competition on the

richer clubs. Nevertheless, baseball limped on,

survive the worst of times.

managing

was an important

tool for boosting the morale of a dejected

nation. Franklin Roosevelt recognized the utility

provide hope amidst despair and as a

of the national pastime as a way

way to promote

positive thinking

Dizzy Dean's biographer, Robert Gregory, captures

Roosevelt upon throwing out the

first ball

this

,09

Rader,

p. 137.

110

Rader,

p. 37.

much

theme by quoting

of the 1933 season. The President

as anything to keep

up the

spirits

to

and wholesome

said,

111

"Baseball has done as

to

110

Baseball in the 1930s

values.

this situation

of the people."

The

During t he Great
Gregory, Robert, Diz: The Storv of Dizzy Dean and Baseball
Depression. (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 95.
1,1

64

President's remarks

made

it

clear that the spirit

of the game would be instrumental

in

seeing the country through hard times. Politicians of
the day routinely invoked the

of the game. Baseball metaphors were conspicuous

in the political rhetoric

spirit

of the

depression.

While not immune from the hard economic times of the 1930s, baseball was
nonetheless enjoying relative

stability.

inter-league wars and no franchises

There were no attempts to unionize by players, no

were

lost to financial ruin.

challenges of the decade contributed to this

Ironically, the

economic

Player revolts, which surely would

stability.

have occurred given the across the board salary reductions of the decade, were never
launched. Because of the abject poverty rampant in the nation such a revolt would surely

have met with overwhelming public disapproval.

When Babe Ruth complained
in the press.

about a salary cut of 33 percent, he was excoriated

Even Judge Landis was forced

willingness to shoulder

times. Baseball

to take a

some of the burden of getting

may have been exempt from the

was not immune

to the regulating influence

pay cut
the

in

order to

game through

legal regulation

show

financial hard

of antitrust

monopoly or by

its

statutes, but

it

of public opinion. Outlaw and upstart leagues

were likewise discouraged by economic conditions as much or more than by
legal

his

baseball's

strong commissioner.

This stability was not seamless. Major League Baseball did face internal
controversies in the 1930s. Controversy over salary cuts was joined by debates over night
baseball and radio broadcasts of ball games. Night baseball had been banned in the big

leagues until 1934,

when

the Cincinnati

Reds began

to play under the lights.

Radio

broadcasts were generally thought to be bad for attendance. Ironically, the Chicago Cubs

65

were the

last

regularly

on

team to play night games
the radio.

at

home

but the

first

team

to broadcast

games

112

Night games were an attempt to increase revenue during the depression.
The
theory was that attendance would be boosted because those
attend

like

a

games

good

putting

it

after

who were working

work. Commissioner Landis opposed night

Progressive, that

on a par with

baseball, arguing, again

detracted from the wholesome character of the

it

the less savory activities

common to

could

game by

the night. Financial necessity,

however, superseded Progressive values, and the commissioner acquiesced to a limited

number of night games.
While the economic exigencies of the Depression worked
baseball, they

owners feared
and

is

had the opposite

games

on

were on the

that, if games

listen to the

effect

rather than

come

in effect

radio, financially strapped fans

all

stay

three

New York clubs.

home

attitude

This ban

113

Baseball entered the 1940s down, but not out.

effects

would

The prevalence of this

to the ball park.

through the 1939 season.

due to the economic

of night

radio broadcasts of games in the 1930s. Club

evident in the ban on radio broadcasts agreed to by

remained

in favor

As

the

economy began

of war, baseball's fortunes rebounded. Just as

it

to recover

had been

during the ravages of economic depression, baseball was an important symbol of American

values during

World War

II.

In a letter from President Roosevelt to Commissioner Landis

dated January 15, 1942, the President expressed his desire for baseball to continue on
during the war.

He wrote

,12

Rader,

p. 137.

113

Rader,

p. 137.

that baseball

would provide

66

crucial opportunities for recreation

6

in

a time when an over-burdened people desperately needed such diversion. The
President

expressed confidence that despite

game would
that

day

its

depleted ranks during the war, the popularity of the

not suffer. Roosevelt also urged Landis to permit additional night games so

shift

workers could see a game occasionally. 114 Though long an opponent of

night baseball, Landis permitted an expansion of night

Major League Baseball accepted

its

special role in the

owners purchased $25,000 worth of bats and
from each of the

all-star

of big leaguers entered
personnel, and in

Despite drops

combined

in

balls for

war

effort. In

1941, the

use by the military. The proceeds

games during the war were donated

military service.

many

games during the war.

Admission to most

other ways baseball sought to pull

to the cause. Large

ball

its

numbers

parks was free to military

weight for the war

115

effort.

attendance during the war years, Major League Baseball failed to earn a

profit only once, in 1943,

1

and

in that

year twelve of baseball's 16 teams were

1

individually profitable.

In his nearly 25 years at the helm of professional baseball, Judge Landis presided

over a stable,

if not

serene, industry. In the final analysis,

it

was

this stability that

government intervention seem unnecessary. While the most palpable
involvement

in the business

1922, baseball was also

left

of baseball may have been the
to

its

own devices

114

free

exemption granted

in

market conditions within the

itself.

Letter from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Commissioner Landis, on

National Baseball Hall of Fame Library, Cooperstown,
,15

from external

during the reign of Landis because of the

commissioner's vigorous defense of and advocacy for

game

antitrust

shield

made

Voigt, p. 256-257.

67

NY.

file at

the

The

free

market values of the Progressive Era had a voice inside of baseball

Commissioner Landis. His support

for a universal draft for

minor leaguers and

in

his

117
opposition to farm systems exemplified his commitment to free market
principles.

Furthermore, the nation's policy makers had

far

more important

fish to fry.

Economic

depression and world war distracted policy makers from the baseball anomaly and,

same

Major League Baseball

time, enabled

to contribute to the national weal in

its

at the

own

unique way.

The

Politics of the

Depression and the

During the Landis years

New

Deal

in baseball, national politics

regulatory environment went from

its

Deal Era emphasis on what Eisner

calls "associationalism."

was but a

part

away from

its

was being transformed. The

Progressive Era focus on the market to the

of a much larger change

in

American

This regulatory regime change

politics as the nation

nineteenth century state of "courts and parties" to the

"administrative state" of the mid-twentieth century. Politics

moving from

its

New

full

moved

further

blown

was becoming more

national,

locus in decentralized political parties and state courts to one in the

federal executive branch. This transition

would

require a major shift in political values as

well as federal jurisprudence in order to be completed.

The tension within Progressivism

between Jeffersonian democratic values and Hamiltonian concepts of nationalism, as
expressed

116

in

Zimbalist,

debates between the

New Freedom and the New Nationalism,

Andrew, Baseball and

National Pastime ,

Billions:

(New York: BasicBooks,

would

A Probing Look at the Big Business of Our
1992), p. 12.
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continue to shape American

politics.

involvement of the government

As

the nation's politics

in the regulation

moved toward

greater

of the economy, the pressure on

baseball's private self-government increased.

Marc Allen Eisner

locates the genesis of the association^ regime in the experience

of war mobilization during World War One.
effort, the federal

In an effort to organize the mobilization

government created the War Industries Board (WIB), which was made

up of fifty-seven sections covering

virtually

every conceivable industry, Each section of

the board solicited the input of business rivals

on

the maintenance of price stability, the

establishment of production priorities and the promotion of rapid response to military

needs.

The

WIB

succeeded

in

forging a closer relationship between the government and

industry representatives like the U.S.

also

showed

Chamber of Commerce. The experience of the WIB

the potential benefits of quasi-corporatist schemes of industrial planning."

The 1920s saw a tremendous

made up of industry

associations,

proliferation

rivals,

of trade associations. These

shared consumer

statistics, credit

cost formulae, and other important industrial information.

associations

policies in

was

ways

The

reduced competition. In

dampened competition with one hand while embracing

this

information,

ostensible purpose of these

to curb unfair market practices, but they defined

that in effect

8

fair

and unfair price

way, these associations

the strictures of the

Sherman Act

Landis had opposed what the owners called the "single entity theory" in their
Major League
support for farm systems. A variant of this same concept would be used by
117

Ironically,

Baseball to defend
118

Eisner,

Marc

its

exemption from

antitrust law.

Allen, Regulatory Politics in Transition , (Baltimore:

University Press,

1

193), p. 75.

69

The Johns

I

fopkins

with the other.

119

when trade

In the 1920s,

associations flourished with the blessing of the

federal government, Baseball's unregulated

was

distinct only in that

monopoly seemed much

no government agency

facilitated the

less

an anomaly.

It

cooperation of the baseball

owners.
Secretary of Commerce and later President, Herbert Hoover was very impressed

with these trade associations to the degree that they performed

To Hoover,

their

designed purpose.

these associations represented an extension of the experience of wartime

mobilization.

Hoover believed

"that a

network of cooperative associations

facilitated

the national government could serve to coordinate and rationalize production."

by

What

Eisner calls Hoover's vision of "associational self-regulation" was designed to "provide a

means of directing economic development,

eliminat[e]

ensur[e] that firms producing comparable goods

standards."

120

damaging competition, and

would agree

to

meet

specific

During the 1920s the Commerce Department and the Federal Trade

Commission pursued many of these types of industry- friendly

associationalist initiatives.

Major League Baseball under Commissioner Landis approximated

this "associational self-

regulation" quite well despite the absence of federal oversight. Additionally, the

was seen

in the

1920s as just

that,

a game, not an industry.

To

game

the degree that anyone

perceived a need to regulate baseball, the creation of an independent commissioner to be
replaced by presidential appointment,

was considered more than

The stock market crash of 1929

drastically

sufficient.

and unalterably transformed

perceptions of economic stability and growth. The previous decade saw a nation

119

Wecter, Dixon, The

MacMillan Co., 1948),

Age of the Great

Depression: 1929-1941

p. 22.

70

,

(New York: The

ruminating over ways to expand and build on
associationalism of the 1920s

its

economic prosperity. The

was undertaken, not out of grave

help stabilize and expand commercial success. The collapse of the

economy

aftermath of the stock market crash completely changed the tenor of such
as world

war had required a

economy would

way

necessity, but as a

to

in the

initiatives.

Just

nationally coordinated mobilization effort, the collapse of the

require a nationally coordinated economic recovery effort.

Despite his associationalist tendencies as Secretary of Commerce, President

Hoover refused

to

expand the concept

in order to defeat the

enemy of economic

depression. His efforts to create cooperative arrangements between industry competitors

with the help of the state had always been animated by his strong belief in a free market.

When presented

with a proposal that would have required the suspension of antitrust laws

and the creation of a regulatory agency with broad powers
into

complying with

would create
beyond
feeling

its

its

recommendations, President Hoover rejected

entities

as a plan that

economy

was a general

industry representatives that the present crisis required the suspension of

some manner of government supervised

measures were seen as necessary to restore

stability to

trade agreements. These

a highly volatile and unstable

121

The mood of the country was

shifting rapidly in

receptivity of government involvement in the economy.

121

it

constitutional limits. Contrary to Hoover's reluctance, there

antitrust laws as well as

120

commercial

destructive monopolies and extend government intervention in the

among

economy.

to coerce

Eisner, p. 76.
Eisner, p. 77-78.
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1930 and 1931 toward greater

Hoover

resisted this political

trend. In the belief that the stock market crash

was just a "paper debacle

checked by

Hoover encouraged

intelligent

cooperation

at the top,"

that could be

industry

representatives to increase spending voluntarily to spur the economy.

He

cheer leader for the "self-recuperative power and socially cooperative

spirit

business." Hoover's optimism and faith proved

the faith" attitude

would become fodder

futile,

for the satire

and

his

acted as public

attempts to

of [American]

instill

a "keep

of a generation. 122 Historian Dixon

Wecter captures Hoover's intransigence:

Hoover believed

that the obligation for relief and

reemployment began with the
effort

might then

call

upon

individual.

Failing there, the

private organizations like the

Red

Cross, thence turn to municipal and state governments

and,

finally,

as a last resort to the federal government-whose

succor, in this ultimate extremity, should take the form of
loans rather than

gifts.

Slowly and reluctantly Hoover was

driven back trench after trench in what he conceived to be
his defense

of the public treasury.

123

Although historians are quick to point out

that the presidential

campaign of 1932

was not waged between opposing

visions of economic regulation,

Hoover's

of economic despair led to Franklin Roosevelt's

inability to

stem the

tide

landslide victory. Roosevelt's

concluded that the American

campaign rhetoric was bold, but

political

of the previous President Roosevelt, FDR's

public opinion and the

122

Wecter,

p.

123

Wecter,

p. 46.

to

is fair

to say that

inconsistent.

Having

spectrum ranged from those who doggedly adhered

to Jeffersonian laissez faire principles to those

Under FDR, a new approach

it

who

supported the bold

New Nationalism

rhetoric included something for everyone.

economic regulation would eventually be blessed by both

Supreme Court.

43.

72

Just as the political atmosphere of the previous decade

was shaped by

the

conservative values of Presidents Harding, Coolidge and Hoover, the
politics of at least
the next forty years

would be shaped by the values of Roosevelt's New Deal. The

seeming inconsistency of his campaign rhetoric reflected more than
forge winning coalitions in politics,

American

whose

New Deal,
result

Progressivism.

crises

ability to

own mind

124

New Deal holds that

was aided by

its

about

While Eisner's thesis

Milkis better illustrates

is

of ad

skilled

of a coherent

enriches our understanding

New Nationalist strand of

compelling and accurate, the work of Sidney

how FDR transformed

"FDR consciously patterned his

series

transformation of state-society relations was the

of experience with war mobilization and the

125

was a

his decided lack

Marc Allen Eisner probes deeper and

arguing that

it

of the Depression brokered by a highly

talent for coalition building

political philosophy.

combined

represented the tensions within his

interpretation of the

hoc responses to the economic

of the

uncanny

politics.

The most popular

politician

it

his

the political landscape. Milkis argues that

leadership after that of Woodrow Wilson and Theodore

Roosevelt, seeking to reconcile the strengths of these leaders."

FDR was drawn to
individual liberty, but he

Wilson's attempt to preserve the nineteenth century

was

also conscious

Jeffersonian individualism in an age

by economic

124

elites

See, James

when

of the pathological

the barriers to freedom were

of

of advocating a

more often erected

than by government interference. The President's heralded "brain

MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and

Brace Publishers, 1956).
125

effects

spirit

See Eisner.

73

the

Fox,(New York: Harcourt

trust"

was headed by two men whose

ideas

were the product of the two strands of

Progressive thought. Adolph Berle used his influence to push the President
toward

Theodore Roosevelt's

New Nationalist

program, while Felix Frankfurter exercised

his

prerogative as one of the President's top advisors to support the ideas of Wilson and
Brandeis,

who

preferred political deliberation and choice to the imposition of

administrative power.

To
Hamilton,

the

bridge the gap between Wilson and Roosevelt, indeed between Jefferson and

FDR laid out his philosophy in what has come to

New Deal,

the

Commonwealth Club Address,

the speech, written by

Adolph Berle and

inspired

redefined liberalism for the industrial age. This

be

New liberalism would

as the manifesto of

delivered during the 1932 campaign. In

by the work of John Dewey, Roosevelt

new

liberalism sought to recognize an

understanding of individualism that was consistent with the

The

known

realities

of industrial

society.

get around Americans' Jeffersonian distrust of centralized

administration by convincing Americans that such arrangements were necessary for the

realization

of individual

liberty in

an industrial age. In essence, FDR,

like

Dewey, was

adapting eighteenth and nineteenth century values of Jeffersonian individualism to

twentieth century conditions.

the social and

economic

He was

realities

of the

expansion of the federal government

rights,

126

redefining individualism and liberty in the context of

industrial age.

By

cloaking his advocacy for an

in the liberal constitutional

language of individual

Roosevelt was able to give legitimacy to Progressive ideals

Milkis, Sidney,

The President and

Party System Since the

New

Deal

,

the Parties:

a

way

that

Wilson

The Transformation of the American

(New York: Oxford
74

in

University Press, 1993), p. 38.

and

TR were never able to

American

achieve. In so doing, he

decisively

toward nationalizing

127

politics.

Franklin Roosevelt's

nation in a

was

moved

way that

new

liberalism

was

successful in changing the

the Progressives were unable to do. Although

rhetorically compelling, the harsh conditions

mood of the

FDR's new

liberalism

of economic depression no doubt helped

Americans to understand the exigencies and changed context of an

industrial society.

Roosevelt's success in turning the philosophical corner from Jefferson to Hamilton was
not merely accomplished in word. The programs of the
political manifestations

Two

New Deal.

of the transition to a nationalized

particular pieces

The National

Industrial

nationalistic goals

the

War

NIRA

Industries

set

in regard to the spirit

in the early

Summer of 1933,

provide excellent

and quasi-corporatist methods of the

up trade associations

Board of World War

I,

was

left

In

rhythm of regime change.

in the various sectors

the

New Deal.

of industry.

NIRA created government/

to the President.

by representatives of corporations, but there was also a

The

Much like

industry

committees to devise codes of fair conduct, which were to be exempt from
Final approval of these codes

of the

Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural

addition, they illustrate the difficulty and the staccato

The

politics.

of legislation are often cited

Adjustment Act (AAA), both passed

examples of the

New Deal were practical, tangible

antitrust law.

statute created a system run

specific provision guaranteeing a

place at the table for organized labor. The Act's protection of collective bargaining was

crucial for the support

Marc Allen Eisner

of labor, without which the

contrasts the

NIRA to

legislation

initiatives

Milkis, p. 39-41.

75

would not have passed.

of the Progressive Era, showing

that

this

law represents a clear departure from the

regime.

The NIRA's

virtual suspension

free

market ethos of the Progressives market

of antitrust law and creation of government

supervised cartels represents the realization of the Theodore Rooseveh
and Herbert Croly

New Nationalist vision.
the

NTRA.

It

agriculture.

The

Agricultural Adjustment Act

was cut from the same

cloth as

consisted of the establishment of government supervised cartels in

128

These bold early

initiatives

of the

the nation to a nationalized politics.

constitutional values.

New Deal represent the political conversion of

They were an

affront to traditional political

The Supreme Court, which had acquiesced to

and

constitutional

experimentation in the face of civil war and world war, was not willing to allow these

bury the doctrine of laissez

initiatives to

regime change

difficult as

Schecter

v.

is

in politics,

faire constitutionalism

it is

even more

United States the Supreme Court struck

without a

difficult in law.

down the NIRA,

In

fight.

May

As
1935, in

holding that

it

had

required an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority by the Congress to the

President.

129

The

NIRA had

authorized the creation of codes of conduct by groups formed by

the President. These codes,

which had the force of law, would thus be made, passed and

enforced entirely within the executive branch. The case produced a clarification of the

constitutional doctrine

of nondelegation. The so-called Schecter

Congress cannot delegate

legislative

power

to the executive branch without clear

standards and guidelines.

128

rule states that the

Eisner, p. 82-87.

76

In January, 1936, the

Supreme Court applied

the Schecter rule in striking

Agricultural Adjustment Act in the case of United States

v.

down the

Butler. Despite these judicial

setbacks, the Roosevelt administration and Congress continued to pass sweeping
initiatives that

New Deal
political

expanded the regulatory reach of the

initiatives despite the

Court's resistance

illustrates the

mood. The Supreme Court was widely and

Americans thought was
and the continuing

its failure

federal government.

new

The continuing

power of the changed

harshly criticized for what most

to understand the Constitution in

legislative assault effectively pressured the

its

Court

modern

into a

context,

fundamental

jurisprudential shift.

The Supreme Court

finally aligned itself

Spring of 1937. In West Coast Hotel Co.

federal

minimum wage

commentators argue

law. Justice

known

political

in the

Parrsih, the court ruled 5-4 in favor of a

Owen Roberts

that Justice Roberts

packing plan as well as by the

v.

with the political environment

had reversed

his position.

Many

was influenced by FDR's threatened court

mood of the

day. In any case, this decision

became

as "the switch in time that saved nine." After the Parrish decision, the Court

regularly upheld

New Deal initiatives. 130

In the remainder of 1937, the Court would give the constitutional seal of approval

to both the National

majority

was

Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act. The new

solidified

by a

appointed Alabama Senator

series

liberal

of appointments to the Supreme Court. In 1937,

Hugo Black

to replace the resigning Justice Willis

FDR

Van

of
Devanter. In 1938, with the death of Justice Benjamin Cardozo and the resignation

129

& Herman Belz, The American Constitution: Its
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991), p. 476-477.

Kelly, Alfred, Winfred Harbison,

Origins and Development ,

77

Justice

George Sutherland,

FDR appointed fellow New Dealers Stanley Reed and Felix

Frankfurter to the Court. In 1939, Justice Louis Brandeis resigned and Justice
Pierce

The former was replaced by William O. Douglass, and

Butler died.

Murphy. The
McReynolds,

last

the latter by Frank

remaining hold out from the conservative court, Justice James

retired in 1941, allowing Roosevelt to complete his total redesign

of the

Court with the appointment of his Attorney General, Robert Jackson. 131

FDR appointed more members of the Supreme Court than any President before or
since.

His overwhelmingly

liberal

and

activist court

would dramatically impact the

nation's politics for the next half century. Interestingly, the Court's role as inhibitor in the

regime change from the Progressive Era to the
associational

its

regime— would not be

New Deal Era-

replicated in the next regime shift precisely because of

Rooseveltian make up. Indeed, the Court would be a leader

associational regime to

Its

what Eisner

conversion to

from the market to the

calls the "societal

in the shift

from an

regime."

New Deal liberalism reversed a half century of the Court

defending corporate property rights

in the face

of attempts

to

expand

state

and federal

regulatory power. Throughout the Progressive Era the Court staved off legislative

assaults

on

traditional Jeffersonian concepts

unconstitutionally expanded the regulatory

of individual

power of the

rights that

it

felt

would have

federal government.

The

conservative jurisprudence of the Progressive Era Court was certainly a factor in the

failure

of Progressives to achieve

as discussed in chapter one,

130
131

Kelly, et

Kelly et

al., p.

al., p.

it

their

more

far reaching,

New Nationalist,

objectives and,

played a part in upholding baseball's unregulated monopoly.

487-488.
489.

78

It

also provides insight into the

antitrust

dominance of less

law and the rhetorical victory of the

The

New Deal's response to

New Nationalist Progressivism

the Great Depression represents the realization
of

depression provided the impetus for a

regulatory

power did

not,

intervention of World

crisis mentality that

New Freedom over the New Nationalism.

The pressure

The Supreme Court's acquiescence

intrusive Progressive initiatives like

created by the exigencies of economic

political,

and eventually jurisprudential, revolution.

to the expansion

of the federal government's

however, unleash wholesale corporatism on the

War II

revitalized the

had spawned the more

American economy

nation.

The

effectively reducing the

far reaching

New Deal experiments

government

in baseball's private self

such as the

NIRA.
The non-interference of the
government

in

1920s was due

federal

in part to the

posture of the Supreme Court and the

Antitrust Division of the Justice Department with respect to corporate combinations.

During the

1

920s the courts not only

failed to dissolve

handed down numerous decisions favorable to firms

a single corporate merger, they

that controlled as

much as 90

percent

of their markets. Despite Herbert Hoover's ostensible support of antitrust enforcement as
both Secretary of Commerce and as President, the 1920s saw a considerable drop
antitrust prosecutions

Department

132

Keller,

and convictions.

in the 1920s, historian

Morton. Regulating a

Of the

Morton

in

Antitrust Division of the Justice

Keller writes that

New Economy:

79

"never met a trust

Public Policy and

America (1900-1933) (Cambridge: Harvard University
,

it

it

didn't

Economic Change

Press, 1990), p. 36.

in

The

associationalism of the 1920s manifest in the proliferation of trade

associations,

had the

effect

of dampening enthusiasm

encouraging cooperative relations among industry
led

by the strong hand of Judge Landis, did not

for antitrust enforcement

rivals.

raise

Major League Baseball's

an eye brow

League Baseball's continued freedom from government

and

in the 1920s.

interference

cartel,

Major

hardly surprising

is

given that antitrust was the primary means of Progressive regulation of the economy and
that enforcement

was repeatedly discouraged by

friendly Antitrust Division

the

Supreme Court and an

of the Justice Department. There was

industry

in the federal

government a general acceptance of apparently benign corporate combinations such as
trade associations,

among them baseball.

Major League Baseball's private
political

self government weathered,

even exploited, the

and economic upheaval of the 1930s and early 1940s. In the wake of the stock

market crash, baseball's monopolistic

whose overriding goal
economy. These

in the

cartel

was hardly a prime

1930s was the recovery and

dire circumstances,

combined with

target

stabilization

of policy makers,
of a national

baseball's relative internal stability,

allowed the game not only to avoid government regulation, but also to

status in

American

solidify its special

culture.

Political leaders, like

the Depression, the

game

FDR, used

baseball as a

way

to rally an anxious nation. In

exemplified America's best traditions and values, a role fully

exploited by Major League Baseball to keep the

game on a

cultural pedestal. Baseball's

morale boosting role was extended with the onset of World War
baseball's private self government

was

II.

shielded by the fact that the

By the

mid- 1940s

game had captured

the

Depression and World Wai
hearts and minds of the nation and because, between the Great

80

II,

there were simply

more urgent matters before

the nation. During the quarter century in

which baseball was ruled by Commissioner Landis, the
with the

instability outside

stability inside the

game

together

of it both secured Major League Baseball's standing as the

national pastime and insulated

it

from government

interference.

through hard times, baseball had become a cultural

Having seen the nation

icon.

Stability in Baseball Begins to Unravel

With victory
droves.

in

Europe and the

The wartime drops

league attendance doubled

pre-war levels and major league profits were

of dollars. But Major League Baseball entered

man at

in

attendance were quickly erased from 1946 to 1949 as major

in

its

Americans returned to the ballparks

Pacific,

this era

in the millions

of post war prosperity with a new

the helm. Judge Landis died in 1944, and Organized Baseball appointed a U.S.

Senator from Kentucky, A.B. "Happy" Chandler, as the game's second commissioner. As

economic
late

stability

and peace returned to the nation,

conflict returned to baseball. In the

1940s and 1950s the game would grapple with a new outlaw league,

integration,

numerous rumblings of player

legislative interference into its

Ironically, the level

discontent, and

its first

racial

brushes with federal

governance.

of cultural significance attained by baseball

in the

1930s and

1940s encouraged congressional interference. The careful and successful campaign by

Organized Baseball to convince Americans that the

of America did help to legitimize baseball law and

made Americans

feel that the

owners' chagrin,

this

game belonged

view was heralded by

to

of baseball were the

internal self government.

them and not

their

81

interests

own hand

to the owners.

But,

interests

it

also

Much to

picked successor to Judge

the

Not long

Landis.

saying,

"You

after his appointment,

don't

own the

Commissioner Chandler chastised the owners

game... the game belongs to the American people." 133

Baseball historians agree that Chandler was chosen by the owners because they

he was a

far cry

from the

irascible,

politician and, as such, the

felt

uncompromising Judge Landis. Chandler was a

owners expected the former U.S. Senator

did not comply with their expectations.

The owners were

less

to "play ball."

He

than thrilled with

Chandler's support of Branch Ricky's attempts to end racial segregation in the game. 134

Although he was a thorn

in their sides

on many

issues, the

owners could

at least

count on

Judge Landis to protect the complexion of the game, so to speak. Ultimately Chandler's
independence from the owners contributed to
Chandler had

little

time to learn or enjoy his

years ended shortly after World

the

first

his contract not being

War EL One

new job,

renewed

as the stability

year into his term, baseball

in

1951.

of the Landis

was faced with

attempt to create a players union since before the Landis years. In 1946, a labor

lawyer with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) attempted to form a new
players union, the American Baseball Guild. With the onset of postwar prosperity players

began to
fertile

feel

more comfortable about demanding

their fair share.

Quickly recognizing the

environment for such ventures, the owners formed a committee headed by Yankees

part-owner Larry MacPhail to improve relations with the players and
perceived need for a union. The committee

fulfilled its

alleviate

any

mandate by granting several

a
concessions to the players. The committee agreed to provide each player with a $25

week

stipend during spring training, a raise in the

133

Quoted

134

Rader,

in

Rader,

p. 187.

p. 187.

82

minimum

salary to $5,000, a pension

plan for the players, and player representation on a committee
of club owners and league
presidents.

135

The MacPhail committee had fended

off the

first,

but hardly the

last,

attempt to form a players' union in baseball.

Chandler also faced a more serious challenge
called

"Mexican League War" broke out as a

result

at the outset

of his tenure. The so-

of raids on Major League rosters by

Mexican League President Don Jorge Pasqual. In the winter of 1946, eighteen

big

leaguers either jumped their reserve clauses or jumped their contracts outright to play in
the

Mexican League

that spring.

Responding to the

threat

of the Mexican League, which

enticed such notable players as the Brooklyn Dodgers' catcher Mickey

Owen and

St.

Louis Browns shortstop, Vern Stephens to play south of the border, Commissioner
Chandler suspended

all

but one of the league jumpers. Before handing

year suspensions, the commissioner offered amnesty to any player

down blanket

who

five-

agreed to return

immediately to his Major League club. Stephens took the commissioner up on

his offer.

Chandler's harsh penalty was unprecedented for the commissioner of baseball.

Even during

the Federal League

war no

Commissioner Landis, well known

penalties as harsh

were handed

out.

for his harsh brand of justice, never faced the threat of

an outlaw league and therefore had not been tested under such circumstances. After
Chandler handed
ratified the

down the

suspension, and despite

its

unprecedented severity, the owners

commissioner's action.

At a joint meeting of the major leagues on August 28, 1946, the Chicago Cubs
sanction the
general manager proposed an amendment to the leagues' rules which would

meant to support
penalty of a five year suspension for league jumpers. The proposal,

135

Rader,

p.

187-188.

83

Chandler's action, was agreed to unanimously.

A congressional report later quoted Mr.

Gallagher of the Cubs at that meeting as saying that "[t]he sight
of Mickey

on

his

farm or

starting the races at the Springfield Fair will

do a

Stan Musial from going to Mexico next winter than any suits
clause."

lot

more

we may

file

Owen sitting

to discourage

on

the reserve

136

Musial, all-star outfielder for the
lucrative contract to

jump

to the

St.

Louis Cardnals, had been tempted with a

Mexican League with the

others. Gallagher's

comments

are illustrative of the attitude within Organized Baseball. Throughout the game's history

was
the

it

the extra legal maneuvers such as blacklisting and boycotts which quelled unrest and

owners expected

this trend to continue.

apparent that the postwar world would be

Unfortunately for them

it

was quickly

much more complicated than the

old days.

In a report to the league committees received the day before the joint meeting

mentioned above, Commissioner Chandler warned of the
baseball law.

of being

The

nullified

legal vulnerability

reserve clause, a principle component of baseball law,

by the courts. Chandler writes

of current

was

in jeopardy

in the report that "the present reserve

clause could not be enforced in an equity court in a suit for specific performance, nor as

the basis for a restraining order to prevent a player from playing elsewhere, or to prevent

outsiders from inducing a player to breach his contract."

The

implications of the commissioner's warning in the aftermath of the Mexican

League War were

clear.

Without modification, the reserve clause would not hold up and

U.S. Congress, House. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
nd
nd
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball, (H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82 Cong., 2 Sess., 1952),
136

p. 78.

84

.

the players

the

who

sought to return to Major League Baseball after being dissatisfied with

Mexican League might

prevail in court, effectively negating the

commissioner to punish those

who

violated the reserve clause.

Although some of the players who jumped

jumped newly signed

contracts, others, including

reserve clause. Gardella,

who had

left

the

to the

Danny

power of the

138

Mexican League had

actually

Gardella, had merely jumped their

New York Giants to

play one season in Mexico

before deciding to return, filed an antitrust suit in federal court against the commissioner

and the league presidents as representatives of Organized Baseball. Gardella' s
trade suit relied

on both the Sherman and Clayton

Court of New York City dismissed Gardella' s
for the court, Judge

Goddard

antitrust laws.

suit for

The

restraint

of

federal district

want of jurisdiction. In

his opinion

stated that, despite the "clear trend toward a broader

conception of what constitutes interstate commerce," the court was bound by the
precedent set in the Supreme Court's Federal Baseball decision.

139

On appeal this decision was reversed and the case was remanded
grounds that the issue of baseball's
a

trial.

Before Gardella' s

trial

interstate character

was scheduled

was

The court

on

sufficiently unclear to

the

warrant

to take place another federal court refused

to grant injunctions reinstating Gardella and other players

Baseball.

for trial

who were

suing Major League

ruled that the plaintiffs' rights to reinstatement depended

on

questions of law and fact that were in dispute.

137

(August
Chandler, A.B., "Commissioner's Report to the Major League Committee."

27, 1946), p. 10.
138

The

recommended by Chandler were adopted by
1946. The modified reserve clause was less harsh than its

modifications to the reserve rule

Major League Baseball

in

predecessor
139

See, Gardella

v.

1948).
Chandler, 79 Fed. Supp. 260, 263 (D.C.S.D.N.Y., July 13,

85

Only days
others,

after the circuit court

of appeals declined to

Commissioner Chandler offered to

Mexican League.

140

reinstate Gardella

reinstate all the players

and the

who had jumped

to the

Chandler justified his change of heart by saying that the court's refusal

to reinstate the blacklisted players

baseball and that as such

it

was a

victory for the authority of the commissioner of

had made clear to future would-be violators of baseball law

that the penalty will be harsh,

and more importantly,

it

will

hold up in court. In

fact,

Chandler's mercy was motivated by the desire to salvage baseball's antitrust exemption

which could have been seriously jeopardized by an appeals court's

ruling in the Gardella

case.

The Second

Circuit Court

of Appeals overruled a lower court judgment against

Gardella, holding that the existence of television and radio broadcasts of baseball had

made

the

game a matter of interstate commerce,

thus bringing

Sherman Act. Major League Baseball responded
exemption by appealing the decision. In the
Organized Baseball would
trade from the

status

tie

him up

New York Giants to

of baseball's exemption up

in

it

within reach of the

to this apparently deadly strike to their

interim, Gardella, surely convinced that

court forever, settled the case for $60,000 and a

the St. Louis Cardnals.

in the air.

141

The

settlement

Would Federal Baseball

would

the Gardella verdict take precedence?

Court

until 1953.

left

the legal

continue to rule, or

The matter would not be

clarified

by the

the Study of
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
nd
nd
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball (H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82 Cong., 2 Sess., 1952),
140

p. 83.
141

Zimbalist, p. 13.
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While Organized Baseball was quietly suppressing attempts to unionize players
and
fighting the legal battles

of the Mexican League War, the Brooklyn Dodgers' Branch

Rickey was breaking the twentieth century color

barrier in

1946, Jackie Robinson was chosen by Rickey to

test the informal

leagues. Rickey picked

character.

Robinson not only

Major League Baseball. In
color barrier in the big

for his superior playing ability, but also for his

A four sport star at UCLA and a World War II

veteran,

Robinson was seen by

Rickey as capable of handling the tremendous pressure and harsh treatment
befall the first black player in the

major leagues.

that

would

142

Jackie Robinson's accomplishment, while certainly controversial, stands apart from

other controversies in baseball. Inter-league wars and player revolts are festering

problems to which Organized Baseball responds. Moreover, baseball's great
experiment did not contribute to the game's efforts to maintain
external regulation and

The
the 1950s.

may

internal stability

The

its

social

independence from

indeed have fueled significant anti-baseball sentiment.

of baseball continued to be

players' pension plan, created

of continuing controversy. Some baseball

sympathy with the players on the

issue

fragile as the

1940s turned

into

by the MacPhail Committee, was a source

historians argue that

Commissioner Chandler's

of funding the pension plan with media receipts

hastened his removal from office by the owners

in

1951

.

Chandler was replaced with

former sports writer and National League President, Ford Frick.

With the changing of the guard

in the

commissioner's office

in

1951-52 and with

Congress began to
the legal status of baseball's exemption uncertain, the United States

Time Coming: The Life of Jackie Robinson From Baseball
106-108.
Birmingham, (New York: Simon & Schuster Publishers, 1995), p.
142

Falkner, David, Great

87

to

take a closer look at the

game of baseball. The

Mexican League jumpers had

cast a shadow,

cases of Danny Gardella and other

however

faint,

over baseball. As early as

1949, sensing the growing vulnerability of the game's special status as a result of

damaging

litigation, "friends

of baseball"

in the

Congress were proposing

validate baseball's judicially created antitrust exemption

Congressmen Wilbur
that

would provide

proposals sought to

Pomerene Act

analogous language

143

and some non

Their

Clayton Antitrust Act and the Webb-

of a human being"

The Act had been construed

antitrust laws.

Major League Baseball. The Clayton Act
is

not a "commodity or article of

to give antitrust exemptions to labor unions,

profit agricultural organizations.

The Webb-Pomerene Act

exempts export trade associations and any of their
intentionally

immunity from

in the

to craft a statutory exemption for

specifically declared that the "labor

commerce."

statute.

Mills (D-Ark) and A.S. Herlong (D-Fla) proposed legislation

legislative sanction to baseball's

utilize

by

legislation to

activities

which do not

specifically

"artificially

or

enhance or depress prices within the United States of commodities of the

class exported

by such association, or which substantially lessen competition within the

United States or otherwise restrain trade therein."

A confidential internal memo

sent to

144

Commissioner Chandler

in the fall

of 1949

discusses the strategy of Major League Baseball in seeking legislative protection of its

anomalous

status.

The memo

Organized Baseball's

League Baseball

143

144

illustrates the increasing organizational sophistication

efforts to preserve

attorney,

its

of

governance structure. In the memo, Major

John Lord O'Brien, explains

The Clayton Antitrust Act (1912).
The Webb-Pomerance Act (1918).
88

that the Mills

and Herlong

bills,

.

using ostensibly analogous provisions of Clayton and Webb-Pomerene, were on
the right
track. Mills

the

and Herlong were proposing to amend the Communications Act of 1934, not

Sherman Act. This

interstate nature

tactic

would serve

to circumvent a serious obstacle. Because the

of television and radio broadcasts of baseball were

increasingly

threatening to jeopardize baseball's exemption created in Federal Baseball, these

proposed to

limit antitrust applicability to

broadcast rights, thus preserving the core of the

exemption while jettisoning the most potent arrows being shot
decision.

bills

at the

Federal Baseball

145

Although these

first

proposals died

in

committee, they opened the congressional

door to others. By 1951, the number of legislative proposals
exemption from

antitrust for baseball

calling for a statutory

had grown to four, three

in the

House of

Representatives and one in the Senate. Mills and Herlong were joined

Congressman Melvin Price (D-IL) and
In 1951, three pending

House

in the

bills

Senate by Edwin Johnson

subcommittee was

(

House by

D-CO).

seeking complete exemption from antitrust laws

for all organized professional sports enterprises

the Study of Monopoly

in the

were sent to the House Subcommittee on

Power of the Committee on

the Judiciary.

New York Representative Emanuel Celler,

The Chairman of this

a long time advocate of

vigorous antitrust enforcement. Chairman Celler ordered a thorough investigation into the
business of baseball.

The subcommittee

held hearings

on the matter

Witnesses were questioned on nearly every aspect of the game.

in the fall

Of specific

of 1 95 1

interest

were

focus of numerous
the nature and operation of the reserve clause, which had been the

145

Confidential

memorandum titled "Proposed

of Baseball, A.B. Chandler. The

Legislative

Program"

memo was dated November 30,

89

sent to

Commissioner

1949 and signed by John

Every witness supported and defended the reserve clause, be they player or

lawsuits.

owner.

The hearings produced no smoking gun and
considered five options:

free

market for player

1) to

in the

end the subcommittee

outlaw the reserve clause, forcing baseball to operate

talent; 2) to

in

a

provide baseball with complete immunity from antitrust

law; 3) to create a federal agency to regulate Major League Baseball; 4) to create a limited
statutory exemption for baseball's reserve clause; and 5) to avoid influencing pending

litigation

and

refrain

from anticipating judicial action by declining

146

action at that time.

the judiciary.

The Subcommittee chose

The option of outlawing

The testimony

the fifth option, thus passing the buck to

the reserve clause

in the hearings, as well as public opinion,

form of a reserve

to take any legislative

rule to maintain competitive parity

on

was never

seriously considered.

unanimously supported some
the

field.

Discomfort with a

complete exemption as well as with creating a new regulatory agency eliminated these
options.

The option of creating a

partial

exemption was seriously considered but action

was deferred pending new pronouncements from
Ultimately, the subcommittee

felt that,

147

the courts.

while baseball's private self government

was problematic, they were not capable of addressing
that while

many

differentiation

the problems.

The committee

felt

aspects of professional sports leagues were indeed unique, the

of essential and non-essential practices

in professional sports

was a job

best

Lord O'Brien.
on the Study of
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee
nd
nd
Monopoly Power, Or ganized Baseball (H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82 Cong., 2 Sess., 1952),
146

p.

228-232.

90

left

to the courts.

With

this decision baseball

was off the hook,

However, the Supreme Court would pick up where Congress
York Yankees,

Court returned the

Inc., the

for the time being.

left off.

In Toolson

v.

New

legislature's favor.

George Toolson was a player on a New York Yankee farm team who refused
honor

his reserve clause.

against the Yankees.

Toolson

The

trial

filed

suit

under the Sherman Act

court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction based on

the precedent set in Federal Baseball.

The Court

a restraint of trade

The case came before

the

Supreme Court

antitrust

its

Baseball holding continue to

rule,

it

exemption

195 1 and chosen to

in

would honor the wishes of the

reafErrning the lower court's judgment in Toolson.

antitrust law, the task

of reversing

legislative prerogative.

that

let

the Federal

legislature

assumption was purely

it

political

and thus a

148

made

exemption was special and would not be extended by the courts

In 1955, in United States

were engaged

The Court

by

was exempt from

Several rulings by the Supreme Court over the next few years

v.

in interstate

it

clear that

to other sports.

Shubert, the Court held that traveling theatrical companies

commerce and

also held in 1955 that boxing

U.S., Congress, House. Committee

did

fall

within the strictures of the Sherman Act.

promoted and broadcast on radio and

on

the Judiciary, Subcommittee

Monopoly Power, Organized Baseba ll (H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82
p.

1953.

Furthermore, the court held that since

baseball had developed for 30 years under the assumption that

147

in

surprised Organized Baseball by ruling that since the Congress had addressed

the issue of baseball and

baseball's

to

nd

television in

on the Study of

Cong., 2

nd

Sess., 1952),

228-232.

Baseball's
Berger, Robert G., "After the Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional
Review 45 (1983),
Exemption From The Antitrust Laws," University of Pittsburgh Law
148

p.

209-226.

91

.

several states

was indeed

court would solidify

its

interstate

commerce

position even

more

subject to the

in the

Sherman Act.

case of Radovich

v.

149

In 1957, the

National Football

League.
William Radovich was an All-Pro offensive guard with the Detroit Lions
offered a job as player/ manager of a minor league club in San Francisco.

who was

The Lions

threatened the minor league club with punitive action. The minor league club

subsequently withdrew

Act.

its offer.

The Court's holding

in

Radovich

Radovich read

filed

a restraint of trade suit under the Sherman

in part:

"In Toolson

we

continue to hold the

umbrella over baseball that was placed there some 3 1 years earlier by Federal Baseball.

Vast efforts had gone
decision and

into the

enormous

Court reasserted that

it

capital

.

development and organization of baseball since that

had been invested

had washed

its

in reliance

on

its

hands of baseball and the

permanence.

." 15 °
.

The

antitrust laws, deferring

to the legislature. In the case at hand, the Court ruled against the

NFL

holding

it

accountable under the Sherman Act.

The

disparate treatment enjoyed by Major

television broadcasting in

Hill

all

League Baseball,

as well as the issue

of

major professional sports, spurred more action on Capitol

throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Major League Baseball exploited the game of

hot potato being played by the Court and the Congress, actively assuring both branches
151

that

149

it

was

within the purview of the other branch to alter baseball's status.

See United States

v.

Shubert 348 U.S. 222 (1955), and United States

v.

Boxing Club of New York, Inc. 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
150
See, Radovich v National Football League 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
151
Lowenfish, Lee & Tony Lupien, The Imperfect Diamond (New York:
,

Publishers, 1980), p. 181.
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International

Stein

& Day

In 1957, following the Radovich decision, seven legislative
proposals were

introduced in the U.S. Congress to deal with baseball's exclusive right to engage

monopoly

practices.

None of the

Baseball. This legislative assault

basketball and hockey.

professional

team

including baseball, to the

for partial

proposals was proffered or advocated by Major League

was mounted by

One of these

sports.

exemptions for

Two
full

all

in

the "friends" of professional football

proposals sought to extend baseball's immunity to

all

proposals sought the explicit subjection of all sports,

measure of the
professional

antitrust laws.

team

The remaining four

bills

sports, in order to protect the types

collective arrangements that leagues require in order to maintain competition

on

called

of

the

152

field.

The seven

bills

were sent

to

Chairman

Celler's subcommittee,

second thorough investigation of professional sports and
investigation the Court

sports.

had muddied the waters by creating disparate
all

largely inconclusive, although

it

was

its

last

policies for different

sports in an effort to

standardize policy. Hearings were conducted with witnesses from

The hearings were

Since Celler's

antitrust.

The subcommittee was now charged with examining

which undertook

all

clear to the

the major sports.

committee that the

options of a blanket exemption or blanket subjection of all major team sports to antitrust

law was unacceptable. The Committee's report concluded

was some type of partial exemption

that the

for these sports, allowing

them

most

feasible option

to undertake those

practices required by the unusual nature of the business as well as the need to maintain

ws
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Applicability of the Antitrust La
Rept. No. 1303
to Certain Aspects of designated Organized Professional Team Sports (S.
152

,

88

th

Cong, 2

nd

Sess.,1964), p.

3.
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competition on the

They reported a

field.

bill

which took a middle course. The report

stated:

the intent of the committee in this bill to permit each of
these sports in general to continue the types of selfregulation that it has developed historically... The

It is

committee has concluded that

this

course

is

preferable to, in

the alternative, the imposition

widespread direct

on these businesses of the
controls by Government officials that

customarily accompanies exemption from, or relaxation of,
the requirements of the antitrust laws. The bill, however,
assures that the courts under the antitrust laws will be able
to proscribe activities that are not essential for continuation

of the sports involved.

The

bill

153

contained controversial language that would ultimately preclude

passage into law. In language supported by Chairman Celler,
laws to be applied to

all

it

called for the antitrust

professional sports, exempting only those practices which were

"reasonably necessary" to accomplish four conditions. Those conditions were

competition on the

its

field,

1)

2) the right to operate in specific geographic areas, 3)

preservation of the integrity of the sport, and 4) regulation of telecasting and other

broadcast rights.

154

There was strong opposition to the phrase "reasonably necessary."
that such

vague language would open the flood gates

It

to nuisance litigation.

was argued

Opponents

charged that the "reasonably necessary" clause was so vague as to expose professional
sports leagues to the

full

force of the antitrust laws, which would jeopardize their ability to

maintain competitive balance on the

field.

An alternative

to the Celler

bill

was proposed

Laws to
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Applicability of Antitrust
nd
th
Organized Professional Team Sports (H.R. Rep. No. 1720, 85 Cong, 2 Sess., 1958),
153

,

5.
154

H.R. 10378, 85

,h

Cong, 2

nd

Sess. (1957).

94

p.

by fellow
bill

New Yorker,

Republican Representative, Kenneth Keating. The Walter-Keating

removed the reasonably necessary

exempt.

was believed

It

that this

clause and spelled out the practices which would be

would accomplish

the goals

of the Celler

bill

without

creating opportunities for unreasonable litigation. 155

The House passed

the Walter-Keating

bill

over the strenuous objections of

Chairman Celler and with the considerable help of representatives of all
leagues

it

who descended on

would be

Capitol Hill like locust. The

bill

then went to the Senate where

scrutinized by Senator Estes Kefauver's Subcommittee

Monopoly. Like Chairman
antitrust enforcement.

Celler,

the major sports

on

Antitrust and

Kefauver was a committed advocate of vigorous

156

Kefauver's subcommittee held hearings that made up for lack of productivity with

some very
player,

entertaining testimony.

Mickey Mantle,

New York

Yankees manager, Casey Stengel, and

testified together providing the

Mr. Stengel was well respected by the Senators who
double

talk,

unable to

make any

Senators with great amusement.

listened patiently to his fumbling

sense of it. In hopes of more lucid comments the

Senators turned to Mantle asking his impressions of the matter.

assembled Mantle responded,

"My

vigorously opposed the Walter-Keating

nd

the testimony of Chairman Celler,

bill.

He

155

H.R. 12990, 85

156

Kefauver's support for antitrust enforcement

Cong., 2

the delight of all

views are just about the same as Casey's."

The Senators were persuaded by

th

To

157

who

convinced the Senators that the

bill

was

Sess. (1957).

was

spelled out in detail in his book,

Ina

America (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965).
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and
nd
th
Monopoly Power, Organized Professional Sports Teams. Hearings (85 Cong, 2 Sess.,

Few Hands: Monopoly Power

in

,

157

,

1958), p. 24.
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too broad, virtually granting complete immunity from antitrust
laws. Celler also told the
Senators that such legislation in the absence of a regulatory agency
with jurisdiction over
baseball

85

th

would

158
constitute an unprecedented departure from past regulatory
policy.

Congress closed without Senate action on the

As

The

bill.

baseball entered the 1960s the legislative stalemate continued.

The changing

demographics of the country as well as the expanded importance of television and radio to
professional sports were the primary obstacles in the

self-government.

The

nation's population

was

way of maintaining

shifting south

of the northeast, people were moving to the suburbs

in

baseball's private

and west. Even

in the cities

record numbers. These

new

population centers were increasingly watching their sports on television, and increasingly
they were tuning in to football and basketball, as well as baseball. Congressional scrutiny

throughout the 1950s had not produced government regulation of baseball, but
a part, along with competition from other sports and changing demographics,

it

did play

in forcing

expansion on Major League Baseball. Members of Congress such as California

Republican Pat Hillings relentlessly urged Organized Baseball to expand to the West Coast
or in the alternative to elevate the Pacific Coast League to major league status.

The economic pressures created by competition from other
continuing political pressure from

Members of Congress

face the hard issues presented by expansion.

The

159

sports as well as the

forced Major League Baseball to

refusal to

the desire to maintain the value of current clubs, the need to

expand had been motivated by

manage competition

for

and
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust^
th
2" Sess.,
Monopoly Power, Organized Professional Sports Teams. Hearings, (85 Cong,
158

1958), p. 375-376.
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player talent and the issue of territorial rights. With

its

back against the wall Organized

Baseball, according to baseball historian James Miller, had four options:
First, the

(PCL) a
it

major leagues could give the Pacific Coast League
special classification, suspend the draft, and permit

to build

possibility

up its talents to major league levels. A second
would be to form a special classification league

out of PCL and other minor league teams in major cities and
grant this new league freedom from the draft until it was

A third alternative was to add two or more
teams to each of the existing major leagues. Finally,
Organized Baseball could achieve the goal of increasing the

competitive.

number of cities with major league teams by moving some
of its financially weaker franchises out of cities that already
160
had two teams.

The

first

three options

were unpopular with owners because they would reduce the

value of existing franchises. The

last

option was the least injurious to present owners. In

1952, both the American and National Leagues modified their rules to

make

it

easier for

financially strapped

teams to relocate. The new rules were quickly exploited by the

Boston Braves, the

St.

Louis Browns and the Philadelphia Athletics. Less than one month

before the 1953 season, the Braves

became the Baltimore
Kansas

Orioles.

moved

to

Milwaukee. Also

The following year saw

in

1953, the

Browns

the Philadelphia Athletics

move

to

161

City.

The migration of the Giants and Dodgers

to California at the

end of the 1957

season was the next major change. Brooklyn Dodgers owner, Walter O'Malley decided to

make

159

the

Miller,

(Chapel

move

out west. The major obstacle to moving west was that there were no

James

Hill:

E.,

The Baseball Business: Pursuing Pennants and

The University of North Carolina

160

Miller, p. 14-15.

161

Miller, p. 79.

97

Press, 1990),

p. 6.

Profits in Baltimore,

other teams

on

the

West Coast

The other major league teams would have a

to play.

financial disincentive to travel to the

West Coast

O'Malley convinced the owner of the

to play just one team.

financially struggling

With

this in

New York Giants,

mind

Horace

Stoneham, to move west with him. By moving two teams to California O'Malley
increased the economic viability of such a move. Additionally, the

and Giants greatly reduced the
as

political pressure

Los Angeles Representative Pat

move of the Dodgers

coming from Members of Congress such

162

Hillings.

While the Dodgers' and Giants' migration may have quelled pressure from western

Members of Congress,
second investigation

it

also created

into baseball in

bad feelings

in

New York.

In Congressman Celler's

1957-58 the migration issue was examined. In

hearings before Celler's subcommittee in the aftermath of the move, the chairman angrily

chastised the National

League owners

denounced the pure

Celler

would mirror those

profit

Mayor of New York

City,

loss

if

decisions in baseball

then baseball's antitrust obligations should too.

163

of the Dodgers and Giants to the West Coast, the

Robert Wagner, began courting other National League teams.

new National League

York Lawyer William Shea
city.

O'Malley to move to the West Coast.

motive of the move implying that

in other businesses,

Unable to prevent the

Failing to attract a

for allowing

club to

New York,

the

Mayor encouraged New

to organize a third major league, placing a franchise in the

Baseball's commissioner, Ford Frick, had throughout the 1950s been publicly

supportive of the creation of a third league, however, he never took any action to

162

Miller, p. 79-80.

163

U.S., Congress, House. Committee

on

the Judiciary, Subcommittee
th

Organized Professional Sports Teams. Hearings (85
,

1370.

98

st

Cong.,

1

on

Antitrust,

Sess.,1957), p. 1359-

encourage such a league. Under pressure from Shea's attempt to
Organized Baseball modified

its

rules in

1958 to allow

for a

cities

with over two million people. Organized Baseball

Frick

made

league

it

map

clear,

third league. Shea,

a third league

second major league team

in the

in

person of Commissioner

however, that expansion would require settlement of the current major

as well as a total reorganization of the minor leagues.

On May 21

start

1

164

959, Major League Baseball announced that

who had

it

would welcome a

hired an elderly Branch Rickey to head up the

new

league,

and who had the support of key Members of Congress who begrudged Organized Baseball
its

monopoly, accepted the

was

trying to

draw out or

offer.

stall

Celler and Senator Kafauver,

However,

it

was made

clear that if Organized Baseball

the process, Shea's backers in Congress, such as Chairman

were prepared

to

push through

legislation creating a third

165

league.

With

this

Branch Rickey's Continental League came

surrounding the Continental League were strained and,

for hearings regarding the creation

into being. Negotiations

in 1960,

Senator Kafauver called

of the Continental League, hoping

to pressure

Organized Baseball into expediting the formation of the new league. In the Spring of
1960, the

new

establish a

the

league was at odds with Major League Baseball over Rickey's attempt to

new minor

new minor

league. In response to

Major League Baseball's

refusal to sanction

league, Rickey threatened to raid major league rosters. After

wrangling in Congress with Major League Baseball

allies getting

Continental League supporters, Organized Baseball did what

it

some

the best of the

had always done

on
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee
a
th
Organized Professional Sports Teams. Hearings , (85 Cong., l Sess.,1957),

in the

Antitrust,

164

99

p. 127.

face of challenges to

its

monopoly. They co-opted the upstart league. Voting to expand

the National and American Leagues, Major League Baseball
effectively absorbed the

Continental League.

166

In 1961, with the issue of expansion settled for the moment, Congressional
interest
shifted.

With the encouragement of lobbyists from

Congress began to focus on the
Kafauver had been sponsoring

the major sports leagues, the

of television contracts. Senator Estes

specific issue

bills in

all

each of the

last

two Congresses

that

would

subject

professional sports teams to the strictures of antitrust laws, exempting only those activities

which were deemed

essential for the

provisions in Kafauver' s

antitrust exemption.

bills

commercial

was a provision

viability

of the

sports.

Among the

to give league television contracts an

167

Friends of baseball, as well as

all

the other professional sports, in Congress were

able to separate out this specific exemption

making

it

a stand alone

serious lobbying by the major professional sport leagues, congressional

exemptions were able to push through

this limited

With the help of

bill.

exemption. Public

allies

Law

87-331 would

allow professional football, basketball, hockey and baseball leagues to enter

television contracts.

The opposition of the major

of sports

into certain

television networks, as well as

congressional antitrust advocates like Celler and Kafauver, was blunted by the fact that

there

in

was consensus on

the need for such an exemption.

Kafauver' s more comprehensive

bill

made

it

'"Miller, p. 81.
,66

Zimbalist, P. 16-17.
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The

fact that

difficult for antitrust

it

was a provision

advocates to

fight.

This was a major victory for Organized Baseball.

1950s baseball had stood alone

in

defending

its

More

special status.

often than not during the

The other

backed off early on from a strategy of seeking a blanket exemption

sports had

for all sports.

Unfavorable court decisions and a clear unwillingness on the part of Congress to enact

such an exemption forced professional
position,

which put them

at

and hockey to take a

fall

back

odds with Organized Baseball. The other major sports

leagues began advocating that

all

football, basketball

all

sports be subjected equally to the antitrust laws and that

sports be granted limited exemptions.

When the

issue

of exempting television contracting by leagues came up,

professional sports leagues supported

it.

Television revenue

was an

all

the

increasingly important

aspect of the business of professional sports. Indeed, professional football, basketball and

hockey only began to

rival baseball as

sporting events. Baseball, however,

a commercial enterprise with the advent of televised

would

benefit disproportionately by this limited

exemption. For the other major sports the exemption provided the potential for greater
television revenue

and control. For Organized Baseball,

most dangerous threats to

its

private self government.

it

also short circuited

Media contracts had been one of

the most controversial aspects of professional sports in the 1950s and 1960s.

the onset of television that

made

one of the

It

had been

baseball's interstate commercial character so clear.

Team

revenues from television broadcasts had by 1961 become almost as important as

attendance.

By

resolving the contentious issue of television contracting the Congress

gTeatly reduced the political pressure

on Organized

Baseball, leaving only the question of

the Antitrust Laws
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Applicability of
n
th
Sports, (88 Cong., 2
to Certain Aspects of Designated Organized Profes sional Team
167

101

baseball's disparate treatment with regard to antitrust law.
This issue

cutting television out

of the equation Congress

was not new and by

effectively eliminated a

major source of

pressure for eliminating baseball's privileged position.

With the expansion following the Continental League challenge and the apparent
legislative settlement

status

of the high stakes matter of media

once again receded from the

commercial status would be eclipsed
political

threats

and

Although

spotlight.

professional sports and antitrust laws

would re-emerge
in the

its

legislative proposals regarding

in

1964-65, baseball's special

minds of the American people by greater

social issues in the 1960s. Baseball's

from within

regulation, baseball's special

anomalous

legal status

would

face

ranks in the coming years.

Baseball in the immediate postwar era

saw

the transformation of its

game from an

exalted position as the nation's "national pastime" and as a source of tremendous cultural

pride to a position of one

among many. The explosion of mass media technology,

the

changing demography of the nation and the increased popularity of other professional
sports

all

combined to

alter drastically the

environment

in

which baseball operated.

Despite their successful efforts to protect baseball's special legal status

in the courts

and

Congress, Organized Baseball took some lumps during the ao^ninistrations of

Commissioners Chandler, Frick and William Eckert (1945-1965).
Judge Landis' successors would not have the unlimited power of baseball's
commissioner, nor would their game be unrivaled
position of commissioner

and

'60s, the position

became

increasingly an

of the players, or

in the national consciousness.

102

As

the

arm of management through the 1950s

labor, evolved in turn.

Sess.,1964), p. 4-5.

first

Controversy over the

in

funding of the players pension fund in 1953 has spurred the creation
of the Major League
Baseball Players Association

(MLBPA), which at

the time

was merely an information

clearinghouse for players. However, this organization would evolve into a

full

fledged

union by 1966. Also, competition from other sports such as basketball, football and

hockey would become
which

significant in the

lent itself to these fester,

The

1950s and 1960s with the advent of television,

time-bound sports.

MLBPA led by Marvin Miller would transform baseball's antiquated

labor/management relations into a much more conventional

industrial arrangement.

The

business of baseball, by the late 1960s, would increasingly be conducted like a business,

not an enterprise with special cultural significance. Baseball's united front in defending

anomalous

The

status

would be

irreparably fractured

threat to baseball's private self government

its

by the development of the players union.

would

in the future

come

as

much from

within as from without.

Baseball's evolution into a

adversarial relationship

more conventional

between labor and management, would

of its private self-government. The

undue

restrictions

industry, with the conventional

ability

of players

greatly threaten the pillars

in other sports to operate

without

caused baseball players to increase the pressure on Organized Baseball

to dismantle the cornerstone

of Baseball Law, the reserve

103

clause.

CHAPTER

III

THE NEW POLITICS OF THE OLD BALL GAME

Baseball's unregulated

monopoly survived

the Progressive Era because

it

shared

the values and goals of the Progressives and because the regulatory institutions of the state

were not yet mature enough to bring
institutions

grew, the nation

moved

As

affirmative regulation to baseball.

into

what Eisner

the state's

calls the associationalist regulatory

regime. This quasi-corporatist regime, in which the regulated community

was

incorporated into the regulatory decision-making apparatus, was pre-occupied with the
imperatives of economic depression and world war. Organized Baseball preserved

anomaly by providing comfort to a troubled nation and not
stability in the

game, as well as

its

raising any eyebrows.

its

Internal

role in boosting public morale, camouflaged baseball's

private self government during a time

when government

regulators had

more urgent

matters with which to deal.

Although
actually created

decisions

were

it

is

commonly seen

as the genesis of the welfare state, the

what sociologist John Wilson

calls a "franchise state" in

largely delegated to the regulated community.

which there was a

shift

168

The

New Deal

which regulatory

real welfare state, in

to predominately direct regulation of industry,

is

more accurately

associated with Eisner's societal regime, which he sees as existing in the 1960s and 1970s.

Its origins trace

168

to President

Lyndon Johnson's Great

Society programs in the mid-1960s.

Rules (Detroit:
Wilson, John, Sport. Society, and the State. Plaving by the
,

State University Press, 1994), p. 147.

104

Wayne

It

was during

its

the societal regime that baseball's unregulated

most severe

monopoly would come under

attack.

The Regulatory Regime of the 1960s and 1970s
Eisner's societal regime, "like the Progressive Era and the era of the

was characterized by

economy."

169

The

result

of the emergent

interests

was

policy in the 1930s the harsh fluctuations in the nation's

the post- World

War

II

new

the creation

change shaped by a new administrative philosophy and a

institutional

new conception of political economy. With the dawn of Keynesian economic

By

Deal,

the formation and mobilization of new interests demanding a

role for the state in the

of public policy and

New

years the roller coaster that

economy were

was

stabilization

gradually tamed.

the business cycle had been

transformed into a merry-go-round. Eisner sums up the distinction between the old

regimes and the societal regime:

Owing

macro-economic management, the
the business cycle during the first two

to active

fluctuations in

War

were mild by comparison with
those during the previous half-century; and thus, during this

decades after World

II

later period, unlike the earlier ones, structural

economy did not drive group
addition, the new regime differed with

transformations in the
mobilization. In

respect to the kinds of policies initiated. Whereas earlier

regimes had focused on questions of economic regulation,
the

169

Eisner,

Marc

new regime

new

170

social regulations.

Allen, Regulatory Politics in Transition , (Baltimore:

University Press, 1993),
170

concentrated on

p.

1

18.

Eisner, p. 118.

105

The Johns Hopkins

Because the
insulated

structural

economy had been

stabilized, in that the nation

from extreme economic depression, regulatory focus

particularly those resulting

The

late

from the

capitalist

was

shifted to social problems,

production process.

1960s and 1970s saw the creation of numerous "public"

which sought to address the negative
These public

interest

the so-called

"New Left." 171

goods and services

essentially

externalities

groups were animated by the

of the

capitalist

political

interest groups,

production process.

and economic philosophy of

Their substantive purpose was to "improve the quality of the

that are produced,

which threaten human health and
groups of the societal regime

173

life,

and the by-products of the
and the environment."

were dominated by the

172

industrial

economy

These public

belief that the

New Deal had

devolved into an "impersonal, bureaucratic, centralized form of governance

dehumanizing American society."
policy

174

The

whose

lust for profit

that

was

New Left charged that the quasi-corporatist

making procedures of the administrative

interests

interest

crowded out the

state

were controlled by big business

public interest.

The

destruction of the

environment, the manipulation of consumers, and the endangerment of workers were said

to be the result

of the "capture" of the government's regulatory agencies by big business

For a comprehensive description of the "New Left" see, Lindbeck, Assar,. The Political
Economy of the New Left (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977), and Reich,
171

.

Charles,

The Greening of America (New York: Random House
.

Publishing, 1970).

172

Eisner, p. 119.

173

Eisner's regulatory regime framework in general and his societal regime in particular

find parallel expression in Harris, Richard

Change:

A Tale of Two

and Milkis

call the

Agencies ,

and Sidney Milkis' The

(New York: Oxford

Politics

of Regulatory

University Press, 1989). Harris

regulatory regime of the late 1960s and 1970s the "public lobby

regime."
174

"The Presidency, Policy Reform, and the Rise of Administrative
Harris and Milkis, (eds.), Remaking American Politics (San Francisco:

Milkis, Sidney,

Politics," in

Westview

,

Press, 1989), p. 164.

106

interests.

In baseball, this translates to the capture of the commissioner
by the owners'

interests.

These public-interest groups, which proliferated

at

an extreme rate between 1965-

1975, sought to open up the regulatory decision making process to average citizens and

consumers. Staffed by veterans of the

civil rights

and anti-war movements of the 1960s,

public interest groups sought to democratize legislative and administrative politics by

introducing public participation into regulatory policy making.
critique

of both big business and big government, public

political activists

shepherded dramatic reforms

interest

amendments

sociologist,

groups and

New Left

New Left

in

by the policy entrepreneurs of

to the Administrative Procedures Act,

which governs executive branch agency rule-making.

The

with the

in the regulatory process. Participatory

reforms included extensive congressional reforms ushered
the "Class of '74" as well as significant

Armed

175

group movement was made up of people who hold what

public-interest

Ronald Inglehart,

176

calls "post-industrial values."

Inglehart,

whose work

is

premised on the validity of Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, hypothesizes
that people

who

enjoy high levels of economic and physical security

in their formative

years develop distinct political and social values. In this view, the generation that grew

up

175

in the

economic and physical

The "Class of '74"

year,

who

security

refers to the liberal

of the postwar years had

Democratic freshman

distinguished themselves as reformers

of legislative

fulfilled its

class

lower order

of congressmen

that

and administrative

processes. For a comprehensive discussion of New Left reforms see, Brand, Donald,
"Reformers of the 1960s and 1970s," in Harris and Milkis (eds.), Remaking American
Politics ,
176

(San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989),

See, Inglehart, Ronald,

Among Western Publics

,

The

Silent Revolution:

p.

27-51.

Changing Values and

Political Sty les

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). Inglehart's work,

107

needs and thus shifted
people

who no

its

focus to higher order needs. 177 Based on Maslow's hierarchy,

longer need to strive for food, shelter and clothing

materialist ends)

(i.e.,

are able to strive for the higher order needs of love, esteem and self
actualization
post-materialist values).

and

178

political perceptions

in turn

These higher order or

of the generation

shaped the ideology,

institutions

post-materialist values shaped the social

came of age

that

(i.e.

and even the

in the

interests

1960s and 1970s, which

of the societal regime.

While the associational regime was characterized by the need to bring about

economic

stability,

the societal regime took economic stability for granted and instead

focused on the goal of improving social justice and the quality of life
agencies created in furtherance of social regulatory goals included

Employment Opportunity Commission (1965),
(1970), the National

Highway

in

America.

among

New

others the Equal

the Environmental Protection

Agency

Traffic Safety Administration (1970), the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (1970), the National Oceanic and Aeronautic

Administration (1970), the Consumer Product Safety Administration (1972), and the Mine
Safety and Health Administration (1973).

These agencies, unlike

their

New Deal Era predecessors,

management of economic competition within

industries.

were not focused on the

They were,

in fact,

focused on

the amelioration of negative externalities produced by unregulated production processes.

These agencies would impose broad regulations

although seminal,

is

affecting

numerous

only one example of a wide literature on the

industries.

shift

from

The

materialist to

post-materialist values in advanced industrial societies.

means that the people who grew up in the physical and economic
materialistic values and thus
insecurity of the first half of the twentieth century developed
perceptions.
focused on lower order needs, which colored their social and political
177

By

implication this

108

harmful effects of these

new

social regulations

were deemed inconsequential compared to
social regulations

relationship

the

initiatives

of the

costs

societal

and replaced

societal regime

it

with a

much more

on

also a product

of the

political

power

benefits.

industrial firms that

These

would cut

in the regulatory

regime of

adversarial one.

and social environments toward consumers, workers, and

a players union that negotiates from a

and competition

regime destroyed the harmonious

of the 1960s and 1970s saw a

concentrated economic or political power. The

efficiency

and environmental

between the regulators and the regulated, forged

New Deal,
The

their social

would impose high compliance

The regulatory

into profits.

upon economic

new

shift in

the political, institutional

and away from

individuals,

politics

of baseball, characterized by

position of virtual parity with the owners,

is

and regulatory environment of the 1960s and 1970s. Just as

the institutions, interests and values of the Progressive Era and the

New Deal had been

instrumental in determining the fate of baseball's private self government, so too would

the regulatory regime of the 1960s and 1970s affect the game's anomalous status.

The 1960s and 1970s saw

the partial erosion of Baseball

emergence of a powerful players association, whose pressure
bargaining to the game, Baseball

regulation. Television and

Law

Law. Because of the

tactics

brought collective

has increasingly become subject to public

mass sports marketing removed any doubts

that the

game was

indeed a matter of interstate commerce. The political atmosphere of the societal regime

made

it

easier for players to turn to the state for relief and protection

the owners.

178

The

political climate

from the tyranny of

of the 1960s provided legitimacy and public support

See Maslow, Abraham, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper
,

Publishers, 1954).
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& Row

for

the players attempts to claim

full citizenship in baseball.

The

players

simply for more money. They were fighting for rights— "workers"

were not

rights.

fighting

In this way,

they can be seen as animated by "post-materialist values."

Most

useful to the players cause were laws created during the

sought to protect workers'

179

rights.

The most

significant

New Deal that

of these was the National Labor

Relations Act of 1935. This act created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),

which would have regulatory jurisdiction over labor/management
engaged

in

baseball

was

or affecting interstate commerce.

in

1946 when the

redress from the

practices.

The

180

ill-fated players

The

first

relations in

all

industries

opportunity for this law to affect

union, the American Baseball Guild, sought

NLRB over its claim that the owners had engaged in unfair labor

NLRB declined to investigate the matter on jurisdictional grounds.
NLRB ruled that baseball was not a matter of interstate

Echoing the courts, the

commerce, and therefore

fell

The posture of the

NLRB reversed its

1

outside the jurisdiction of the board.

NLRB would not change until the late

181

1960s. In 1969, the

946 position on baseball by claiming jurisdiction

in

a case involving an

attempt by American League Umpires to unionize. In American League of Professional

Baseball Clubs and Association of National Baseball League Umpires, the Board held
that recently the courts

despite their failure to

179

Wilson,

p.

had found

lift

that baseball

was a matter of interstate commerce,

the exemption created in Federal Baseball. Accordingly, the

186- 187.

& Herman Belz, The American Constitution Its
488.
Origins and Development. Vol. IL (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), p.
180

Kelly, Alfred H., Winfred A. Harbison,

181

Wilson, p. 187.
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Board ruled
such

is

that "professional baseball

subject to

an industry

Board jurisdiction under

The Board

the Act."

in

or affecting commerce, and as

182

spelled out four factors that mitigated in favor of their assertion of

jurisdiction. First, the

regulation,"

is

which

Board found

relies

that

Organized Baseball's system of "internal

upon the commissioner

self-

to resolve labor disputes, "appears to

have been designed almost entirely by employers and owners." The Board found
arrangement to be unlikely "either to prevent labor disputes from

this

arising in the future, or,

having once arisen, to resolve them in a manner susceptible or conducive to voluntary

compliance by

all

The second

parties involved."

factor

was

the board's finding that the

Umpires' Union was indeed a labor union within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act.

finally,

The

third factor

was

baseball's undisputed interstate character.

And

the board rejected the owners contention that the umpires were supervisors, and

thus did not meet the definition of labor contained in the Act.

This 1969

NLRB decision guaranteed the players'

in collective bargaining.

The

players union

would marshal

collective bargaining rights with great effect.

of the gains of the players' association

The

threat

in the 1970s.

association the right to engage

this state

endorsement of its

of NLRB action stood behind

The emasculation of the century old

reserve clause could not have been accomplished without the state's protection of the

players right to bargain collectively.

Sports, Final Report, (H.
U.S. Congress. House, Select Committee on Professional
nd
,h
Rep. No. 1786, 94 Cong., 2 Sess., 1977), p. 458.
183
Committee on Professional Sports, Final Report (H.
U S. Congress, House, Select
nd
th
458-461.
Rep. No. 1786, 94 Cong., 2 Sess., 1977), p.
182

,

Ill

all

The development of the

MLBPA into a full-fledged, and very powerful, union was

the by-product of the regulatory climate of the 1960s. While the legislative and
administrative initiatives of the societal regime were not directly related to unions, they did
create an atmosphere that

was amenable

baseball that meant the players.

The

Ralph Nader, speaking out for the

to the

empowerment of the

disenfranchised. In

spectacle of public-interest groups, and activists like

rights

of consumers and

citizens to participate in

regulatory decision making, as well as the emergence of post-materialist values across
society, contributed to the efforts

of the

MLBPA to claim participatory rights for the

"locked out" citizens of baseball, the players. The players union's goal was to
players into the governance of baseball in the same

way that Ralph Nader and

inject the

others were

attempting to inject consumers onto the production process.

The
interests

New Left critique of a closed system of governance, dominated by corporate

would

surely not sound foreign to baseball players in the 1960s.

attempt to correct the defects of pluralism by securing a place

for the public interest

was not

The

at the policy

New Left's

making

table

unlike the players union's attempt to attain a role for the

players in the policy making process of Major League Baseball.

Marvin Miller and the

MLBPA

The onset of conventional

labor/

management

relations in

Organized Baseball

the mid-1960s transformed the sport. While baseball had been a big

at least the

turn of the century,

it

had never resembled a conventional

evolution of the Major League Baseball Players Association

information clearinghouse into a

money

full

in

business since

industry.

The

(MLBPA) from an

reform
fledged labor union was the catalyst for major

112

in

Organized Baseball's private self-government. The

MLBPA would become a powerful

player in the struggle over baseball's unregulated monopoly.
players' association

would be the century old reserve

The union would become an
control of the game.

late

of the

owners unhindered
originally designed

1960s become increasingly sympathetic

Since the death of Landis, the baseball owners gradually weakened the

power of the commissioner,
truly independent

union.

effective counter balance to the

had by the

target

clause.

The post of commissioner of baseball, which was

to act as a disinterested arbitrator,

to the owners.

The primary

subjecting the post to

commissioner to protect

more control by

the owners. Without a

their interests, the players turned to the

184

Unionization was not popular with owners or players in the 1950s. The

MLBPA,

created in 1953, had been intended to perform the limited duty of administering the

pension fund. The organizers of the association were careful to rebut fears that a union

was being formed.
telling

Player representative Allie Reynolds tried to calm these fears by

The Sporting News

suspicion that

we

that he

in baseball

do with the enterprise."

185

had "nothing against unions

were moving towards a union,

I

in industry.

But

if I

had any

would not have anything

to

Reynolds and fellow player representative, Ralph Kiner, had

raised the fears of unionization by their efforts to secure various concessions from the

owners

in the

summer of 1953. They gave

the owners a

list

of demands, which included

For a comprehensive treatment of the history of labor relations in baseball see David
Voigt, "Serfs versus Magnates," in Paul Staudohar & James Mangan (eds.), The Business
of Professional Sports (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), p. 95-1 14; Leo
184

.

Lowenfish and Tony Lupien, The Imperfect Diamond (New York: Stein
,

113

& Day,

1980).

matters such as a raise in the

Norman Lewis

The owners, who

to advise them.

player/management

December, 1953.

initially

players hired lawyer

acquiesced to Lewis' attendance

settled without

Lewis and the newly formed

Bob Feller, was

president,

Friend, the National

Sporting

News

He

is

need a union

bad for the game because
pastime.

denounced

"the reserve clause

that the players did not

it

for the

calls to unionize

MLBPA,

wrote an

Bob

article in

Major League Baseball

The

players.

an absolute must for the survival of baseball" and
at

all.

would betray

He

concluded that a baseball union would be

the special cultural significance of the national

claimed that possible player strikes would threaten baseball's image and that

the "spectacle of someone like Stan Musial picketing the ballpark"

game.

MLBPA's

a strong opponent of collective bargaining. In 1963,

League player representative

that sharply

He argued that

would destroy the

187

The MLBPA's anti-union sentiments were
Robert Cannon as the association's

Quoted

in

Staudohar

Korr, Charles

Miller,

(Chapel

made

legal advisor replacing

"Marvin Miller and the

clear

Lewis

by the appointment of

in

1960. Cannon, a

New Unionism in Baseball," in Paul

Hill:

1

99 1 ),

p.

1 1

6.

The Baseball Business: Pursuing Pennants and Profits
The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 13-14.

James

Quoted

P.,

also

& James Mangan (eds.), The Business of Professional Sports, (Chicago:

University of Illinois Press,

187

MLBPA

relegated to the role of assisting in the administration of the fund. Sentiment

first

186

in

186

throughout the game remained staunchly anti-union well into the 1960s. The

185

J.

suddenly barred the attorney from talks on the pension fund

talks,

The pension fund matter was

was

as well as the issue of funding the players

When the owners rejected their demands the

pension fund.

at

minimum salary

E.,

in Korr, p. 116.

114

in Baltimore,

Milwaukee

circuit court judge,

was widely known to be

interested in the job

of

commissioner of baseball. Historian James Miller characterizes Cannon's management
of
the players' affairs as being "in the interests of labor peace and the owners'

pocketbooks."

188

Several commentators have quoted Cannon's testimony in a 1964 Senate

committee hearing on baseball and

antitrust issues in

and claims on behalf of the players

that

for next."

189

Marvin Miller would

"we have

later write that

it

which he praises the reserve clause

so

good we don't know what

to ask

Cannon "never met an owner he

didn't

190

like."

By

MLBPA.

1966, the players were ready to appoint a full-time executive director for the

Still

not comfortable with the idea of a labor union, the players offered the job

to

Judge Cannon,

an

office,

and a

who

staff*

The owners feared

surprisingly refused

it.

The

issue

for the association created tension

that a

of creating a permanent

between the players and owners.

permanent executive director would move the organization

toward a more adversarial relationship with management
191

position.

The

director,

selection

of Marvin Miller by the

in order to legitimate his

own

MLBPA executive committee

contributed to those fears.

188

Miller, p. 141.

189

Quoted

Billions:

A

Andrew, Baseball and
Pastime , (New York:
National
our
of
Probing Look Inside the Big Business

in;

Lowenfish,

Basicbooks, 1992),
190

Miller, Marvin,

p. 191; J. Miller, p. 142; Zimbalist,

p. 17.

A Whole Different Ball Game:

(New York: Carol Publishing Group,

The Sport and Business of Baseball,

1991), p. 6.

from the 1960s to
The Sport and Business of
the 1980s see, Miller, Marvin, A Whole Different Ballgame:
Bowie, Hardball: The
Baseball (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991), and Kuhn,
Education of a Baseball Commissioner, (New York: TimesBooks, 1987).
191

For partisan descriptions of labor/management

115

relations in baseball

Miller

was a recognized

labor law expert.

chief economist with the Steelworkers Union.

executive committee

labor/management

knew

that Miller

relations.

By

He had

earned his reputation as the

The members of the

would bring a more

adversarial perspective to

1966, players were beginning to

exploited. Complaints about playing conditions,

minimum

players' association

feel that

they were being

salary levels, inadequate

pensions, large bonuses to amateur players, and even racial discrimination were

After his selection by the executive committee of the

appointment would have to be

ratified

by the

and a thug. His
Svengali.

critics

interests.

Miller's

players. Miller spent the spring

going from team to team, explaining to the players
could protect and forward their

MLBPA,

how a strong

The owners

common.

of 1966

independent organization

tried to paint

him as a labor

accused him of brainwashing players. They called him a

192

The

players' apprehensions about unions, however,

would be overridden by a

general atmosphere of discontent in the nation, as well as specific grievances that

union seem palatable. The players saw
expansion of their

were bringing

own sport,

to the

not getting their

and the huge amounts of money

a

that television broadcasts

game. These factors combined to make players

fair share.

made

salaries rising rapidly in professional football, the

feel that they

In addition, the players appetite for collective action

wetted by the example of the Dodgers Sandy Koufax and
Prior to the 1966 season, as Miller

Don Drysdale.

was campaigning

Korr, p. 121-123, 133.

116

were

was

193

for the players vote

of

confidence, Koufax and Drysdale teamed up in an effort to gain increases in their

192

agitator

salaries.

Combining

their interests, they hired

Dodger management was forced
collective holdout until they

a lawyer to negotiate

to negotiate with the

their

two

were offered an acceptable

1966

salaries.

star players

who

The

staged a

salary increase. In April

1966,

the players ratified the appointment of Miller.

The owners reacted
the

to Miller's appointment by reneging

on

their

MLBPA permanent office with proceeds from the all-star game.

promise to fund

In addition,

according to historian James Miller, the owners vented their anger by blacklisting veteran
pitcher

Robin Roberts, who, as a member of the

instrumental in selecting Miller.

194

MLBPA executive committee, had been

The seemingly

punitive nature of the

owners

refusal to

fund Miller's office, as well as the successful collective bargaining of Drysdale and

Koufax, provided the

who had been

new

executive director with the opportunity to win over players

reluctant to create a labor organization.

The owners claimed

that funding the office

would

Taft-Hartley Act, which prohibits employers from paying

The owners

organizations.

tactics

would have

constitute a violation

money

to

of the

employee

several unintended consequences.

Not

only would the episode solidify player support for Miller and a strong union type

organization,

Baseball.

By

it

also

opened up a Pandora's box of legal

vulnerabilities for

Organized

invoking Taft-Hartley the owners exposed baseball's labor-management
195

relations to legal challenges.

193

Rader, Benjamin, Baseball:

Illinois Press,

A History of America's Game

,

(Chicago: University of

1992), p. 189.

194

Miller, p. 143.

195

For a detailed discussion of the owners

refusal to fund the

Miller's response, see Korr, p. 122-127.

117

MLBPA office as well as

Using the threat of such challenges Miller negotiated a player

friendly settlement

with the owners. The settlement included a raise in the owners' contribution
to the
pension fund and the elimination of the requirement for the players regular contribution.
Essentially, the

owners were forced to assume

responsibility for funding the entire pension

plan in order to wiggle out of their ill-considered decision to renege on funding Miller's
office.

Prior to the 1967 season, Miller announced that he would pursue negotiations with

management on a contract covering
the

all

aspects of labor/management relations.

owners might have harbored about the

becoming a

players' association not

Any hopes
full-fledged

union were crushed by Miller's declarations. The owners, however, did not believe that
Miller

would be

able to hold the players together under pressure.

bogged down by continued management
Finally, in

negotiations were

designed to test the players unity.

January 1968, Miller and the owners recently hired professional negotiator,

John Gaherin, made a

owners

stalling tactics

The

in the face

deal.

Baseball's

first

"Basic Agreement" was acceded to by the

of threats by Miller to bring

in federal mediators.

The agreement was a

two-year contract that increased the iriinimiim salary from $7,000 to $10,000, gave
players the explicit right to hire professional agents, and established a grievance procedure

whereby the commissioner
years in the league.

arbitrated contract disputes for players

The agreement

also set

who had

at least three

up a joint study group on the reserve

196

clause.

The following

year, Miller

moved on the

issue

of increasing the owners

television
contribution to the pension fund. Given the huge profits being garnered by

118

contracts, Miller sought to obtain a percentage

owners were indignant about

of those

Miller's proposal.

to television revenues. In response to the

profits for the pension fund.

They claimed

that the players

owners unwillingness

The

had no

right

to link their pension

contribution to television revenues, Miller asked the players to refuse to sign their
1969
contracts.

The

resulting holdouts

veteran players.

When the

left

spring training

camps without

the majority of their

holdout threatened the regular season the television networks

threatened not to pay to televise games played without the veteran players. Historian

Benjamin Rader quotes an

NBC executive as saying that his network would not "pay

major league prices for minor league games."

197

The pressure from

the television networks

hastened a settlement of the dispute. Because Commissioner Eckert had been

owners

earlier that year, National

League lawyer, Bowie Kuhn, was

called

on

fired

by the

to broker an

agreement between the owners and the union. In the settlement the owners would agree
to increase their contribution to the pension plan but not to contribute a percentage of the

television revenues.

Shortly after this settlement,

Kuhn was

appointed commissioner of

baseball.

In the winter of 1969, the

a player. Curt Flood

was a

new

commissioner, Bowie Kuhn, received a

letter

thirty-two year old outfielder with the St. Louis Cardinals, a

team with which he had spent

his entire eleven year career.

He was

writing to the

commissioner to complain about having been traded suddenly to the Philadelphia
without his consent. Flood asked

196
197

189-191;

Rader,

p.

Rader,

p. 190.

J.

from

Kuhn to

intercede

on

his behalf, arguing that his tenure

Miller, p. 142-144; Korr, p. 125-128.
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Phillies

in the league

had earned him the

own destiny. The

right to determine his

commissioner

refused to assist Flood. In January 1970, with the backing of the players association,

Flood

an

filed

Major League BasebalL 198

antitrust suit against

MLBPA executive director Marvin Miller orchestrated Flood's challenge of
baseball's storied exemption. Miller convinced the association to finance Flood's lawsuit.

Miller also personally recruited former

Supreme Court

Justice Arthur

Goldberg to

represent Flood. Despite the financial backing of the players union, Flood received no
significant public support

from any major league

laments that the association

Flood.

He

case had

made

little

players. In his autobiography, Miller

effort to organize big

name

players in support of

speculates that the players were not yet solidly united as a union and that

come up

after the

1972 players

might have been a greater show of

strike, there

support from the players. The only support offered by fellow players came
court testimony from Jackie Robinson,

It

may be

Hank Greenberg, Jim Brosnan and

in the

Bill

form of

Veeck.

199

argued, however, that the silence of the players during the Flood case represents

an improvement compared to the dozens of active-players who were compelled

in

if the

support of the reserve rule during congressional hearings

Flood's lawsuit was heard

in federal district court

in the

to testify

1950s.

by Judge Irving Ben Cooper.

Judge Cooper heard the case without a jury, weighing more than 2,000 pages of testimony

and dozens of evidentiary documents as well as the arguments of the

20

litigants.

The

trial

Judge ruled against Flood, upholding the Federal Baseball decision as a matter of stare

198

Lowenfish and Lupien,

199

The Flood case

200

is

p.

206-207; Zimbalist,

p. 18-19.

discussed extensively in Miller,

p.

169-202.

The
Koppett, Leonard, "Reserve Clause Could Aid Management, Veeck Says,"

Sporting

News

(June 27, 1970),

p. 30.
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decisis.

In his opinion for the court, Judge

baseball's significance

pervasive that

that baseball

one to keep

would not

it

wrote, "Baseball's status

there."

The second

his

is

understanding of

in the life

strain credulity to say that the court

everybody's business.... The game

is

it

when he

Cooper revealed

of the nation

on higher ground;

of appeals

circuit court

also rejected Flood's assault

statutory regulation,

the congressman face his constituents the next

let

decision the court held, "If baseball

face the consequences of his baseball voting record." 202

trial

it

behooves every

201

its

of the

so

can take judicial notice

treasured immunity. In

that

is

court,

was

littered

is

to be

on

baseball's

damaged by

November and

The appeals court

opinion, like

with praise of baseball's cultural significance. In

concurring opinion for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge

also

his

Moore recounted

the

heroes of baseball's past claiming that baseball's most notable players "were probably
better

known

to a greater

exploits better

In the

number of our populous than many of our statesmen; and

remembered than some of our outstanding

summer of 972,
1

the

public figures."

Supreme Court received

the

their

203

Flood case and thus was

faced with the antitrust exemption question once again. Once more, the Court refused to

tamper with

its

Federal Baseball decision, holding that while baseball indeed was a matter

of interstate commerce, the game's long standing
precedent

the

made

it

202

on

the Federal Baseball

necessary for the legislature to address the anomaly. In Flood

Supreme Court

v.

Kuhn,

opinion, written by Harry Blackmun, reads like a testimonial to the

cultural significance

201

reliance

of baseball

in

America. Blackmun' s ode to baseball was even more

Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (1970).
Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264(1971).
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extravagant than that of the lower courts. Throughout the legal odyssey of
Flood, from
the

court to the Supreme Court, one message

trial

special!

for the

204

is

repeatedly affirmed: Baseball

Despite the instability in baseball since the end of World

game was

alive

and well

in

on

in

Flood

v.

Kuhn

served to focus the efforts of the

the collective bargaining process as the

way

to effect reform

reserve clause. After half a century and numerous court challenges,

judicially created

the reverence

II,

1972.

The Supreme Court decision
players association

War

exemption was not going to be corrected by the

it

was

courts.

the

deemed necessary

for

its stability.

wisdom of repealing Federal

Even Marvin

Moreover, the

made
.

that

He went on to recommend

"would be

fair to

game and any

Miller himself had doubts about

Baseball. In an interview in the spring of 1969 Miller

told a reporter that "a chaotic situation could exist

the reserve clause."

of the

clear that the

court opinions in the Flood case illustrated the continuing reverence for the

practices

is

if a

law

suit

overthrew the

that a "substitute

legality

of

arrangement" should be

both the club and the player and that would stand up

in

,,205

court.

Even before

the

outcome of Flood,

collective bargaining process to achieve

included another raise of the

Impasse

in negotiations

minimum

its

the players association set

goals.

sights

on the

The second Basic Agreement of 1970

salary and a reduction in the

over the funding of the pension fund would

203

its

maximum

salary cut.

set off the first regular

Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F. 2d at 269.
and the Rule of
This argument is made by David Curie in "On Higher Ground: Baseball
29-62.
Flood v. Kuhn:' Legal References Services Quarterly 8 (1988), p.
Sporting News (February 1,
205
Broeg, Bob, "Just What Prompted Flood Lawsuit?" The

204

1970), p. 33.
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season, industry-wide players strike in April, 1972. Historian Benjamin
Rader describes
the issues surrounding baseball's "first real strike."

Ostensibly, the strike revolved around

how

the players'

pension fund would be financed, but in the background
hovered the general agreement that would be negotiated

in

1973 and the status of the reserve clause that was being
argued before the Supreme Court. Even though the owners

had just negotiated a new television contract with NBC for
$70 million, they initially rejected any increase in the share
going to the player pension fund. A powerful minority of
the

owners wanted to

union.

Baseball's

first

industry-wide strike lasted only nine days into the 1972 regular

The settlement of the

season.

strike garnered the players a

owners contribution to the pension
players,

however, the

players in

1

seize the opportunity to break the

206

real benefit

fund.

of the

It

strike

972 contrasted sharply with the

owners much more than the

players.

cost

The

$500,000 increase

them $600,000

would be reaped

disunity

in lost

later.

in the

wages. For the

The

of the owners. The

unity of the

strike

had cost the

players demonstrated their willingness to suffer

short term losses for long term gains and in so doing greatly increased their bargaining

power

in

an increasingly adversarial relationship with management.

The resolve demonstrated by

the players in 1972

would

benefit

them

in

negotiations over the third Basic Agreement in 1973. Although the reserve clause was

in tact, the players

were granted the

right to impartial arbitration

left

of contract disputes.

Instead of the commissioner settling salary disputes, any player with at least two years in
the league could submit his case to a three-member arbitration board.

consist of one

206

Rader,

member chosen by

the owners, one

p. 191.
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member chosen by

The board would
the players, and one

independent member. The board was charged with accepting either the
player's salary
207
request or the owner's proposed salary, with the decision binding on both
parties.

Salary arbitration would
association and

would

become one of the most

achievements of the players

lead to the virtual dismantling of the century old reserve clause.

In the winter of 1975, the

Two

significant

new

arbitration procedure bore

National League players, the Los Angeles Dodgers pitcher

the Montreal

Expos

pitcher

that the reserve clause

Dave McNally,

209

significant fruit.

Andy Messersmith and
They argued

clause and that by playing the 1975 season

fulfilled their obligations.

Seitz ruled in favor of the players.

most

petitioned for free agent status.

was a one-year option

without a contract, they had

its

208

Independent arbitrator Peter

The owners responded by

his ruling to the courts. U.S. district court Judge,

firing Seitz

John Olver ruled

and appealing

that the Seitz decision

should stand. The Eighth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals also upheld Seitz' s ruling,
holding that the collective bargaining agreement between the players and owners gave
Seitz the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the grievances of Messersmith and McNally.

court, however,

rather

on the

was

careful to note that

it

was not

ruling

on the reserve clause

specific case at hand. Furthermore, the appeals court

itself,

The
but

echoed the sentiments
210

of previous courts

207

in saying that baseball is not

Quirk, James and

Rodney

Fort,

Pay

Dirt:

a matter for the courts.

The Business of Professional Team Sports

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p.
208

209

,

194-195.

Quirk and Fort, p. 195.
Seitz had been an arbitrator between the

late

NBA and the NBA Players Association in the
1960s when he helped to clarify the NBA standard contract making clear that
it

without a contract.
players were effectively free agents after playing out their option year
contracts was exactly the same as Major League Baseball
The reserve clause in

NBA

Contracts.
2,0

rd

"Baseball Reserve Clause Dealt 3

Loss

in

Row," The Japan Times (March

1976), p. 10.
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11,

In July 1976,

when baseball's Fourth Basic Agreement went

clause had been emasculated.

into effect the reserve

A fifteen-day lock-out during spring training had prompted

both sides to make major concessions. Free agency had come to America's national

Under the reformulated reserve

pastime.

clause, players

one team. For contracts signed prior to August

were no longer

9, 1976, the

tied indefinitely to

team could renew

for

year after the expiration of the contract. If the player remained unsigned through

one

this

"option" year, he automatically became a free agenL For contracts signed after August

9,

1976, players with six or more years in the major leagues at the end of his contract could

become a

free agent simply

In 1977, the

salaries

first

by giving notice
market

free agent

and a pronounced increase

in

to the players association.

in baseball

produced

2,1

significantly higher player

mult iyear contracts. Commissioner Bowie

Kuhn

released a report showing that the average player's salary rose from $51,501 in 1976 to

$76,349

in

1977. The explosion in the number of multiyear contracts began as soon as the

Seitz decision

clause,

many

was rendered. Recognizing what

two

would mean

for the reserve

clubs signed players to multiyear contracts before the 1976 season "[I]n

57 players signed such pacts, 36

for

the decision

hitters

and 21

pitchers.

Of these 57

contracts,

years, 18 for three years, 7 for four years, and 6 for five years."

players signed multiyear contracts.

The break down

that year

was

1 1 1

212

all

26 were

In 1977, 281

contracts for two

for
years, 105 for three years, 21 for four years, 33 for five years, 10 for six years, and one

ten years.

211

Hill,

James R. and William Spellman, "Professional

Baseball:

Salary Structure," Industrial Relations 22:1 (Winter, 1983),
212

Hill

and Spellman,

p. 5.
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The Reserve Clause and

p. 3.

Despite the apparent advances in reforming baseball's private self
government with
regard to labor/management relations, pressure for government regulation
again increased

mid-1970s. In

in the

May

1976, the U.S. House of Representatives created the Select

Committee on Professional Sports under the chairmanship of California Democrat, B.F.

The purpose of the Sisk Committee was

Sisk.

professional sports leagues and to

the main issues

on

to investigate the stability

recommend any

the committee's agenda

was

legislation thought necessary.

suits

ABA and NBA merger,

One of

to determine whether Organized Baseball

should continue to enjoy an exemption from the nation's

of the

of America's

antitrust laws.

The

recent failure

franchise relocation's in football and baseball, several law

and findings of unfair labor practices by the

NLRB, were

America's sports pages. The introduction to a study prepared

all

regular stories

for the use

committee chronicles the woes of professional sports and concludes,

of the

"[i]t is

on
select

rare that the

formation of a special investigative committee receives such instant justification for

existence."

213

The committee held extensive hearings
witnesses from

weighted

in the

all

in

which they heard from a wide array of

the major sports. Baseball representation at the hearings

owners

favor.

its tireless

to the

New

committee about baseball's

efforts to operate in the public interest.

committee that baseball's exemption was

heavily

President Charles Feeney, and

American League President, Lee MacPhail. Each spoke
storied tradition and

was

Testimony was heard from Commissioner Kuhn,

York Mets Chairman, Grant Donald, National League

2,3

its

Each assured

the

crucial to the sports continuing conmiitment to

Professional Sports
U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Professional Sports,

and the Law. Study (94
,

lh

Cong., 2d Sess.,1976),

126

p. 1.

the public interest.

The arguments advanced

to the committee. Nonetheless, the "baseball

to control franchise migration,

Most

destructive litigation.

their states

were

men"

exemption were already well

reiterated the

known

need for the exemption

manage competition between clubs, and avoid

costly and

potent, however, were their veiled promises of expansion

Members of the committee were assured
and that

for the

that

Major League Baseball intended to expand

certainly in the running.

214

These overtures from Major League Baseball were countered by the impassioned
testimony of Marvin Miller, as well as testimony from several noted scholars
for the repeal

who argued

of baseball's exemption. Economist Roger Noll and Lawyer Steven Rivkin,

both contributors to a 1972 study entitled Government and the Sports Business ,
that baseball's

testified

exemption created an unequal and destructive tension between the major

professional sports and that the Congress should consider legislation to eradicate the

anomaly.

215

After balancing the competing interests and arguments of those

the committee chose a

The

who

testified

compromise recommendation.

final report

of the Sisk Committee

Based upon the information

states:

available to

it,

the

Committee

has concluded that adequate justification does not exist for
baseball's special exemption from the antitrust laws and that
its exemption should be removed in the context of overall
sports antitrust reform.

216

Inquiry Into
U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Professional Sports,
th
348-425.
Professional Sports. Hearings (94 Cong., 2d Sess.,1976), p.

214

,

Committee on Professional Sports, Inquiry Into
th
110-191.
Professional Sports. Hearings (94 Cong., 2d Sess.,1976), p.
Sports, Final Report, (H.
2,6
U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Professional

215

U.S. Congress, House, Select
.

Rep. No. 1786, 94

th

Cong., 2

nd

Sess., 1976), p. 4.
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Despite the Sisk committee's conclusion that baseball's exemption
should be

recommended no such

it

legislation.

The extensive

investigation

lifted,

produced an

encyclopedic report, but no legislation. The committee did, however,
recommend that

its

successor committee undertake an extensive study of sports antitrust law. The
proposed
sports oversight committee

in 1981.

was never convened,

but a study

was prepared and published

217

At the

time,

it

was widely acknowledged

in the press that Sisk's

committee was

the result of his failed attempt to convince Organized Baseball to locate an expansion team
in

Washington, DC. Sisk and fellow Congressman Frank Horton (R-NY) had fought

new team

1971 when the Senators

in the nation's capital since

Other Members of Congress had been
Rep.

Gillis

Long (D-LA), who wanted a major

legislation to strip

a hearing

in

which

do

-

for a

second time.

Organized Baseball as

league team for

New Orleans,

well.

sponsored

tirade during

NBA Commissioner Larry O'Brien was testifying, Rep. Long
bill

to strip

treatment" because, he said, baseball

favorite sons

town

Organized Baseball of its exemption. In a widely reported

interrupted to announce his

cities

rattling their sabers at

left

for a

as a prodigal son."

Major League Baseball of its

"is

218

sought major league teams, died

"favorite son

beginning to respond to such treatment as many

Long's

in

bill,

supported by other members whose

committee.

Baseball's owners went into negotiations over the Fifth Basic Agreement in 1980

determined to

217

roll

back some of the players association's advances. The owners sought to

Professors Jesse

Markham and

Paul Teplitz of the Cambridge Research Institute

conducted an extensive analysis of the economics of Major League Baseball
Economics and Public Policy (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., 1981).
,
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in Baseball,

end salary arbitration and to modify the
1980,

was decided

it

free

agency

Unable to come to terms

rules.

in

to postpone negotiations until a joint player-owner
committee could

study the issues at hand. The 1980 season was played without
an agreement.

During the 1980 season the owners took steps to
strike in

1981

They used a percentage of gate

.

strike insurance

from an expected

deflect injury

receipts as a strike fund

and they took out

with Lloyds of London. The 1981 season opened without an agreement

Negotiations broke

down on

June 10 and the next day a 50-day player

strike began.

During the protracted dispute the players charged the owners with bargaining

The National Labor Relations Board sought

settlement

left

1,

compensating teams who
In the

making great
mid-1980s

1

The

parties finally

the day after the owners strike insurance ran out.

salary arbitration

bad

injunctive relief for the players, then

unfair labor practices proceedings against the owners.

agreement on August

in

came
219

faith.

began

to

The

unchanged and created a complicated formula

for

lost free agents.

980s, the impetus for change was shifting from the players,

strides against their "indentured servitude," to the fans.

that baseball's place as an

players' union to a position

American

cultural icon eroded.

of virtual parity with the owners

contributed to the changing public mood.

As Organized

in

It

who were

was during

The

rise

the

of the

terms of bargaining power

Baseball

moved

into the

1980s

the public's perception of the relationship between the players and the owners began to

2,8

Brady, Dave, "Congress Aims Anti-Trust Blow

at Baseball,"

The Sporting News

(August 28, 1976), p. 8.
219
For a detailed description of the events surrounding the 1981 strike see, McCormick,
Robert A., "Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective Bargaining in Professional
Baseball," Vanderbilt

Law Review

35 (1982),

21.
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p.

1

131-1 169; Also see Zimbalist, p. 20-

change. While the 1970s saw the players association achieve numerous
victories over the

owners with the general support of the American

saw

fan disgust with both sides.

The
strained.

It

Fifth Basic

Agreement expired

had become almost routine

in

for the expiration

new

contract.

of each Basic Agreement to

agency compensation rules were modified so as to
draft choices.

The concessions made by
were

was

indicative

set

The 1985 season was no

A two-day strike in August was settled when the players agreed to

compensation through amateur

strike

1984 and once again negotiations were

major league tenure requirement for any player seeking salary
free

of the 1981

220

off a highly contentious negotiation over a

different.

public, the aftermath

limit

a three-year

arbitration. In addition, the

teams that

lost players to

221

the players association in the 1985 Basic Agreement

of the changing mood

in the nation regarding baseball.

Particularly telling

the players agreement to a reduction in their share of television receipts from thirty-

three to eighteen percent.

222

Baseball scholar James Quirk writes that, from the players

perspective, "the mid-1970s to early- 1980s were 'Star Wars,' and the mid-1980s looked

more

like

The Empire

Strikes Back.'"

relations war. Their cries

220

"Baseball's

New

This article

p. 8.

is

Strike

223

The owners were beginning

of poverty were having a positive

-

By the

Fans," U.S.

News

&

effect

to

win the public

on negotiations with

World Report, (Aug.

the

24, 1981),

representative of the type of stories in the press following the 1981

strike.
221

In 1982, Marvin Miller resigned from the

MLBPA. He was replaced by former

federal

mediator, Kenneth Moffitt. After just one year in office Moffitt was fired by the union for
take aggressive stands against management. Miller resumes control of the union
failing to

until

Donald Fehr, the union's general counsel, was named the new executive

director in

1984.
222

Jennings, Kenneth, Balls and Strikes:

York: Praeger Publishers, 1990),

The Money Game

p. 67.

130

in

Professional Bas eball,

(New

players. In 1984, the

owners complained

that they

independent auditor, appointed by the owners

in

were losing $100 million a

year.

An

compliance with National Labor

Relations Board rules, estimated that the owners were losing between $25 million and
$35
million a year by 1985.

After the 1985 season

it

became apparent

back." Commissioner Peter Ubberoth

laid the

that the

owners intended to

groundwork

for the

"strike

owners revenge when

he reported to the owners the results of a cost/benefit analysis of free agency. The
statistical

cost.

study concluded that the benefit of signing free agents was outweighed by their

Sixty-two players

filed for free

agency; none

was

than the team with which they were already playing.

224

offered a contract by teams other

The

MLBPA charged the owners

with collusion and sought redress through the grievance procedure. After two years of

what became known as the "collusion hearings"
ruled against the owners finding that there

was owner

Owners were exchanging information about
until 1990,

in baseball,

an independent arbitrator

collusion in the free agent market.

their salary bids for free agents.

however, that the arbitrator fined the owners $280 million

It

was not

for their collusion.

In the 1990 Basic Agreement the players preserved both the arbitration system and free

agency, as well as a provision that provided for

were again found

guilty

triple

damages

to the union

if the

owners

of collusion.

After the collusion decision, the players regained some leverage against the

owners, and the

new

politics

of baseball were once again near equilibrium The outside

environment, however, was poisoned by the travails of what had become the baseball

223

224

Quirk and Fort, p. 193.
Cited in Quirk and Fort,

p. 197.
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"industry."

battles

price

of labor equity

in baseball

was not

The rancorous

insignificant.

between the players and the owners brought the national pastime

looking

icon.

The

much

different than

it

had

in the 1960s. Baseball

By the 1990s Americans had grown cynical about

had

into the

lost its status as

the game, seeing

it

1990s

a cultural

more as a

nasty business than a national treasure.

Other Sports:

Is

Baseball Unique or

One Among Many?

Organized Baseball was the national pastime and a highly profitable industry before
the advent of television or the

coming of age of professional

football

and basketball. With

the postwar explosion of mass media technology these other sports slowly began to rival

baseball's popularity.

As

television

the 1960s and 1970s, the nation

the one hand, there

was

part of the

also undergoing profound

was a movement of population from the

sun belt and the west.
sizable migrations

became an important

On the

other hand,

all

lifestyle in

demographic change.

On

northeast and midwest to the

regions of the country were experiencing

from urban centers to outlying

demography of the nation and

American

areas, the suburbs.

The changing

the appearance of television in every living

room across

the

country changed the habits of American sports fans dramatically.
In a younger and more mobile population, the sports best for

football,

limits

and even hockey, with

- drew

their

TV — basketball

combination of faster action combined with

set time

increasing audiences. Prior to the advent of television, baseball ruled

spectator sports. Going to the ball park to see a major league

among

game was an experience

of
unrivaled by other professional sports. Gradually, however, especially with the advent
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television, the other professional sports cut into baseball's popularity, reducing

it

to

one

among many.
The development of football and

came of age

basketball as professional sports, both of which

1950s and 1960s largely through

in the

private self government.

The

fate

television,

had an impact on baseball's

of these other sports since the 1950s has provided

Major League Baseball with the knowledge of what might have been. These other sports
dealt with the

empowerment of players

unions, the explosion of television revenues, and

the transformation of professional sports markets without a pre-existing immunity from

federal antitrust laws. Their development, despite subjection to antitrust laws, exposed

baseball's private self government.

unnoticed until the

1

The

baseball anomaly, which had

gone

largely

950s, would be repeatedly besieged in the era of television. The

perception that baseball was no different than other professional sports, yet

would constantly

special treatment,

fuel

it

received

antagonism with baseball's exemption. As these

other sports dealt with antitrust issues, baseball's anomaly was increasingly a target for the

press, the public,

and the policy makers on Capitol

Hill.

Professional football experienced a markedly different path of development from

that

of baseball

in

terms of labor/ management relations and especially

federal antitrust statutes. Football in

began

America can be traced

inter-collegiate play. In 1920, the

in its relation to

to the 1870s,

when colleges

American Professional Football Association was

this league
created, featuring the legendary college football star Jim Thorpe. In 1921,

became the National Football League (NFL), which enjoyed moderate success
to big time status in the 1960s

when

it

was

rivaled,

American Football League (AFL).
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until its rise

and then joined, by the newly formed

Professional football's

Pennsylvania federal

district

brush with antitrust law came

first

court ruled that the

constituted a violation of antitrust law.

Supreme Court

in

The

NFL's

decision,

sale

broadcast on radio and television.

Congress that baseball's special
In 1957, in Radovitch

1953 decision of the federal

v.

which came

in the

same year the

antitrust, stated explicitly

commerce by

virtue

of its commercial

This decision fueled ongoing sentiment in the halls of

legal status

among

sports must be remedied.

National Football League, the Supreme Court echoed the

district court, finding that professional football is

subject to federal antitrust laws.

speculation that football

225

1953 when a

of pooled television contracts

Toolson upheld baseball's exemption from

that the court considered football to be interstate

in

226

indeed

This decision put to rest any expectation or

was exempt from antitrust because of the Court's

decision in

Toolson. The Radovitch decision also had a profound effect upon the players union

movement

in football.

Like baseball, professional football had a reserve clause

in all

standard player contracts which bound players to the team that originally drafted them for
the duration of their careers or until their team sold, traded, or released them.

The National Football League
Radovitch decision, had

failed to

227

Players Association, formed a year before the

make any headway with the owners

in

1956 on the issue

of the reserve clause or any other player grievances. The 1957 Supreme Court
however, greatly improved the bargaining position of the

225

226

players.

decision,

By threatening

the

United States v. National Football League, 1 16 F Supp 319 (Pa., 1953).
Radovitch v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). The facts of this case

are discussed in chapter two.
Chattle
For a history of the reserve clause in football see, Garvey Edward R., "From
American
Employee: The Athlete's Quest For Freedom and Dignity," in Annals of the
Academy of Political and Social Science 445 (September, 1979), p. 92-95.

227

,
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to

football

owners with a multimillion

dollar antitrust suit, the football players association,

headed by attorney and former player, Creighton
concessions from the owners. The
players were guaranteed

$50

minimum salary

for each exhibition

injury clause in their contracts, that

an

injury;

and they also

same time the

Miller,

was

able to secure important

for players

was increased

game played and won

would continue

won a pension plan for the

salaries

to $5,000;

the inclusion of an

and pay for medical care

players that began in 1959.

228

after

At the

fledgling baseball players association continued to languish in a position

of

virtual powerlessness vis-a-vis the baseball owners.

In 1961, a federal district court, citing the 1953 Pennsylvania federal appeals
decision, struck

and

CBS on the

down the

validity

grounds that

it

of a $9.3 million

was

in violation

television contract

of antitrust law.

between the

229

Just

months

NFL

after this

decision, Congress granted professional baseball, football, basketball, and hockey an

antitrust

exemption that would

nullify the court's decision

and allow leagues to enter

television broadcasting contracts as a single entity, rather than requiring each

make

its

own broadcasting

deals.

The

team

into

to

practice of leagues entering into television

contracts as a unit greatly increased television revenues. The statutory exemption granted

by Congress was vigorously opposed by the

television networks.

230

While

this

exemption

allowed professional football, basketball, and hockey to increase television revenue

dramatically,

228

it

was much more

significant for

Organized Baseball.

Staudahar, Paul, The Sports Industry and Collective Bargaining , (Ithaca:

ILR

Press,

1989), p. 67-68.
229
230

1 96 1 ).
United States v. National Football League, 1 96 F Supp 445 (SDNY,
discussed in detail
Public Law 87-33 1 The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 is
,

chapter two.
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in

By removing the
potent

the

weapon

most

well as

issue

in the struggle to repeal the

significant factor in

its

of television revenues, Congress had taken away the most
Federal Baseball exemption. Television was

exposing Major League Baseball's interstate character as

"special" treatment. Professional football basketball and hockey only caught

on with American

sports fans

when television brought them

Television transformed American spectator sports.

interest in sports.

Television

made

It

baseball just one

into everyone's living

room

leveled the playing field as far as fan

among many and

baseball's unfair legal advantage over the other sports.

it

revealed

The Sports Broadcasting Act of

1961 eliminated the most potent argument for repealing baseball's exemption and gave

new

life

to the baseball anomaly.

In 1962, football's reserve clause was apparently shattered, more than a decade
before any significant alteration in baseball's reserve clause. San Francisco player R.C.

Owens

played out his option year and signed with the Baltimore Colts for the 1963

season. Given the recent judicial declarations that football

this

move seemed

to signal the

end of peonage for football

responded the following year with a

The
in

so-called "Rozelle Rule,"

1963.

was

creativity reminiscent

named

subject to antitrust laws,

players.

The owners, however,

of their baseball counterparts.

for then-commissioner Pete Rozelle,

By awarding compensation in the form of players,

was

draft choices or

instituted

money

to be

paid by the team hiring the free agent to the team losing one, the Rozelle rule effectively

negated the

viability

of free agency. The amount and type of compensation would be

determined by the commissioner of football. This disincentive to signing free agents was

and 1976.
so significant that only a handful of free agents were signed between 1963
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In 1963, the players of the newly formed American Football League
created the

American Football League Players Association and almost immediately joined
colleagues in the

that the

NFL

in

opposing the merger of the two leagues. The players contended

merger would reduce

officially

their

their ability to negotiate player salaries.

approved by Congress

in October, 1966.

The merger was

The newly consolidated

NFL

began

unrivaled play in the 1967-68 season-

Congressional approval of the merger did not come without a
Representative Emanuel Celler of New York, a well

fight.

known foe of baseball's

exemption,

fought hard to scuttle approval of the merger. But the plan was approved by the Senate

what was widely considered a deal wherein key Senators traded

their votes for the

promise of expansion teams. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (Rparliamentary trick to get the merger past Celler' s forces in the House.

House-passed

anti-inflation

House allowed the Senate

The

The overwhelming support

to hold

jeopardize the anti-inflation

conference.

bill.

bill,

it

in

111)

He

used a

attached

for the anti-inflation

it

to a

bill in

the

hostage with the merger plan as ransom Unwilling to

House opponents were forced

to acquiesce in

231

football

merger

legislation

is

a good example of how institutions, and

institutional contexts, affect public policy

political clout to get the

outcomes. Pro-merger forces did not have the

merger through the House of Representatives, however, by

exploiting the rules of the legislative process pro-merger forces were able to get the plan

passed despite not having a majority on

of the merger was such

their side.

The regulatory environment

that contravening antitrust principles

137

at the

time

was very unpopular. Had

Congressman

Celler and the opponents of the merger been prepared for the parliamentary

maneuvering of pro-merger
later

Congressman

strategy

Celler

merger would surely have

legislators, the

and

his allies

on Capitol Hill were prepared

when the NBA- ABA merger came

before the Congress.

failed.

A decade

for parliamentary

The

of that

failure

merger better represents the sense of the majority.
While the passage of the Sports Broad castinp Art of Q61 might seem to indicate a
1

softening of support for antitrust enforcement, in fact

it

was

the result

of the pervasive

influence of television, not eroding support for the vigorous enforcement of antitrust law.

In 1961, only the

from

selling

challenge

pooling

NFL,

as a result of the aforementioned court decisions,

restricted

pooled contracts to television networks. Major League Baseball was beyond

on

this point

due to

its

blanket exemption.

The NBA's and NHL's

TV contracts had not yet been successfully challenged in court.

rival the

was

American Football Conference (AFC) remained

desire to bring parity to this situation

new mass media medium enabled

free to

pool

practice

of

Even the NFL's

TV contracts.

combined with the pervasive influence of a

The

relatively

advocates of the broadcasting exemption to argue that

the "rule of reason" dictated that pooling

TV

contracts

was not

injurious to

economic

competition.

In 1968, the

NFLPA became the

first

players association to register with the U.S.

Department of Labor as a labor union. Football players seemed poised

to join baseball

players in pressuring for significant reforms through collective bargaining agreements,

protected under the National Labor Relations Act. In contrast to the
the football players association achieved

231

The merger

fight in

Congress

is

little

in the early

described in Wilson,

138

p.

MLBPA,

however,

1970s because they were faced

131-132.

with the owners refusal to recognize them as a legal unit for collective bargaining.

Because the

NFL union had merged with the AFL union,

certification

from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). During the complex

it

was forced

to seek re-

process of re-certification that resulted, the owners were able ignore the union and go
their

own way.

While advocates of baseball's exemption often point to

between the effectiveness of the baseball and

football players unions, the success

baseball players cannot easily be linked to the exemption.

certification

this disparity

problems muddy the comparison, making

it

The

of the

football players union

a strained analogy

at best.

After brief pre-season strikes by football players in 1968 and 1970 and a forty-four

day long

strike at the beginning

of the 1974 season, which was undermined by the lack of

player solidarity and lackluster public support, the

for relief. Baltimore Colts tight end,

sued the

v.

National Football League, a federal

upheld by the Eighth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals

1976.

the

Sherman

district

Antitrust Act. In the

court ruled in favor of

finding the Rozelle rule to be in violation of antitrust law.

The decision

in

Mackey was among

The Sisk Committee, or

summer and

legislation,

it

fall

Select

in 1976.

232

The

decision

233

Mackey
Mackey

v.

v.

was

233

the events sparking attention

on Capitol

Hill in

Committee on Professional Sports, held hearings

of 1976. Although the committee recommended no

did endorse the application of antitrust laws to

all

specific

professional sports

mdiscriminately.

232

the courts

John Mackey, who was president of the NFLPA,

NFL charging that the Rozelle rule violated the

case of Mackey

Mackey,

NFLPA once again looked to

National Football League, 407 F Supp 1000 (Minn.,, 1975).
th
National Football League, 543 F2d 606 (8 Cir., 1976).

139

in

Despite the victory in court and a relaxation of the Rozelle rule negotiated
in the

1977 Basic Agreement with the NFLPA, the owners continued to enjoy the benefits of
restricted player mobility

by employing the age old

limped into the 1980s, and
football players

went on

in

tactic

of blacklisting. The

1982, encouraged by the 1981 baseball players

strike.

For the players union, the 57 day

strike

NFLPA

strike, the

was a

failure.

The

players were, in the end, forced to accept a settlement on management terms. Adding
insult to injury

was

the fact that several prominent players

found themselves either cut or traded
strike again in 1987.

That

replacement players, with

after the

1982 season.

strike ended, after several

little

change

in player/

with the football players union disorganized and
antitrust law, football

in controlling the

The
to the issue

far

more

games

234

in

management
dispirited.

The

NFL

players

would

which teams used
relations.

The 1980s ended

Despite the strictures of

successful than their baseball counterparts

demands of players.

contrast between football and baseball

of franchise migration. In contrast

restraining player

franchise

owners had been

who were union representatives

on

labor/

management

to the success

of football team owners

demands, the owners had trouble controlling each

movements, not player

issues extended

other.

It

relations that caused problems for football.

problems began when Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis moved

his club to

in

was
The

Los Angeles

in

1982, despite the lack of league approval. Unable to get the required three-fourths vote of

the

owners needed

to relocate his club, Davis sued the league, arguing that the voting

requirement for relocation violated antitrust law.

234

Harris, David,

Books, 1986),

The League: The Rise and Decline of the NFL (New York: Bantam
,

p. 184.
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A U.S.
Sherman Act

district

court agreed with Davis, finding the

in its efforts to

in violation

block the Raiders move. Upheld on appeal,

touched off what the economist Paul Staudahar

movement

NFL

calls the "free

of the

this decision

agency" era of franchise

235

in football.

In affirming the lower court decision, the Ninth U.S. Court of

Appeals stated that the Raiders move to L.A. would promote competition with the Los
Angeles Rams, as well as produce lower
court, therefore, justified

its

enhance consumer welfare.
the

NFL's

1982, the

ticket prices

invocation of antitrust law by arguing that the

236

numerous clubs have been

commonly

cites the disruptions

relocation in football as an argument for preserving

it

its

antitrust

players association in basketball has been

counterpart.

The National Basketball

In 1956, basketball had

its first

Professional Basketball Corp.

much more

much

caused by franchise

exemption on the grounds

Staudahar,

p.

respects; however, the

its

football

(NBPA) was

encounter with antitrust law.

v.

some

effective than

Players Association

created in 1954.

In the case of Washington

National Basketball Association™ a federal

court ruled in favor of a prospective team owner

236

Since

serves the public interest.

Basketball's development has resembled football's in

235

relocated.

has seen several high profile team relocation's that have evoked

controversy. Organized Baseball

that

move would

Despite concerted efforts to gain statutory exemption for

ability to restrict franchise mobility,

NFL

and greater consumer choice. The

who had been

district

prevented from entering

93.

Greenwood
Freedman, Warren, Professional S ports and Antitrust (Westport, CT:
,

Press, 1987), p. 78.
237

Washington Professional Basketball Corp.

v.

141

N.B.A., 147 F Supp 867

(SDNY,

1956).

the ranks of professional basketball by the

NBA. The

across state lines by virtue of its travel and
subject to the strictures of the

The

its

sale

court held that the

of broadcast

rights

and

is

therefore

Sherman Act.

owners did not recognize the players union

basketball

NBA operates

until

1967,

when

competition from the newly formed American Basketball Association greatly enhanced the
players leverage over the owners. In 1967, the players and owners agreed to the

first

collective bargaining agreement in basketball. During the next nine years, the players

association did not pursue collective bargaining vigorously.

Suffering from escalating salaries the owners in both leagues began to press for a

merger

in

1969.

The

players association strongly opposed the merger, which would of

course reduce their leverage against the owners.

When the two

a merger agreement, the players association, lead by

filed

an

antitrust suit to block

contract,

merger

and the reserve

until the merits

argument

it,

clause.

leagues

came

to terms

NBPA president Oscar Robertson,

which included challenges

to the draft, the uniform

A federal court issued an injunction preventing the

of the case could be determined. The court

that the court lacked jurisdiction in the case

and that the

also rejected an

recourse to the courts for antitrust challenges the weapon of choice

That weapon was used by Spencer Haywood, an

it

made

in basketball.

all- American

basketball player

from the University of Detroit and member of the 1968 United States Olympic

Haywood had

NBA

NLRB was the

appropriate adjudicative venue. This created a situation peculiar to basketball, as

team.

on

signed a contract with the Seattle Supersonics of the

basketball

NBA. The

NBA Commissioner voided the contract because Haywood had not yet been out of high
school for four years, as required by the

NBA rule designed to discourage the signing of

142

Haywood

college underclassmen.

sued the

NBA charging them with an unlawful

conspiracy in restraint of trade. The courts agreed. In the case of Haywood

Supreme Court ruled
This decision

football

and

that the

officially

it

between baseball and these other

The same approval had been obtained by

were well organized and a potent lobbying force

those in Congress

who opposed

trickery this time.

The

the

NFL and AFL

the football merger

NFLPA,

in

1966,

the basketball

against the merger. In addition,

would not be duped by parliamentary

basketball merger hearings in 1971 were brief and unremarkable.

There was not great support

in

Congress to contravene the

antitrust

combined with the vigorous and well organized opposition of the

made passage of the merger
owners offered

sports.

NBA and ABA sought approval for their merger plan on

but the politics of the basketball merger were different. Unlike the

the

the

placed basketball in the same position vis-a-vis antitrust law as

In the meantime, the

players

NBA,

NBA rule was indeed a violation of the Sherman Act. 238

further illuminated the disparity

Capitol Hill in 1971.

v.

unlikely.

239

laws once again. This

NBA players association

Seeking the support of the players for the merger

to ease the reserve clause, bringing

it

in line

with the football reserve

clause at the time, which included the Rozelle rule. The players refused this offer and

managed

to block congressional approval of the merger.

240

In 1975, a federal district court settled the Robertson case by striking

down

basketball's version of the Rozelle rule, which had acted as a disincentive to signing free

agents, the player draft, and the uniform contract, finding

™Haywoodv. NBA,40\

them

all illegal

under the

U.S. 1204(1971).

Antitrust and
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
nd
Monopoly, Professional Basketball Hearings (92 Cong., 1 Sess.,1971).

239

st

,

143

Sherman Act. The court
antitrust law.

also ruled that the

NBA- ABA merger would

be a violation of

241

In 1976, following the Robertson decision the players
and owners

negotiated a collective bargaining agreement in which the players
acquiesced to the

merger plan

in

exchange for major concessions. 242 The newly consolidated

NBA began

play in 1976-77 season.

The

issue

of franchise migration came to the

owner of the San Diego

Sterling,

NBA in the person of Donald

Clippers. In 1982, he tried to

move

his club to

Los

Angeles. After two years of litigation, encouraged by the decision in the Raiders case,
Sterling

moved

his

team without the NBA's permission. The

1987, a federal appeals court provided the
court's dismissal of the

NBA's

suit

migration.

it

and ordering a new

on

trial.

In

its

franchise

decision the court

movement. The

NBA

did create hesitation regarding unrestricted franchise

243

The NBA's

labor/

management

most productive. Unlike baseball and
strike or

in

NBA with some hope by throwing out a lower

stated that leagues can put "reasonable restrictions"

eventually lost the case but

NBA sued Sterling and,

work stoppage. The

threat

relations

have been the most

football, basketball has not

litigious, but also the

had to endure a major

of antitrust action has chastened the basketball

owners and provided the players with a powerful weapon

in

labor/management

negotiations. Additionally, franchise migration has not been a controversial issue in the

NBA.

Unlike football, the history of professional basketball and the antitrust laws

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and
rd
Monopoly, Professional Basketball Hearings (93 Cong., 1 Sess., 1972), p. 241-245.

240

st

,

241

242

National Basketball Association, 389 F Supp 867 (SDNY, 1975).
For a detailed description of the terms of this agreement see, Staudahar, p. 120.

Robertson

v.

144

indicates that productive labor/

management

relations

and franchise

stability

can be

maintained despite exposure to federal antitrust law.

The impact of the emergence of other

professional sports like football and

which are subject to

antitrust law,

on the

one hand, these sports were the

beneficiaries

of the advent of television. As such they

basketball,

became as popular, and
least,

these sports

came

in the case

made

anomaly

of football more popular, than

to be equally as popular as baseball,

exposing the inequity of the baseball anomaly for

On the

baseball

all

is

mixed.

At the very

baseball.

which had the

effect

of the business of baseball,

understanding of the cooperative nature of sports leagues and

would be considered "reasonable"

collaboration

of

to see.

other hand, television changed the nature of the game. While

clear the interstate character

On the

it

it

certainly

also facilitated greater

doing expanded what

in so

among members of such

leagues.

More

importantly, by shielding broadcast activity from the antitrust laws, television diluted the

case against baseball's exemption. Baseball limped into the 1980s with

government battered but

in tact

and as the regulatory environment

revolution that private self go vernment began to look more

its

private self

shifted with the

like the

Reagan

emerging norm rather

than an outdated anomaly.

The Regulatory Regime
The new

politics

of the 1980s

of baseball involve the players' association becoming a powerful

labor union, which by the mid-1970s

on a

243

virtually equal basis.

NBA v.SDC Basketball

That

is

would deal with Organized Baseball's management

were
to say that the fortunes of the players association

Club, 815 F. 2d 562 (1987).
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aided by the political environment of the day. The societal regulatory
regime of the

late

1960s and 1970s was animated by the mobilization of popular sentiment against the
exploitation

of the

capitalist

production process by "big business." This sentiment worked

against the baseball owners, and facilitated the progress of the players association
in the

1970s. But, the player friendly political environment shifted in the 1980s. The onset
of

what Eisner

calls the "efficiency"

regime provided the owners with some

relief from

negative public opinion, allowing them to stem the tide of player advances in collective
bargaining.

The

so-called

Reagan revolution of the 1980s caused a

shift in

regulatory policy.

Eisner sees the onset of the efficiency regime as a reaction to the expansive regulatory

push of the

late

He

1960s and 1970s.

regime. First, the efficiency regime

is

identifies four defining characteristics

characterized by an "unprecedented centralization of

regulatory authority in the Office of Management and Budget

review bodies." Second, regulatory

of the new

initiatives

during the

late

(OMB) and

in

White House

1970s and 1980s were

subjected to unprecedented amounts of economic analysis prior to promulgation. Third,

regulators assessed the need for regulation and designed

markets as a benchmark.

Finally, the efficiency

regime

new

is

policies with

characterized by an

"overwhelming concern with corporate compliance costs" on the
regulatory reform and deregulation. The

common thread

economic

part

of advocates of

pervading these characteristics

is

244

the pursuit of economic efficiency

Eisner's identification of the shift in regulatory policy in late 1970s and 1980s as a

new

regulatory regime

is

controversial.

Students of regulatory policy, Richard Harris and

146

Sidney Milkis, contend that no coherent consensus
developed

in

support of the type of

anti-government, market based regulatory program that
dominated administrative politics

during the period in question. They agree that the regulatory
reform and deregulation
initiatives

a

half,

of the 1980s were a reaction to the

social regulation

of the previous decade and

but they see the forces of deregulation as achieving parity with,
rather than

overwhelming, the forces of social regulation and the societal regime.

Although no firm consensus has developed

in support of a
market-oriented regulatory regime, the principles of "real

economics" pose a strong challenge to the public philosophy
that gave impetus to social regulation... Quality-of-life
issues

and

citizen activism will be challenged

by well

organized business interests and advocates of economic
theories,

who

provide a theoretical alternative to the moral

imperatives of social reformers. In one sense this suggests a

stalemate between

two

visions

another sense, however,
public lobby

movement.

it

of regulatory

politics.

signifies a confirmation

In

of the

245

In contrast to the prevailing continuity of Harris and Milkis' "public lobby regime"

Eisner distinguishes the efficiency regime from the societal regime.

lack of consensus in the electorate regarding the

He

argues that the

wisdom of regulatory reform and

deregulation does not preclude the existence of a

new

regulatory regime. Eisner locates

the origins of the efficiency regime in elite politics, rather than democratic politics.

identifies three contributing factors in the

which

is

development of the efficiency regime, none of

directly related to electoral politics.

to affect regulatory reform, 2)

244

Eisner, p. 172.

245

Harris and Milkis,

p.

new

He

They

are: 1) the use

of presidential

initiatives

administrative practices and changes in staffing in

293.
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regulatory agencies, and 3) shifting

power configurations

in the public interest

group

system.

These factors did not appear suddenly

in the late 1970s.

the early 1970s, and thus overlapped with the societal regime.

All

The

began to develop
societal

regulatory regimes overlapped because of their disparate origins. Like
the societal regime resulted

by a majority
elite politics

from mass

political coalition,

and

political mobilization.

It

its

and efficiency

predecessors,

was a regime supported

by public opinion. The efficiency regime has

finds expression in administrative politics

in

origins in

its

and the mobilization of

distinctly minority corporate interests.

While the early 1970s were dominated by more populist

advocacy groups,

it

was only a matter of time before

citizen

and consumer

corporations, and Major League

Baseball, began marshaling their superior resources in an effort to regain advantage in the

new

political

Washington,

environment.

By

1980, almost three quarters of the active lobbyists in

DC represented corporations or trade associations.

Big business exploited

the institutional reforms of the societal regime to recapture the reigns of regulatory power,

despite the absence of pro-business sentiment in the electorate.

calls the "politicization

246

247

In

Of particular

What Thomas

of the business community" was undertaken

reform-minded Democratic Congress with strong

movements.

246

many ways Major League

ties to the

Baseball

in the face

Edsall

of a

consumer and environmental

was ahead of the

importance to corporate lobbyists were the reforms

procedures which guaranteed access and input for interested private

in

learning curve in

rule-making

parties.

With

their

superior resources such lobbyists are able to exert disproportionate influence on the
regulatory process using the very reforms intended to end such advantages.
247

EdsalL Thomas Byrne, The

New Politics of Inequality (New York: W.W.
,

Co., 1984), p. 107.
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Norton

&

Major League Baseball's organized lobbying

this strategy.

efforts in

Washington, D.C. go

back to the 1950s.
Large corporations and trade associations used vast armies of professional
lobbyists to influence both legislative and administrative policy making. Taking advantage

of the 1974 campaign finance reforms, which increased the importance of so-called
political action

committees (PACs), as well as a 1975 Federal Election Commission (FEC)

decision allowing corporations to use corporate funds to create and administer PACs,

corporations and trade association lobbyists in the mid-1970s and 1980s dramatically
increased their financial support for conservative policies and candidates.

248

The

intricacy

and complexity of regulatory policy together with the power of corporate money
elections enabled corporate interests to influence even Democratic

in

Members of Congress.

Corporate interests also sought to "redefine the terms of the policy debate over

state-economy relations" by spending huge amounts of money on corporate advertising

and the funding of new conservative "think tanks."

249

The former was designed

the anti-business sentiment of the public at large, while the latter

fight

among

to press the

the nation's intelligencia.

Corporate advertising
1970s, but

was designed

to soften

may have

failed to create a discernible shift in public opinion in the

contributed to the

effort to influence the scholarly debate,

wave of conservative
however, met with

values in the 1980s.

significant success.

conservative "think tanks" created in the 1970s and 1980s includes,

among

The

The

list

of

others, the

the National
Heritage Foundation; the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace;

248

Eisner, p. 176.

249

Eisner, p. 175.
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Bureau of Economic Research; the Center

American Council

for Capital Formation.

These conservative think tanks

for the

Study of American Business; and the

250

largely succeeded in changing the terms

debate from the appropriate level of government intervention

such intervention was appropriate

at

all.

government regulation of the economy

The

that

virtual

in the

economy

to whether

consensus on the propriety of

had animated the associationalist and societal

regimes was fractured by the 1980s. The policy debate was transformed into a
laissez-faire

of the

battle

of

advocates versus interventionists, devotees of the Chicago school's "new

learning" versus defenders of the traditional structure/ conduct/ performance paradigm,

neo-conservatives versus neo-liberals.

influence

251

Major League Baseball exploited the increasing

of the Chicago school's view of antitrust

policy.

Lobbyists for Major League

Baseball consciously adopted the economic argument against antitrust policy, adding

their rhetorical arsenal in their fight to preserve baseball's unregulated

The change

in the

monopoly.

it

to

252

terms of the debate over state-economy relations combined with

the regulatory reform and deregulatory initiatives of presidents of both parties constitutes

what Eisner
regulation

Reagan

calls the

"triumph of economics."

was a prominent

By the

1980s, the economic costs of

feature of the regulatory decision making process.

The

administration, claiming a mandate for the drastic reduction of the size and role of

250

Edsall, p. 117.

251

Adams, Walter and James W. Brock,

New Laissez-Faire
252

253

.

Antitrust

Economics on

Trial:

A Dialogue on the

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. XI.

Major League Baseball's Director of Government Relations acknowledged

in

an

1980s,
interview with the author that baseball's lawyers and lobbyists, beginning in the
consciously adopted the economic arguments which condemn antitrust policy as

counterproductive. Interview with Gene Callahan, conducted on 8 January 1997.
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government, marshaled
laissez-faire

all

of its resources and power

economic ideology, which constituted an

consensus that characterized the previous

One of the
antitrust law.

As

fifty

to give effect to

all

out assault on the Keynesian

years of American economic policy.

254

discussed in chapter one, antitrust policy became a principle means of

economy because

it

was compatible with both

of limited government intervention and the developing
of the

direct regulation envisioned by the

Era, antitrust policy, cast as law enforcement,

industrial

conservative,

cornerstones of twentieth century American economic policy has been

regulating the industrial

Falling short

its

economy without abandoning

founders. Antitrust policy

was seen by

the liberal tradition

institutional capacities

of the

New Nationalists of the

state.

Progressive

was a means of regulating an expansive

the limited government traditions of America's

its

creators and proponents as a

the fairness of the pre-industrial free market, as a

means of protecting

way to

preserve

the individual

property rights and economic opportunities of Americans that the industrial economy

might endanger.

The Reagan

administration's assault

on

established

economic

policy, animated

by

the economic ideology of the so-called "Chicago School," included a virtual one hundred

and eighty degree turn

253

Eisner,

Marc

255

in antitrust policy.

Allen, Antitrust and the

Chicagoans believe

in the superior efficiency

Triumph of Economics (Chapel
,

Hill:

University

of North Carolina Press, 1991).
This term refers to the general consensus on economic policy that grew out of efforts to
stabilize the economy after the Great Depression. Keynesian economics encompassed all

254

attempts of the state to manage the economy through macroeconomic policy.
255
The Chicago school refers to a very conservative, laissez-faire view of state-economy

Free markets are understood to be self-regulating and efficiency producing.
of
This school of thought has been vigorously advocated by scholars from the University
the
of
devotes
Chicago since the 1950s. Adherents to this philosophy are considered
relations.

Chicago school whether or not they are

directly associated with the University

151

of Chicago.

of the market as well as the superiority of self regulating market
state regulation

condemns

forces.

They condemn

of markets as wasteful and corrupt. Their view of antitrust law

the economic policies of the United States for the last half century.

effectively

The Reagan

administration's influence, both institutional and political, as well as the ascendance of
the

Chicago school's view of antitrust
assaults

on

policy, created

baseball's private self government

One of its widely recognized

an environment

were very

in

which

difficult.

adherents, Judge Robert Bork, identifies the

primary characteristics of the Chicago school's view of antitrust policy.
that the singular

and exclusive goal of antitrust law

is

to maximize

For an application of antitrust law to be

The

legitimate,

pursuit

it

two

First is the belief

consumer

second requires the application of rigorous economic analysis to justify

benefits than costs to consumers.

legislative

welfare.

The

antitrust policy.

must produce greater economic

of maximum consumer welfare

via rigorous

cost/benefit analysis translates into the preservation of maximum business efficiency,

which

in turn allows for

Wider

lower prices to consumers.

definitions

of consumer welfare as well as the goals of preserving small

businesses and a decentralized

among

56

economy

are considered by mainstream scholars to be

the primary goals of the antitrust statutes.

Conservative economist Milton Friedman

is

257

The Chicagoans, however,

reject the

often seen as the father of this school of

thought.
256

Bork, Robert, The Antitrust Paradox:

A Policy at War with Itself (New York:
,

MacMillian International Publishing, 1993),

Maxwell

p. xi.

dominant, scholarly view of antitrust adheres to monopoly
The traditional,
power theory. This is the view that sees antitrust as means of preserving free and fair
antitrust are
competition in the industrial market. The social and political assumptions of

257

and

still

spelled out well in Estes Kafauver's, In a

Few hand s: Monopoly Power

in

America,

(New

Monopoly Power,
York: Pantheon Books, 1965.), and Earl Latham's, Political Theory of
theory of antitrust is
(CoUege Park: University of Maryland Press, 1957). The economic
152

possibility

history

of political or social goals for

of antitrust supports

They claim

antitrust policy.

their conclusion that business efficiency, in pursuit

maximum consumer welfare,

is

saw

the achievement of virtual equilibrium in the

between labor and management. These decades

also

saw

parity in the public policy debate over state-economy relations

laissez-faire

the achievement of near

between advocates of

economics of the Chicago school and proponents of the more

philosophy that had dominated regulatory politics since

made by

of

the singular goal of antitrust policy. 258

In baseball, the 1970s and 1980s

struggle

that the legislative

at least the 1930s.

interventionist

The advances

the players to elevate themselves from virtual peonage ran their course and,

although the central

pillar

of baseball law which concerned the players had been

drastically

reformed, the owners' private self government continued. The ideology of the efficiency

regime

may

not have achieved a coherent consensus in the electorate, but the landslide

victory of Ronald

Reagan preserved and strengthened

against antitrust enforcement.

The

so-called

appearance of an electoral mandate

the institutional

Reagan Revolution

weapons

bills

to

sufficient to chasten antitrust advocates in Congress.

in the

1980s

of the day. In 1982, the Congress considered several

exempt professional sports leagues from exposure

franchise relocation decisions.

war

also created at least the

Congressional interest in antitrust policy and professional sports

reflected the conservative values

in the

As

to antitrust law with regard to

the Oakland Raiders were entangled in litigation that

Thomas Karier's, Bevond Competition: The Economics of Mergers and
Monopoly Power (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993); and Hans Thorelli's, The

explained in

,

The Johns
Federal Antitrust Policy Origination of an American Tradition, (Baltimore:
:

Hopkins University
258

Press, 1954).

This interpretation of the legislative history of antitrust

Judge Bork's work.

153

is

one of the main themes

in

would eventually

result in the courts striking

down the

ability

of sports leagues (other than

baseball) to regulate individual owners' ability to relocate their teams, the Congress

was

considering alterations to antitrust law that would extend part of baseball's immunity to
other sports.

259

Congressional support for exempting the

regulate franchise relocation from antitrust law

attitudes about antitrust

among

Although the 1982

NFL

opposition of the

was

of sports leagues to

ability

bipartisan, reflecting the

policy elites.

legislation died in committee,

owing

partly to the highly vocal

players association, and the forceful opposition in the Senate lead

by Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), the issue re-emerged
midnight escape of the Colts

and the Senate considered
by exempting the

NFL

measures.

NFL

franchise

from exposure

all

sought to extend
260

stabilizing franchise locations.

immunity to the

NFL was

again, both the

House

communities from franchise relocation's

three

it

while the

House considered

five

included the repeal of baseball's antitrust

partially to other sports in the interest

As was

spearheaded

bills,

of

the case in 1982, the effort to provide antitrust

in the

Senate by Senators Arlen Specter (D-PA)

and Dennis Deconcini (R-NM). These Senators reintroduced

NFL

1985 following the

to antitrust law with regard to league control over

None of these proposed measures

exemption; rather

in

from Baltimore. Once

legislation to protect

The Senate considered

franchise migration.

changing

bills

which would exempt

regulation of franchise migration from exposure to antitrust law. Spector and

Antitrust
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Professional Sports
th
Congress,
Immunity. Hearings on S. 2784 and S. 2821 (97 Cong, 2d Sess.,1982); U.S.
Commercial Law,
House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Monopolies and
H.R.
Professional Sports. Hearin s on H.R. 823, H.R. 3287, and

259

,

Antitrust Policy and

6467 (97
,

,h

g

st

Cong.,

1

& 2d Sess.,

1982).
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Deconcini were spurred by the public outcry from communities such as Oakland, and
Baltimore, that had been the victims of relocated professional football franchises.

again the opposition to this effort was lead by Senator

Senate hearing

in

Howard Metzenbaum, who

Once
in

a

1985 argued;

I say, let the leagues fight it out. Repeal the baseball
exemption; require the National and American Leagues to
really compete with each other. ... I don't kid myself. That

not going to happen; that

is

go.
I

I

am not

not the road

going to introduce any

do not think
26

is

that

it

we

are going to

legislation, not

should pass, but because

I

because

am a

'

realist.

Metzenbaum's comments
antitrust policy in the 1980s.

It

was a time when attempts

immunity were "unrealistic" and
antitrust

it

reflected the ascendant influence of opposition to

ill

to repeal baseball's antitrust

advised in Congress. While the issue of baseball's

exemption was being debated on Capitol HilL the question was whether

to other sports not whether to repeal

it.

The proposals

to extend

to extend antitrust immunity to

the other sports, with regard to franchise relocation decisions failed to get out of

committee

in

both the House and the Senate.

The preservation of baseball's anomaly
political

1980s was aided by a paradox

in the

environment. During the efficiency regime, Organized Baseball

disgruntled fans

who were

felt

in the

the wrath of

highly critical of its business practices, while at the same time

benefited from the institutional and rhetorical protection of the dominant faction in the

elite

public policy debate over state-economy relations. This contrasts sharply with the

Transportation,
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and
th
Sess.,1985).
1
Professional Sports Protection Act of 1985. Hearing (99 Cong.,
260

st

,

Sports Antitrust
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Professional
th
Immunity. Hearings (99 Cong., 2d Sess.,1985), p. 32.

261

,
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it

previous three regulatory regimes in which Organized Baseball capitalized upon

support

among

its

strong

the American people, the fans, to fend off the imperatives of the dominant

regulatory philosophy of government.

antitrust policy in the 1980s,

With the

rise

of the Chicago school's view of

Major League Baseball's

times more like a harbinger of industrial policy to

private self government looked at

come than

anomaly.

156

a threatened regulatory

CHAPTER

IV

THE BASEBALL ANOMALY

Baseball's unregulated

IN

THE

1990s

monopoly entered the 1990s without much pressure from

Congress, despite continued conflict with both the players union and the minor leagues.
Legislative proposals designed to repeal baseball's exemption from antitrust laws,
which
routinely accompanied labor disputes between the owners and the players, had since the

1970s been overshadowed by the issues of cable television broadcasting and franchise

late

migration

in all professional sports.

Work

stoppages

262

in baseball in 1981, 1985,

and 1990 were greeted by

legislative

proposals to repeal baseball's exemption; however, none was given more than cursory

consideration.

The anti-government atmosphere

benefit of Major

League Baseball's

in the nation

efforts to retain

February 1990, a Gallup poll asked, "If there

is

its

that

70%

22% would favor the

of people polled

other major sport.

263

players.

a strike,

felt that

Another

baseball players

to the

unregulated monopoly. In

owners or the players?" Fifty-seven percent responded
while only

was redounding

whose

side

that they

poll,

do you

favor, the

would favor the owners,

conducted

in April

1990, found

were overpaid, more overpaid than any

264

1980s which would have repealed
ever given serious consideration.
was
baseball's antitrust immunity. None of these
263
Hueber, Graham, "Majority Expects Baseball Strike and Would Side with Owners,"
262

Only a handful of bills were proposed

The Gallup
264

Poll

Monthly

in the

(February, 1990),

p.

37

Newport, Frank and Linda DeStefano, "Football Top Sport

Gains Support,"

The Gallup

Poll

Monthly

Among Fans;

(April, 1990), p. 19.
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Basketball

In 1994, however, Major League Baseball suffered
player strike in

its

The

history.

strike canceled the playoffs

its

longest and most costly

and World Series for the

first

time since 1904 and resulted in the cancellation of the early weeks of the 1995 season.
Capitol

Hill, calls for the

repeal of baseball's exemption were given

consideration than ever before. In the previous seventy years no

exemption had ever been voted out of committee

two such

bills

in Congress.

were favorably reported out of committee. As

more

bills

On

serious

affecting baseball's

During the 1994-95

the strike

wore

strike

on, public

sympathies for the owners softened. In March 1995, a Gallup poll found Americans
almost evenly

split

on

declined significantly.

retaining the exemption,

265

new

signed a

266

strikes.

for the

owners overall had

Gradually the public came to see both sides as culpable.

Though play resumed
the 1994 strike did not

and support

come

in 1995, the final resolution

until the winter

of the labor dispute that led to

of 1996, when the owners and players

finally

labor agreement that will take baseball into the next century without further

Included

in the

agreement was a deal between the owners and players to seek

congressional repeal of certain portions of the game's antitrust exemption. The impact of

this

on

the baseball anomaly,

the agreement indicates that

if

its

Congress
effects

acts,

on

remains uncertain, but the limited nature of

baseball's unregulated

monopoly might be

minimal.

265

Moore, David, "Most Fans Support Replacement

(March, 1995),

p.

Players,"

The Gallup

Poll

Monthly

39-48.

ended on March 31, 1995, when the terms of the previous labor
pact was not
agreement were reinstated by a court injunction. However, the new labor

266

The

strike actually

agreed to

until January, 1997.
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Baseball and Antitrust Policy Re-Emerge in Congress

During the 1980s, the Congress addressed the
antitrust policy

the spot light.

more broadly than
The hot

issue

of professional sports and

had before. The baseball anomaly was taken out of

it

topics in the 1980s were cable television deals with sports leagues

and franchise relocations. In the 1970s, the advancing technologies of television had

Network

collided with professional sports.

The

sports skyrocketed.

foul

when

the

NFL

clear to the

produced

television.

political outrage.

Members of Congress,

that the proliferation

felt

TV

Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH),

the baseball exemption, and then

was

for example, cried

sports channel

of such deals would

of professional sports to those without the means

Senator

major professional

owners of professional sports teams. In the 1980s

signed a television contract with the paid

Many Members of Congress
inaccessibility

all

potential of paid television, such as cable and pay-per-view,

becoming more and more
this profit potential

television revenues in

ESPN.

result in the

to purchase paid

a vigorous antitrust advocate, foe of

Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on

Monopolies, and Business Rights, opened a hearing on the signing of the

Antitrust,

NFL-ESPN

contract saying:

We know that the NFL-ESPN

contract will put $153

million in the pockets of the club owners.

have here today
will

it

is:

be

who

number of games

available for

cannot afford to subscribe to

the interest of the viewing public, or

Will

it

first

step in an effort to reduce competition and

in

public pay

I

Will that contract increase viewership, or

instead limit the

viewing by those

The question

ESPN?

is it

make

the
the

267

more?

Antitrust,
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
T elevision
NFL
recent
the
of
Monopolies, and Business Rights, Antitrust Implications

267

th

Contract. Hearings (100
,

st

Cong.,

1

Sess.,1987), p. 2.
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Senator Metzenbaum' s comments captured the feelings of many
also provided insight into the nexus

importance of television
chapter,

was cemented

in the

in the

between TV,

antitrust,

was

of interstate commerce and therefore subject

TV

contracts such as the

and other

antitrust

immunity

in professional sports.

in the political

broadcasting

salience

and professional sports. The
in the last

Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 . which exempted pooled

to defuse contentions that television

explosion of paid

Congress, and

maintenance of the baseball anomaly, as noted

television contracts by professional sports leagues.

baseball

in

advocates

in

The

made

effect

Congress saw

legislation

on

baseball unquestionably a matter

to antitrust law.

NFL-ESPN

of this

In the 1980s, with the

contract, Senator

Metzenbaum

their opportunity to attack antitrust

A frontal assault on baseball's exemption was impossible

environment of the 1980s and early 1990s. However, the issue of sports

on

cable television, to the exclusion of free television, gained political

on Capitol

Hill.

Metzenbaum and

others in Congress used this issue to get at the

question of antitrust immunity in professional sports more broadly.

At

issue

was whether

the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 covered television

contracts with paid television providers.

The Act

states that the

exemption

is

"sponsored telecasting" of sporting events. The question was whether cable

for

TV

is

sponsored telecasting. Both the Justice Department's Antitrust Division and the Federal

Trade Commission,

in

opinions provided to the Congress, stated their belief that the 1961

Act does not cover cable

television deals.

Both agencies, however,

existing league cable contracts did not warrant action by them.

also found that

The agencies opinions

deals
gave force to the threat of congressional action on the issue of cable television

leagues crossed the

line.

While no legislation came out of congressional hearings

160

if the

into this

issue in 1987,

many

in

Congress hoped that the potential

for

such legislation would

chasten the professional sports leagues in their dealings with paid television.

By

1989, sports league contracts with paid television had proliferated to the

degree that Congress once again saw

fit

to scare the professional sports leagues.

Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings

in the fall

of 1989 to discuss the

The

possibility

of

explicitly subjecting sports broadcasting deals with paid television providers to
the

antitrust laws.

Senator Metzenbaum

set the

tone in his opening statement of the 1989

hearings. After chronicling the exodus of major sporting events from network

TV,

TV to

paid

the Senator said:

Let

me make one

thing clear.

around, that won't happen

on

free

As long

[i.e.

as this Senator

is

sports not being accessible

TV]. Congress has some leverage here, given the

We

favorable antitrust treatment granted to sports leagues.
will use that leverage if need be,
that.

We

and

I

want

to emphasize

are prepared to go back and reexamine the

antitrust laws

necessary.

with respect to both football and baseball,

if

268

Metzenbaum' s harsh warnings were not new. This was
Major League Baseball had been hearing
produced by these hearings, but the

for forty years.

legislators

made

Once

the type of threat that

again,

their point.

The

no

legislation

issue

of cable

television contracts with professional sports leagues constitutes the only area

Congress considered applying
political

antitrust

law to professional sports

in applying antitrust

161

where the

in the 1980s.

atmosphere was simply too poisoned against government regulation

advocates in Congress to succeed

was

The

for antitrust

law to baseball or any other

sport.

The

issue

of franchise migration, activated by the National Football League's

Oakland Raiders move to Los Angeles and the Colts midnight
produced continued concern

in

Congress considered granting

ride out

of Baltimore, also

Congress. The difference, however, was that on

antitrust immunity, not revoking

it.

this issue

In 1982 and again in

1985, the Congress gave considerable scrutiny, in the form of extensive hearings, to

proposals to exempt from antitrust coverage professional sports league rules that

team's

ability to relocate at will.

In each session of Congress in the 1980s,

proposed to extend such an exemption to professional

The 1990s have seen a continuation of this

Browns and

others have kept the heat

franchise relocations

on

on communities. The

concern

of the minor leagues

in the 1990s,

and

this has

trend.

were

bills

and hockey.

269

The moves of the Cleveland

for legislation to curb the destructive effects of

franchise relocation problems in football have

provided ammunition to Major League Baseball

addition, the fate

football, basketball

a

limit

if the

in its defense

exemption

redounded to the

of the exemption. In

is lifted

benefit

has become a growing

of Major League Baseball's

defense of the exemption.

Just

one month

after Bill Clinton's

1992 presidential

election,

began an investigation of baseball's continued exemption from
repeal the exemption had accompanied every

work stoppage

Congress once more
While

antitrust law.

in baseball since

bills to

1981,

including the 1990 lockout of spring training, no serious consideration, such as

Congressional hearings, had been given to repealing baseball's exemption. Sensing the

268

Monopolies, and Business Rights,
st

(101
269

on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Sports Programming and Cable Television, Hearings,

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee

Cong., l'Sess., 1989),

Congressional interest

p. 3.

in franchise relocations in the

162

1980s are discussed

in

chapter 2.

possibility

of a

shift in political

winds with the election of a Democratic President, the

Senate Judiciary Committee, under Senator Metzenbaum, held hearings
1992. This

was

the

first

in

December

time since the 1976 Select Committee on Professional Sports that

Congressional hearings addressed the specific issue of baseball's antitrust exemption. 270

One of the key

witnesses at these 1992 hearings was former Baseball

Commissioner Fay Vincent. Vincent had recently been forced out of baseball. His
departure from the

game was due

to his involvement in the settlement

of the 1990 labor

dispute that followed an owners lockout of the players during spring training. The

owners, stung by the recent settlement of the collusion cases which cost them $280
million,

were determined

to bring revenue-sharing

spring training lock-out to force the issue.

money every
The

and a salary cap to baseball and used a

The owners claimed

year, while the union countered that the

that they

were losing

owners had cooked the books.

271

players refusal to consider the cap resulted in the lockout, which delayed the opening

of spring

training.

Commissioner Vincent then stepped

into the negotiations

and

eventually took the salary cap and revenue-sharing off the table, which resulted

with the players.

Selig,

a deal

72

Although they endorsed the deal

"Bud"

in

at the time,

owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, and

it

was widely reported

Jerry Reinsdorf,

that Allan

owner of the Chicago

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
nd
Monopolies, and Business Rights, Baseball's Antitrust Immunity. Hearings, (102 Cong.,

270

2d Sess.,1992).
271

The New York
The New York

Chass, Murray, "Chill of Labor Impasse Threatens Baseball's Spring,"

Times (Feb 9, 1990), p. Al, A26; "Myths Surround
Times (Feb. 12, 1990), p. C2.

Negotiations,"

1990," Monthly
Staudohar, Paul D., "Baseball Labor Relations: The Lockout of
Labor Review (October, 1990), p. 32-36.

272
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White Sox, were unhappy with Vincent. Over the next two years Selig and
Reinsdorf
quietly convinced other club

owners

that Vincent

was too

pro-player, not capable of

representing the owners' interests in labor negotiations. Selig

"There

no doubt

is

in

my mind that

was quoted

as saying,

the commissioner and his entire office should never

again participate in labor negotiations or even labor-related matters." 273 In
Selig

and Reinsdorf asked Vincent to agree

to

remove himself from labor

May

1992,

matters.

Vincent's refusal allowed Selig and Reinsdorf to turn sixteen other owners against

who

Vincent,

finally

resigned under pressure in September 1992. The owners then chose

Milwaukee owner, Bud

Selig, to

be acting commissioner

until

a replacement for Vincent

could be found.

As Senator Metzenbaum opened

the

December 1 992

hearings, baseball

was

without a commissioner and the owners were restructuring the office of commissioner.

Convinced

that a strong, independent

confidence

in baseball,

shift in

is

the key to preserving public

and hoping that the election of President Clinton signaled a

the country, Senator

League Baseball

commissioner

Metzenbaum called

the hearings in order to pressure Major

into hiring a strong, independent commissioner.

justification for the

The

and therefore government regulation was unnecessary. The

severely

weakened

this

essential either to the

game

firing

that a

in the public

of Fay Vincent

argument.

At the 1992 Senate hearing Fay Vincent

273

traditional

exemption offered by Major League Baseball had always been

strong independent commissioner provided effective regulation of the

interest

political

economic health or the

testified that the

legal integrity

exemption

of the game."

Chass, Murray, "Diamond Business," Athlon Baseball (1995),
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p. 76.

"is

He

not

also said

that, "if the

owners of baseball continue on

their business,

will,

I

and

at the

same time

would no longer support

comments, Vincent stressed

League Baseball

their stated

insist that the

course of making baseball into

commissioner

their

CEO to

that the

one

utility

of the exemption

at

is

the ability of Major

to control franchise migration.

efforts to focus the hearing

of a strong and independent commissioner, senator

over the proposed relocation of the San Francisco Giants to
the minds of many senators. Senators

on

the

after senator shifted the focus to

the franchise migration issue and defense of the exemption in this regard.

Feinstein

be fired

the preservation of the exemption."274 Despite these

Although Senator Metzenbaum made continued
issue

is

St.

The controversy

Petersburg was fresh on

Hank Brown (D-CO), Arlen

Specter (R-PA), Diane

(D-CA), Paul Simon (D-IL) and even Senator-elect Barbara Boxer (D-CA)

all

expressed concerns about franchise migration. Each emphasized that changes to

baseball's

exemption must not jeopardize a league's

ability to control franchise migration.

Franchise migration and even cable television deals were resonating with the public, but no

significant public support existed for lifting baseball's antitrust exemption.

the 1994 strike that Senator

of his colleagues on the

Metzenbaum was

issue

one or

all

scarcity

on

sway a

was not

significant

until

number

of the exemption.

The 1992 hearing produced no
positions

able to begin to

It

legislation.

the exemption issue. Those

of the following arguments.

who

It

did,

however, lay out the various

favor repeal of baseball's exemption

First, the

exemption underwrites the

of franchises by allowing baseball owners

make

artificial

to control entry into the industry, both

Antitrust,
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
n
Hearings,
(102 Cong.,
Monopolies, and Business Rights, Baseball's An titrust Immunity,

:74
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in

terms of expansion and inter-league competition. In addition,
the owners

maintain

artificial

ability to

values for their franchises gives them greater leverage with their
local

communities with which to extract lucrative and exploitative publicly-financed
stadium
deals.

Second, The exemption provides owners with an unfair advantage

negotiations, especially

representative.

if the

commissioner

is

nothing more than the owners

Because baseball players do not have recourse

labor disputes have resulted in

in labor

more work stoppages than

to the courts, baseball's

in all the other

major

professional sports combined. These arguments have been advanced by the players union,

Members of Congress, academics, and

as well as by

local officials

concerned with the

escalating costs born by local communities of keeping or obtaining professional baseball

franchises.

Those who oppose the repeal of the exemption do so

for

one or

all

of the

following reasons. The repeal of the exemption would result in destructive franchise

relocations,

an argument

that

is

supported by pointing to football's recent and widespread

NFL

troubles with franchise migration.

Had

would not have prevailed

and thus the

the 1980s and 1990s

repeal

in court

the

been immune from

string

of franchise relocations

would never have occurred. Others

would have on

antitrust law,

Al Davis

in football in

point to the destructive effects

the minor leagues. Without the exemption big league clubs

would

not be able to reserve minor leaguers in the manner they currently do. This would have
the effect of reducing the incentive of big league clubs to subsidize the minors. Without
the ability to hold players for at least the six years from the date of initial signing, as minor

leaguers are

now

2d Sess.,1992),

reserved, the majors

would not be

p. 4-5.
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willing to spend as

much on

player

development. Without subsidies from major league clubs, many minor leagues
might

fold,

unable to sustain profitable enterprises in small town, small market, areas.
Another

argument against repeal stresses

its

irrelevance to labor relations in baseball,

which are

covered by the nation's labor laws. Arguments for retaining the exemption are routinely

accompanied by predictions of excessive and

frivolous litigation that

would be ever more

injurious to the national pastime.

Opponents of the exemption's repeal have found

that their predictions

of doom

for

the minor leagues and of chaos from franchise relocation are the most potent arguments
for the exemption.

Capitol

Hill,

The minor leagues argument has been

particularly successful

where around 125 Members have minor league teams

enough number

to warrant the creation

on

in their districts, a large

of the Minor League Caucus

in the

House of

Representatives in 1993. Rep. Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY), whose

district includes

Cooperstown and

cooperation with the

baseball's Hall of Fame, organized the

National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues.

caucus was and

is

Caucus

275

in

The primary purpose of the

the promotion of the interests of minor league baseball and, although

Rep. Boehlert denies

it,

this

means opposing the

repeal of the antitrust exemption.

In a letter to his congressional colleagues inviting them to join the caucus, Rep.

Boehlert chronicles the recent threat to the minor leagues by noting
consider repealing baseball's antitrust exemption, a

move

that could

that,

"Congress may

have serious

consequences for the minors." Boehlert implies that the exemption's repeal could put the

minor leagues

275

in "real trouble." Despite a disclaimer in the letter assuring

Boehlert's upper-state

New York district

Members

that

includes three minor league teams as well as

the Baseball Hall of Fame.

167

involvement

in the

caucus "doesn't commit you to a particular stand on the

exemption issue" the message was

276

clear.

Of the

antitrust

162 Members of Congress

who

belonged to the caucus

in

1996, none has publicly supported the repeal of baseball's

exemption. The caucus

is

clearly a vehicle for organizing opposition to repeal

of the

exemption.

The creation of the Minor League Caucus came
into baseball's

exposed

all

exemption held

in

March

in the

wake of House hearings

1993. While the 1992 Senate hearing had

the various arguments for and against the exemption, the 1993

brought the question of the minor leagues into greater focus. The witness
the

same as the Senate hearing

difference,

in

1992.

Much of the testimony was also

House hearings
list

was

the same.

largely

One

however, was the presence of testimony from a representative of the National

Association of Professional Baseball Leagues (NAPBL), the governing association of the

minor leagues. In the

1

992 hearing the only minor league representation was a former

minor league player named Roric Harrison who

testified that the antitrust

him from catching on with an expansion team and kept him stuck
pinnacle of his career.

the 1993

House

277

NAPBL

276

1,

at

would crush the minors.

in the 1990s.

The

NAPBL became a

sophisticated lobbying organization. Before 1991, the Association had a small

The quotations come from a "Dear Colleague"

Feb.

at the

NAPBL has always assisted Major League Baseball in the defense of its

exemption, that assistance expanded considerably

more

minors

Vice President, Stanley Brand represented the minors

hearing, arguing that repeal of the exemption

While the

in the

exemption kept

1995.
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letter to

staff,

Members of the House dated

a limited conception of its role and was not a very professional operation. 278
Operating

from

their offices in Florida, they played only a

lobbying effort in Washington. 279 In

upon themselves

to

come

fact, in

minor and inconsistent role

in baseball's

1990, several minor league owners took

to Capitol Hill during their very tense negotiations with

League Baseball over the Professional Baseball Agreement (PBA) which governs
between the majors and minors, and

in that instance

it

Major
relations

they actually lobbied against the

exemption.

Major League Baseball had decided
lost

$280

million in the resolution

the minors

seemed

it

would help cushion the blow of the

Lower

start.

subsidies to their minor league clubs

collusion payments. But, after minor league owners

met with Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), he began
matter.

needed to cut expenses. Having just

of the collusion cases, they wanted to cut corners and

a good place to

like

that

calling for

immediate hearings

into the

Under pressure of threatened congressional hearings and amidst a barrage of

invectives in the press

minors was reached.

from minor league owners, an agreement between the majors and

280

While the threat of congressional scrutiny played a part

in the

277

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
nd
Monopolies, and Business Rights, Baseball's Antitrust Immunity. Hearings (102 Cong.,
,

2d Sess.,1992),

p.

405-408.

"Monopsony Means Never Having To Say Your Sorry-A Look At
Baseball's Minor Leagues," Journal of Contemporary Law 4 (1978), p. 191-209.
279
The NAPBL was founded in 1901 as the governing body of the affiliated minor leagues.
The association's headquarters have moved periodically. Initially the NAPBL offices were
Carolina. In 1947,
in Auburn, New York. In 1932, the offices moved to Durham North
moved to their
the offices moved to Columbus, Ohio and in 1973 the NAPBL offices

278

Shapiro, Paul W.,

present city, St. Petersburg, Florida.
280

The 1990

PBA negotiations are discussed

(New York: BasicBooks,

1992). p.

1

13-1 16.

Andrew. Baseball and Billions,
The lobbying efforts of the NAPBL are

in Zimbalist,

Players Association
discussed in a document prepared by the Major League Baseball
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1

hastening of a settlement,

it is

sensible deal independently

important to note that both sides were moving toward a

of the

political pressure.

In 1991, Stanley Brand, newly elected Vice President of the

General Counsel to the House of Representatives, began from
office

what has been a steady and sophisticated campaign
*

exemption.

28

in

his

NAPBL and

Washington,

former

DC

law

support of baseball's

Brand's entrance on to the scene evinces a recognition of the importance of

the minors in protecting the exemption in the 1990s, and the desire of Major League

Baseball not to have to worry about minor league owners causing trouble on Capitol

Hill.

In January, 1993, Major League Baseball created the post of Director of

Government
politically

League

Relations, headquartered in the Washington

connected law

since the

office in

1

Baker and Hostetler, which has represented the American

firm,

920s. This

Washington. The

made

first

Callahan, a Washington insider

(D-IL). Callahan,

who had

DC offices of the powerful and

baseball the only professional sport with a

incumbent of this newly created

who had

office

full

time

was Eugene

spent ten years as an aid to Senator Allan Dixon

close personal relationships with numerous key legislators,

was a well known and respected

figure

on Capitol

Hill until his retirement in early 1997.

Callahan's experience in the Senate complimented Brand's experience in the House.

Together Brand, Callahan and the Congressional Minor League Caucus have
maintained steady pressure on

Members of Congress

since 1993, keeping the negative

consequences for minor league baseball from the repeal of the exemption on the

entitled "Baseball's Antitrust
Bill,

Exemption

"Baseball; Grass Roots Chaos,"

-

A Resource Book," (1992).

The Sporting News

170

(Dec.

3,

p.

front

22-23; Madden,

1990), p. 44.

burner.

Numerous

sponsored by the

"educational" opportunities for

NAPBL, when minor

Hill for "courtesy calls"

on

legislators.

Members of Congress

are routinely

and major league owners are brought to Capitol

The Minor League Caucus and

NAPBL also

co-

sponsor social events several times a year where minor league owners can spend time with
282

legislators.

Increased sophistication and coordination of baseball's lobbying effort in

Washington has become more important
to side with the

owners more often than

in the

1990s because, while the public continues

not, they also continue to register their

As

disgust with the business of professional sports.

growing

recently as the 1970s, baseball

seemed

able to exploit the cultural significance of the "national pastime" in their efforts to preserve

the exemption, but that significance had eroded significantly by the 1990s and, with

strategy.

Public opinion polls in the 1990s reveal that Americans

America's game as often or more often than

283

baseball.

now

it,

the

identify football as

This volatility in public sentiment

increased the need for vigilance in baseball's courtship of Congress.

The

creation of an official Major League Baseball lobbyist position in Washington,

as well as the existence of a Washington based minor league lobbyist, both unprecedented,

illustrates this increased vigilance.

Prior to the 1990s baseball had no such permanent

lobbying presence in Washington. In the 1990s, the tag team of Stan Brand and Gene

Callahan has worked

281

It is

tirelessly

and well to preserve baseball's

noteworthy that Brand was not

affiliated

with the

antitrust

NAPBL

in

exemption. The

1990 when several

says that they
minor league owners challenged the exemption. Of that effort Brand simply
were a small number of recalcitrant owners acting without NAPBL approval.
of Professional
282
Interview with Stanley Brand, Vice President, National Association

Baseball Leagues, 8 January 1997.
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creation of the Congressional

Minor League Caucus

sophistication and professionalism in lobbying that

is

line

meeting

in the unstable political

environment

284

The owners' increased
hard

example of the increased

Major League Baseball has deemed

necessary for the protection of its antitrust exemption

of the 1990s.

also an

fire

power on Capitol

approach to labor relations
in Louisville,

in the 1990s.

Hill

In

was

also

made necessary by

December 1992,

their

the owners,

Kentucky, voted 15-13 to re-open the part of the collective-

bargaining agreement dealing with the game's economic system In addition to reopening

on

the sections

free agency, salary arbitration

and the minimum

salary, the

a resolution requiring the assent of three-quarters of the owners to

Armed with

initiate

owners passed
a lockout.

data from a recently released report by the Major League Baseball Economic

Study Committee, which predicted economic hard times
planning for the 1994 labor negotiations.

285

By

for baseball, the

owners began

1993, the owners had agreed

among

themselves on a revenue-sharing plan that would require the imposition of a salary cap on
the players. During this

Hill.

283

In the 1992-93 hearings, representatives of Major League Baseball defended their

Gallup, George

Spectator Sport,"
284

same time period the owners were claiming poverty on Capitol

Jr.

and Frank Newport, "Football Remains America's Number One

The Gallup

Poll

Interview with Eugene Callahan,

Monthly (October,

1992), p. 36-38.

MLB Director of Government Relations, 9 January

1997. Mr. Callahan retired from this position February

1,

1997.

As of this

writing no

replacement has been named.
285

The Economic Study Committee was commissioned during

the 1990 collective

bargaining process. In the labor agreement of 1990, the committee was created to
determine the actual financial heath of baseball, in order that the exaggerated claims of

agreement negotiations. See also Baldo,
"Secrets of the Front Office: What America's Pro Teams are Worth,"

both sides would be minimized

Anthony,
Financial

et al.,

World

in the next labor

(July 9, 1991), p. 28-43.
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restructuring

of the commissioner's

commissioner

--

office

-

the appointment of Bud Selig as acting

as a necessary step to save the

The economic study committee

report,

game from

financial ruin.

which the owners used to

justify the re-

opening of the collective-bargaining agreement, was not the propaganda
document the

owners had hoped
faced

many

it

would

be.

Although the whole committee did conclude

serious economic problems, one

supplemental statement to the report

in

member of the committee

He

attached a

which he strongly condemned the broad

conclusions of the report. Independent committee

Brookings

that baseball

Institution, did not agree that baseball

member Henry

had any

J.

significant

Aaron, of the

economic

troubles.

wrote:

Through the 9,000 words of text, however, the majority
report leads readers up one blind alley and down another,
suggesting that an industry whose companies are valued in
the market at prices as high as, or higher than, ever before

on

the brink of some vague sort of economic trouble

is

286

Aaron's statement went on to say that baseball's problems were

political,

economic, caused by the game's lack of a strong, independent governing

not

structure.

Instead of a powerful, objective piece of evidence supporting the owners, the report

produced a powerful piece of evidence

for the players union.

The

report's majority

conclusions were drowned out by Mr. Aaron's statement, which would be

referred to by the players union representatives

The owners

cries

Statement of Henry

J.

Hill.

of pending economic collapse were given some support by

continuing disclosures from

286

on Capitol

liberally

CBS

ESPN on their revenues

and

from baseball broadcasts.

Aaron, attached to the Major League Baseball Economic Study

Committee Report issued December

3,

1992,

p. 10.
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From 1990 through
indicated that,

1993, the television networks

when broadcast

for the

in 1990.

huge losses they claimed

salaries

287

their revenue-sharing

been rejected by the players

public their large losses and

contracts with baseball were reviewed in 1994, they would

not be willing to pay nearly as much.

owners pushed

made

Going

into the

1994 player negotiations, the

and salary cap plans,

They argued

that

earlier versions

changes were needed to make up

for the last several years as a result

and because of additional losses expected from decreases

On January

of which had

of escalating player

in television revenue.

18, 1994, the owners, meeting in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, adopted a

revenue-sharing plan that would distribute $58 million to low-revenue teams.

Implementation of the plan required the imposition of a player salary cap. The cap,

however, would not be proposed to the players

until June, six

months

later.

By March

1994, a year and a half after forcing Fay Vincent from office, the owners had

a

new commissioner.

Incensed by the owners

as by the structural changes

made

Metzenbaum scheduled a Senate
on March 21, 1994,

Metzenbaum opened

a

new commissioner,

powers of the commissioner's

in the

Judiciary

to coincide with

failure to find

Committee hearing

still

office,

not hired

as well

Senator

for St. Petersburg, Florida,

Major League Baseball's spring

training.

the hearing saying:

Today's hearing

will focus

on major league

baseball's

name a new commissioner and to destroyand I use the word destroy advisedly-to destroy the
commissioner's power to police the business of major
league baseball. By reason of the new restrictions on the
commissioner, the commissioner doesn't become much

decision not to

more than a

287

Many commentators

"lackey", working for baseball, rather than the

nothing
argue that the networks claims of huge losses are

than posturing designed to

illicit

more

mo

favorable deals in the future. See, Zimbalist, p.

162.

174

independent commissioner that
years.

The

we

have

known over

the

288

effort to repeal baseball's

exemption was clearly picking up steam. The

Petersburg hearing, which was considering a

introduced by Senator

bill

St.

Metzenbaum to

repeal the exemption, brought attention, not only to the need for a commissioner,
but also
to baseball's slow expansion schedule and

Francisco Giants to

Graham of Florida
summer and

fall

St.

to

its

failure to

allow the relocation of the San

Petersburg. This had led Florida Senators Connie

become advocates of the exemption's

repeal.

Mack and Bob

Throughout the

of 1994, Major League Baseball employed several public

strategies to divert pressures. Periodically, they leaked

relations

names of possible replacements

for

Vincent, including the Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate, Democrat George Mitchell of

Maine. They also used the veiled promise of expansion. Senator Connie

Mack (R-FL)

reported to a Florida newspaper that baseball owners had issued "veiled threats" to him

that Florida

would not

get an expansion

In the months before the

into

expansion

sites.

The 1994 Player

It

March hearing

finally

289

issue.

baseball formed an expansion committee to look

seemed no coincidence

that Florida

topped the

list.

Strike

The 1994 season opened
owners

team unless he backed off the exemption

in April

amid threats of work stoppages.

proposed the salary cap to the

players. Their plan

would

On June

split

14, the

revenue 50-50

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies, and Business Rights, Professional Baseball Teams and the Antitrust Laws,

288

Hearings (103d Cong., 2d Sess.,1994),
,

289

Dahl, David. "Baseball

(September 30, 1994),

p.

p. 1.

Owners Dealt Blow By
1C.

175

Panel," St. Petersburg

Times

between owners and players

in

exchange

proposed eliminating arbitration

in

for payroll limitations.

exchange for lowering

The owners

also

free agent eligibility

from

six to

four years of service, with the provision that a player's former team could match any offer

through the player's sixth year of service.

On July

18, the players publicly rejected the cap

proposal and countered with proposals to lower the tenure requirement for arbitration to

two

years, eliminate restrictions

With the back and

on

repeat free agency, and raise the

forth maneuverings of the players and

minimum

salary.

owners being widely

reported in the press, the Small Business Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives

began to inquire
20, 1994,

antitrust

was

into the business

of minor league

The House

hearing, held July

to investigate the possible negative effects that the repeal of baseball's

exemption would have for the minor leagues. That such a hearing was held was a

victory for

Major League Baseball, because the uncertainty around

exemption's repeal on the minor leagues has

political

baseball.

weapon

in

Major League Baseball's

in the

in

1990s become the most important

arsenal.

The network of minor league teams across
unprecedented efforts

the impact of the

the country has since 1993

support of baseball's antitrust immunity. While

baseball has long enjoyed a lobbying advantage in Congress due to

governance structure, which makes

all

290

is

utilized this

advantage

true that

vertically integrated

of the 170 minor league owners and

de facto baseball lobbyists, the game had never
coordinated and professional way.

its

it

made

in

local officials

such a

In the past, the minor league advantage remained in

integrated
Discussion of basebaU's lobbying advantage resulting from its vertically
and Organized
governance structure can be found in Ellig, Jerome R., "Law, Economics,
Dissertation, George Mason
Baseball: Analysis of a Cooperative Venture," (Ph.D.

290

University, 1987), p. 41-62.
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the background, while baseball justified

its

privileged legal status by citing the special

nature and cultural significance of America's national pastime. Baseball's
owners were
able to exploit the cultural significance of the game, as well as the uncertainty
of applying
antitrust laws to

significance

major league baseball. With the erosion of baseball's special cultural

and the

much of what

rise

of the players association, which dismantled the reserve

the exemption had arguably protected has been

League Baseball with only two

significant

arguments for

its

lost.

This has

left

clause,

Major

exemption: to prevent

franchise migration and protect the minor leagues.

At the House hearings
effects

worn

speech. In feet, Brand, Selig, and

Congress since 1991 were

entitled "Talking Points

all

1994, several witnesses testified about the negative

of repealing the exemption. Stanley Brand gave what had by then become a well

testified in

to

in July

all

the other exemption defenders

literally

reading from the same

who had

script.

A document

Regarding Baseball's Antitrust Exemption" had been distributed

of Major League Baseball's defenders, including several Members of Congress

The document

includes six sub-headings: franchise

stability,

291

preservation of the

minors, governance, labor relations, expansion, and the inappropriateness of applying the

antitrust

laws to baseball. The script prompts baseball advocates to argue

that,

without

the exemption:

•

the Oakland Raiders precedent

•

the minor leagues

would become

the

norm

would crumble without big league

in baseball;

subsidies for player

development.

The author was provided with copies of these "Talking Points" by Stanley Brand
(NAPBL), Gene Callahan (MLB), and Congressman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY).

291
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The
•

script further

prompts the reader to mention

the commissioner search committee

is

"now

that:

actively

working to

identify a

strong leader of unquestioned integrity";

•

the exemption

is

irrelevant to player relations because those relations are

governed by the labor laws, and the players union
than any other players union

•

baseball expansion

the

is

has gotten more

at the bargaining table;

on a par with non-exempted

same number of teams as

in baseball

the

NFL

sports because baseball has

and more than the

NBA and NHL; and,

antitrust laws are inappropriate because sports leagues are joint ventures, single

entities,

whose

internal rules

and regulations are wholly appropriate.

Attention to the arguments of baseball's

clear that

everybody

The

is

transcript

officials, lobbyists

and congressional

allies

makes

following the same script.

of the House minor league baseball hearing

in July,

1994, chaired by

Rep. John Lafalce (D-NY), himself an active member of the Minor League Caucus,
revealed a decided bias on the part of the committee members. In an opening statement,

New York

the chairman of the

Minor League Caucus,

Sherwood Boehlert

passionately defended baseball's exemption and drew praise from

many committee members ~ even

Republican Representative

a standing ovation from one member, California

Republican, Michael Huffington. The hearing appeared to be almost a public relations
event staged by the Minor League Caucus.

292

U.S., Congress, House, Committee

on Small Business, The Key
rd

Minor League

Baseball. Hearings (103
,

292

Cong., 2d Sess., 1994).

178

Issues Confronting

The House hearing
Baseball in defending

its

illustrates well the institutional

exemption from

advantage of Major League

legislative repeal.

While the Senate became

embroiled in the substantive policy debate on the exemption, the House remained
firmly
the grip of baseball's lobbyists,

maintain

much greater

who

in

because of the great number of minor league teams

leverage with

members

must face the voters every two years and run

in the

House. U.S. Representatives also

in districts rather

than in statewide elections.

This enables local interests, including minor league teams and their local supporters, to
exert a greater influence in

advantage

is

House

further illustrated

elections than in Senate elections. This institutional

by the

fact that

no Member of the House who has a minor

league team in his district has publicly opposed the exemption.

Meanwhile, on July 27, 1994, the owners rejected the players

latest

proposals and,

the next day, the executive committee of the players union voted unanimously to strike

beginning August 12.

rejection

of the

On August

1994, the owners, not happy with the players

1,

make

salary cap, refused to

players' pension plan.

The owners

a scheduled payment of $7.8 million to the

failure to

make

the

payment resulted

unfair labor practices being filed by the players with the National

(NLRB). On August

in

charges of

Labor Relations Board

12, the strike began.

At the heart of the

strike

was

the disagreement between the owners and players

about the financial health of Major League Baseball. The owners claimed that they were

losing

money because

player salaries were out of control due to free agency bidding wars.

The competitive balance on the

field

was

also said to be jeopardized

by the continued

escalation of these wars. Smaller market teams, the owners argued, were disadvantaged

because they could not

attract

huge

television deals.

179

The players responded

that the

owners were

lying about revenue losses, that television revenues,

evinced huge profits

The

among

other things,

and that even the smaller market teams were

in baseball,

profitable.

players union argued that revenues were in fact rising at twice the rate of player

salaries.

The owners refused

to

open their books

to public scrutiny and relied

of their Economic Study Commission to make the case

was threatened by

escalating player salaries.

The

by the union, countered the owners references

that the

players,

to the

game's

on the

report

financial health

whose incomes

are

made

Economic Study Committee

public

report

with the supplemental statement of committee member Henry Aaron of the Brookings

The

Institution.

study,

players

augmented

their rhetorical

weaponry

commissioned by the Players Association, was

Roger Noll,

this

was

released.

August 1994, when a

Conducted by economist

study found that baseball was financially healthy and that poor

management, not declining
contracts,

in

to blame for

viability

of small market teams and decreased value of TV
293

its

troubles.

Major League Baseball responded

to the Noll

report with a statement that simply cited the counter conclusions of their Economic Study

Committee Report.

As

It

was a standoff between

the players strike got under

way

in

the experts

on both

294

sides.

August 1994, opinion

precarious nature of baseball in the hearts and minds of Americans.

conducted just days before the
in baseball.

293

The

poll

strike

polls revealed the

A Gailup poll

began revealed the danger of continued labor unrest

found Americans disgusted with the greed of the players and the

Noll, Roger, "Baseball

Economics

in the 1990s:

Baseball Players Association," (August, 1994).
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A Report to the Major League

dishonesty of the owners. Two-thirds of those polled supported a cap
on player salaries

and by 45 to

27%

said that the

Half of those surveyed
felt

the

felt

term "greedy" applied more to players than to owners.

that the players

demands were "unreasonable," while only 29%

owners demands were unreasonable. The owners, however, were not immune

public disgust.

The

poll also

found that half of the people surveyed

were "honest," while only 16% thought the owners were. In
most Americans believed the

More

players, not the owners,

felt

that the players

addition, the poll found that

were "bargaining

in

good

faith."

alarming perhaps for baseball was what the poll said about Americans love of the

national pastime: Less than half of those surveyed indicated that they

at all

to

during the

would miss

baseball

295

strike.

Selective results of this poll, as well as internal polls regularly commissioned by

Major League Baseball, were

publicly trumpeted by Organized Baseball as showing

support for the owners' position on baseball's exemption. Privately, Major League
Baseball

was aware of the

Judiciary Subcommittee

volatility

of public opinion.

Major League Baseball released the

among

Just days before the

House

on Economic and Commercial Law, chaired by Democrat Jack

Brooks of Texas, opened hearings on

indicated,

296

baseball's antitrust exemption in

results

of an

internal poll that they

September 1994,

would claim

other things, public support for baseball's antitrust immunity.

A copy of a document entitled "Response Prepared By MLB to

Roger Noll Analysis"
was provided to the author by the Congressional Research Service. The documents
author was not cited and it was undated.
295
McAneny, Leslie and Lydia Saad, "With Popularity On The Upswing, Baseball Strikes

294

Monthly (August, 1994), p. 28-31.
Interview with Len Sanderson, Media Consultant with Eisner

Out,"
296

The Gallup

Poll

1997.
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& Sanderson,

15 January

The September 19
Role
that

in Players Strike."

80%

asked

if

press release

Conducted by the

of those surveyed saw no

entitled, "Baseball

polling firm

role for

players culpable, while only

owners proposed

the poll's reported results

in the

On the question of blame
19% blamed the

salary cap

was a

of Penn

government

Congress should become more involved

the people polled said, "no."

for the

was

Fans Reject Government

& Schoen, the poll found
When

in resolving the strike.

management of baseball, 89% of
for the strike,

31%

found the

owners. The poll also found strong support

and revenue sharing

plan.

Conspicuously absent from

direct question about the antitrust exemption.

Nevertheless, the poll would be marshaled by Major League Baseball in defending the

exemption.

297

When Chairman Jack Brooks opened the

September 22, 1994, hearing

into

between the players and owners was

baseball's antitrust exemption, the labor dispute

being fought out in the press and the World Series had already been canceled. Brooks, a

longtime foe of baseball's antitrust immunity, began with a passionate statement about the

cultural significance

of baseball

in

America.

He spoke of the game's

contributions in

helping the nation cope with hard times, and then declared that with ongoing strike "the

fabric

of our national

game

will

297

life

have to reap

The Penn

was torn asunder." He went on
298

their bitter harvest."

Brooks' outrage

& Schoen poll was conducted on September

of the

to say that "the lords

illustrated the

13-14, 1994.

The

changing

results

were

included in a September 19, 1994, press release of Major League Baseball. The author
made repeated attempts to obtain this and other poll data directly from Penn Schoen,

&

but access to the data was

not provided.

Economic and
U.S. Congress, House. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
rd
2d
Commercial Law, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption (Part 2), Hearings (103 Cong.,

298

,

Sess.,1994), p.

1.
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mood even

in the

House. Prior to the

challenges only in the Senate.

Numerous

bills

consideration in the

bills

affecting baseball's

exemption faced

The House had been tightly

repealing

House

strike, baseball's

in the

all

significant

controlled by baseball lobbyists.

or part of baseball's exemption were taken under

wake of the

strike.

Before the strike began only two

exemption had been considered

in the

103

rd

A bill to

Congress.

exclude Baseball from the benefits of the Sports Broadcasting Act which exempts pooled
,

television contracting

by professional sports leagues, was introduced by Republican

Representative Michael Bilirakis of Florida in March, 1993. This limited proposal for
repealing baseball's exemption followed an earlier

by

and others that had aimed

Bilirakis

more ambitious

at total repeal

effort in January 1993,

of the exemption. Neither

bill

was

reported out of the Judiciary Committee.

After the players strike began in August 1994, however, there was a flurry of bills

introduced in the House calling for the limited repeal of baseball's exemption. These
included the "Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994" (H.R. 4965), the "Baseball Fans and

Community

Protection Act of 1994" (H.R. 4994), and the "Major League Play Ball Act"

(H.R. 5095). H.R. 4965, introduced by Democrat Representative Major

Owens of New

York, called for the application of antitrust law to any term or condition

unilaterally

imposed by
disdain

on

This limited repeal

either party in the baseball labor dispute.

all sides.

Those opposed to the exemption

defenders of the exemption

felt

that acceptance

felt

Representative Bilirakis, introduced H.R. 4994 a week

However, while the

strike

183

it

was not enough, while

of this limited repeal would jeopardize the

remaining immunity in the future. Exemption opponents

repeal of the exemption.

that

was greeted with

in the

House, led by

later, calling for

had

stirred

the complete

up opposition

to the

exemption, the complete repeal was

Caucus

in the

still

unlikely given the activities

of the Minor League

House.

In light of this political reality, Bilirakis and the others

who sponsored H.R.

4994,

including baseball Hall of Famer, Republican Representative Jim Bunning
of Kentucky,

amended H.R. 4994,

bringing

the

same time

bill

to create a regulatory

in the Senate,

it

into line with the

more

limited proposals for repeal.

299

At

Republican Dennis Deconcini of New Mexico introduced a

commission to oversee professional baseball and resolve

disputes such as the strike. Deconcini' s

bill

was never given

serious consideration, but

did indicate the atmosphere in the Senate, where baseball's exemption

was

it

seriously

threatened even before the strike.

The September 1994 hearings
Major League Baseball.
and Commercial

Law

300

into baseball's antitrust

Members of the House

grilled acting

immunity did not go well for

Judiciary Subcommittee

commissioner Bud Selig on the propriety of the

exemption. Representative Michael Synar, a principle sponsor of a
the exemption, very nearly called Selig a

commissioner,

"Why

on Economic

liar.

bill

for partial repeal

Congressman Synar asked the

should anyone believe what you say?"

He

of

acting

lectured Selig for

reneging on his two year old promise to appoint a strong commissioner.

30
'

There were no

diversions to other issues such as franchise migration at this hearing. Players Association

299

Michael Synar (D-OK) and Major Owens (D-NY) were the other co-sponsors of H.R

4994.
300

See, Vecsey, George, "The

Owners

Strike

Out

On Hill,

Too," The

p. B9.
Antitrust Exemption Draws Fire
"Baseball's
David,
Hosansky,

New York Times

(September 23, 1994),
301

in

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (September 24, 1994),

184

Congress,"

p.

2673.

chief,

Donald Fehr,

told the

committee that

if Congress

passed the limited repeal presently

under consideration the players would return to work and

The witness
1994

at this hearing

list

strike, the players

shift in

union had stood alone among

repeal of the exemption.

303

it

out in the courts.

the balance of power. Until the

interest

groups

in

advocating a

legal scholars

and

political scientists, antitrust

advocates such

Metzenbaum and Republican Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah were hard

to generate support in

302

Although there was plenty of "expert" testimony against the

exemption from economists,
as Senators

evidenced a

fight

Congress for repealing the exemption. Once the

however, the players union was more vigorous

in its

campaign

to

pressed

strike began,

end the exemption and

other groups joined in the effort for repeal.

Small organized groups of disgruntled fans began appearing
the most notable being "Sports Fans Unlimited,"

accompanied by Frank Sullivan of "Fans

First"

in the fall

of 1994,

whose founder, Adam Kolton,

and Bradley Stillman of the Consumer

Federation of America, testified at the September House hearing. In cooperation with the

Consumer Federation of America, which

claims to represent over 50 million consumers,

Kolton's and Sullivan's groups, joined also by over a dozen other fan groups across the
country, conducted a national petition campaign to end the antitrust exemption. The

appearance of grass roots lobbying against baseball's exemption was indicative of the
increasingly precarious position of baseball's unregulated

monopoly

in the fall

of 1994.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Economic and
rd
Commercial Law, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption (Part 2). Hearings (103 Cong. 2d

302

,

Sess.,1994), p.

172-174.

With the exception of the brief time in 1990, when a small group of minor league
owners were temporarily against the exemption.

303

185

Despite their polls showing public approval of the owners
positions, Major League
Baseball

was

quite

aware of the damage being caused by the

strike.

The September 1994 hearing ended with Acting Commissioner
object to a

comment by union

Selig trying to

chief Donald Fehr. Chairman Brooks cut him off and

closed the hearing with a scathing indictment of Major League
Baseball.
that,

when Congress reconvened

surely act.

304

One week

baseball's antitrust immunity.

full

House

1995,

if the strike

after the hearing, the

Commercial Law became the

the

in

first

settled,

congressional panel to vote for the repeal of part of

The subcommittee's

action

was followed

the next day

Judiciary Committee, which, by voice vote, passed H.R. 4994, that

were unwilling to go on the record

in

that

antitrust laws to labor disputes,

it

passed

support of repeal. In addition, the version of the

it

would apply

did not include a provision, as in the original that would

provide an automatic injunction against a salary cap

bill

bill

in the

committee members

voted out of committee had been considerably weakened. While

The

would

appeared that both public and congressional sentiment was moving toward

it

through the Judiciary Committee by voice vote, which meant

suits.

by

305

committee approval of H.R. 4994 weighed against such an outcome. The

law

clear

Congress would

support for at least a partial repeal of the exemption, several factors involved

bill

it

Subcommittee on Economic and

apply antitrust law to baseball's labor relations.

While

were not

He made

approved by the committee

left

it

until the settlement

of any pending

to the courts to decide whether the

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Economic and
rd
Commercial Law, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption (Part 2). Hearings (103 Cong. 2d

304

,

Sess., 1994), p.

177-178.
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union would have to "decertify" before an
action thus seemed

more symbolic - a

antitrust suit

"threat" to

could be heard.

306

Major League Baseball - and, indeed,

players union chief Donald Fehr announced that his
promise to return to

passage of legislation did not apply to

The
the

House

interest

Judiciary

of the 103

rd

Committee

this

Congress

bill

that

in baseball's

would impose binding

exemption was not exhausted by

1994.

He opened

as scheduled."

08

between

now and

Chairman of the
Relations,

on owners and

the hearing saying, "I intend, although

to raise legislative hell

on

arbitration

1995, held a hearing on his

1,

for the

307

vote. Representative Pat Williams,

agreement were reached by February

work

bill.

House Education and Labor Subcommittee on Labor-Management
introduced a

The committee

I

who had

players if no

bill

on September

29,

don't like binding arbitration,

spring training to see that the 1995 season goes

Williams' hearing revealed no

of his colleagues were also not fans of binding

new

information, other than that most

The

arbitration.

bill

was never reported out

of committee.
In mid-October, after the Congress had gone

President Bill Clinton called

305

Dahl, David, "Baseball

(September 30, 1994),
306

p.

Bud

Selig

home

to

campaign

for re-election,

and Donald Fehr to the White House.

Owners Dealt Blow By Panel"

St.

On the same

Petersburg Times

1C, 4C.

means that a labor union disqualifies itself from acting as a collective
bargaining agent for its member. In effect, it constitutes the elimination of the union. To
decertify, a union must file a petition with the NLRB, then hold a decertification election
among its members. Decertification requires that a majority of union members vote to
Decertification

dissolve the union.
307

Thomas,

Jennifer,

"Subcommittee Backs Anti-exemption

Bill," St.

Petersburg Times

(September 28, 1994), p. 9C.
308
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, Subcommittee on Labormanagement relations, The Impact on Collective Bargaining of the Ant itrust Exemption:
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day Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, appointed former Secretary
of Labor, W.J. Usery,
to mediate the dispute

between the players and owners. 309 Secretary Reich

called

Usery

the "Mr. October" of labor negotiations and predicted that the
highly respected mediator

would bring the two

sides in baseball

back together. For

Usery sounded a

his part,

310

cautious tone saying that resolution of the dispute would be very

difficult.

Since the strike began, there had been calls for President Clinton to intervene to
stop

Fan groups, as well as some

it.

legislators,

urged Clinton

in

September to use

executive powers, as he had in a recent railroad strike and the American Airlines
attendant strike, in order to save the 1994 baseball season.

would

issue a

It

League Baseball was meeting

in

1994 mid-term

elections,

flight

was hoped than Clinton

60-day back to work order, which might salvage the World

Just days before the historic

his

311

Series.

on the same day Major

Chicago to consider proposals from groups hoping to win

expansion franchises, a small band of baseball entrepreneurs headed by famed player

Moss announced

attorney and agent Richard

The United League was
League
the

new

in

the

first

the creation of the United Baseball League.

attempt to create a

new

league since the Continental

1960, which had prompted Major League Baseball's expansion. Organizers of

league, which operated out of a Manhattan real estate office, included Moss,

former Congressman from

New York,

Robert Mrazek, and then current

Congress John Bryant, Democrat of Texas. Also

listed

among

the officers of the

rd

H.R. 5095. Major League Plav Ball Act of 1995. Hearings (103
,

Member of
new

Cong., 2d Sess., 1994),

p. 2.
309
310

Usery had served as the Secretary of Labor in the Ford Administration.
Neikirk, William and James Warren, "Labor's 'Mr. October' new hope

Chicago Tribune (October

15, 1994), p. 2:1-2.
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for baseball,"

league

was Curt Flood, whose

challenge to baseball's reserve clause in 1970

instrumental in eventually gaining free agency for the players.

group announced

New Orleans, New York,

Angeles,

league

where

six charter cities

was
It

to begin play with a

UL teams would play:

1994, the

1,

Washington, Los

Vancouver, and San Juan, Puerto Rico. The new

156-game schedule

quickly became apparent that the

connections to the

On November

was

in

March 1997. 312

UL, organized

MLBPA, was an attempt

entirely

by people with serious

by advocates and friends of the players

association to pressure the owners into a settlement. Nevertheless, the

new

league

regularly reported ambitious plans and received endorsements from economists, including

Andrew

Zimbalist,

who

said that

it

could be viable.

313

The

UL organizers kept the league

idea alive through the 1995 season and into the 1996 season, only folding their tent,

according to organizers, after

TV

and stadium deals

fell

through

Representatives of Major League Baseball claim that the

UL

in April

1996.

314

was never considered

anything more than a bargaining tactic by the players union.

Other than the announcements coming from the United League, November 1994

Washington was consumed with after-shocks from the congressional

elections.

in

The 1 994

mid-term elections transformed the partisan make up of the House of Representatives and
the Senate, both of which were captured by the Republicans, ending 40 years of

Democratic

3,1

rule in the

House. One of the victims of the Republican sweep was Texas

Johnson, Chuck, "Fans ask Clinton to help save season,"

USA Today

(September

8,

1994), p. 12C.
312

Loverto, Thorn, "United,

plans for 1997,"
313

it

waits:

New baseball league passes on the

The Washington Times

Shapiro, Leonard,

The Washington

"New

(February 29, 1996),

Baseball League

Post (May 23, 1995),

p.

Still

Lacking Owners, Players, Stadiums,"

El, E6.
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p.

1996 season,

CI.

Democratic Representative, Jack Brooks, the leading foe of baseball's
exemption
House.

315

in the

In addition, Democrat Michael Synar of Oklahoma, a principle
sponsor of H.R.

4994 was defeated

for re-election.

Metzenbaum removed a
end of the 103

principle

In the Senate, the retirement of Senator

opponent of baseball's exemption as

Howard
Toward

well.

the

rd

Congress, Senator Metzenbaum had been pre-occupied with getting the

Brady hand gun waiting period

bill

passed, which he had long considered his

and had not been as involved with baseball

first priority,

issues.

Despite these setbacks for the advocates of repealing the exemption, the election

seemed

to provide encouragement to both sides.

With the new Republican

majorities,

Major League Baseball's hope of appointing Democratic Senator George Mitchell of

Maine became

less viable.

In the Senate, Orrin Hatch,

who

replaced

Metzenbaum

as

chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, would himself propose a limited repeal of the
exemption, but the Republican takeover put Henry Hyde of Illinois
Judiciary Committee, and

turn back the

up by

Hyde was an opponent of the exemption's

momentum for

repeal in the

that panel's vote in the previous

House

Judiciary

Congress to

lift

charge of the House

in

repeal.

Committee

that

He would

had been

built

the exemption in labor matters.
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During the winter of 1994, the players and owners had several negotiating sessions
with

Bill

Usery, but no agreement was reached.

complaint against the owners for their

August.

3,4

failure to

On December 14,
make

the

NLRB

issued a

the pension plan contribution in

A week later, the owners declared an impasse and unilaterally imposed their final

Shuster, Rachel, "League Folds,"

USA Today

(April 12, 1996), p. Bl.

Brook's defeat cannot be attributed to his position on baseball's exemption. Their
record of his opponent raising the exemption issue during the campaign.

315

190

is

no

offer, a

complicated system of payroll taxes and revenue-sharing that had the effect of a

salary cap.

On December 27,

both sides

NLRB. When the NLRB made

it

filed unfair labor practices

clear that they

were going

the owners, alleging that the salary cap had been imposed

charges with the

to issue a complaint against

illegally,

the owners rescinded

the economic system they had imposed.

Frustrated with the lack of progress, President Clinton ordered talks to resume and

of February 6

set a deadline

progress.

for a

for progress

The President extended

it

on an agreement. The deadline came without

by one day and called both sides to the White House

summit of sorts. At the February 7 White House meeting, the President asked both

sides to accept binding arbitration.

The owners

refused.

Both the President's and Mr.

Usery's attempts to mediate the strike were rebuffed by both

sides.

thereupon sent a proposal for binding arbitration to Congress where

During the winter, Major League Baseball
relations war.

as mediator,
317

side.

In

felt that

November, just two days before the

first

it

The President
it

was dead on

was winning

arrival.

the public

negotiating session with Usery

MLB put out a full page ad in USA Today intended to win fans over to their

Their internal polling was telling them that the players were getting the brunt of

public disgust. Oakland A's General Manager, Sandy Aldersom, suggested that the union

was

acting with "the
318

in the '70s."

The

same

institutional arrogance that

objective of the owners

was

proved the downfall of the owners

to break the union

by bringing

in

Dodd, Mike, "Election results encourage both sides on antitrust issue," USA Today
(November 11,1 994), p. 7C.
Competitive,"
317
"Baseball In The twenty first Century: Still Accessible, Affordable, And
USA Today (November 9, 1994), p. 9C.
Globe
3,8
Gammons, Peter, "The big picture escapes small minds," The Boston Sunday

316

(February 12, 1995),

p. 83.

191

replacement players for the 1995 season. Internal Major League Baseball
public opinion
polls at the time indicated that fans

were

willing to support replacement players, a

conclusion backed up by independent polling data. 319

Meanwhile, the 104
legislation,

th

was considering

baseball's exemption.

Moynihan, a

Two weeks

Congress,

not consumed with "Contract with America"

several bills aimed at either the complete or partial repeal of

On the

first

day of the 104

New York Democrat,

later,

when

introduced a

Moynihan backed off his

bill

th

Congress, Senator Daniel Patrick

bill

to repeal the

320

exemption

entirely.

and co-sponsored one proposed by the new

chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Republican Orrin Hatch, which was a more
limited repeal

of the exemption to apply only to labor matters. Another

bill

sponsored by

Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont and South Carolina Republican Strom

Thurmond, was

also

proposed

removed the exemption only
consideration

321

opening days of the 104

in labor matters.

when the Senate

February 1995.

in the

was

It

th

Congress and would have

these measures that were under

Judiciary Subcommittee

on

Antitrust held hearings in

These hearings, chaired by Senator Thurmond, provided a sounding

board for frustrations with the ongoing
the exemption in labor matters,

strike.

would have

Both

left

bills

under consideration, while

lifting

the exemption in tact with regard to the

minor leagues and franchise relocation decisions. Several Senators expressed concerns
that these bills

319

would have unintended consequences.

Moore, David W., "Most Baseball Fans Support Replacement

Poll

Monthly (March,

Players,"

The Gallup

1995), p. 39-41.

104

th

st

Cong.,

Sess. (1995).

320

National Pastime Preservation Act of 1995 ,

321

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee

S. 15,

1

on

Antitrust,

Antitrust
Business Rights, and Competition, The Court-Imposed Major League Baseba ll
th
Exem ption. Hearings (104 Cong., 1 Sess.,1995).
st

,

192

Senator Nancy Kassebaum, Republican of Kansas, quoted a section of
one of the

pending

out of context and claimed that

bills

unfair advantage to the players union.

bill's

it

would

alter current labor

law and give an

Senator Arlen Specter repeatedly questioned the

sponsor, Hatch, about whether his

bill

would

pertain to the current strike. Specter

obstinately insisted that because no unilateral terms were imposed in the current
conflict
that a bill to extend antitrust coverage to such impositions

repeated reminders from Senator Hatch and Democrat

owners had

and would

in the past

Specter continued to assail the

The

likely in the future

was

irrelevant.

322

Despite

Bob Graham of Florida,

impose such

that the

unilateral terms, Senator

323
bill.

contrast between this hearing in the 104

th

Congress, where Senators openly

argued with each other about the merits of these limited repeals of the exemption, and
similar sessions held in the previous Congress,

committee

in the

House,

is

both striking and

where such

telling.

this limited repeal

came

after the release

had passed out of

The concerns expressed by Senator

Specter and Kassebaum had not been raised in the 104

about

bills

th

Congress. Ironically, their doubts

of a study by the Congressional Research

Service, a non-partisan organization within the Library of Congress, which contravened

nearly

all

of the owners arguments for retaining the exemption.

The CRS
impasse

report found that baseball's exemption allows owners to declare an

in collective bargaining

and to impose employment terms that

differ

from any

in

415, would have allowed the players to file antitrust
expired labor
suits if the owners unilaterally imposed conditions other than those of the

322

Senator Hatch's proposed

bill,

S.

agreement.
323

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust,

Antitrust
Business Rights, and Competition, The Court-Imposed Major League Baseball

Exem ption.

th

Hearings (104
,

st

Cong.,

1

Sess.,1995), p. 6, 11-14.

193

prior labor agreements including those that

do not qualify

narrow nonstatutory

for the

labor antitrust exemption which covers the collective
bargaining process.

The

report

further found that the owners' contention that a salary
cap and revenue-sharing

only ways to correct the problems created by inequality of resources
"questionable."

many

salary cap

to solve the problem.

"greatest share

more

The

report

among teams was

and revenue-sharing were said to be one option among

The report

also concluded that these measures

of costs on the players" and

The

evenly.

were the

that other options

recommended, among other

franchises in large-revenue markets and using the

would

distribute the costs

things, expanding the

new

imposed the

number of

franchise fees to compensate the

present owners for their loss. This would restore competitive balance without unfairly

burdening either the players or owners.

324

Major League Baseball responded
Fallacies

of the

CRS

prepared document

qualifications

to the report with a press release entitled,

Report for Congress of January

filled

13, 1995."

with disparaging comments about the

of its authors. While the arguments

The

CRS

release

was a

"The
hastily

report, as well as the

in the press release

were generally

without merit, they nonetheless convinced the right people. Senators Specter and

Kassebaum's

criticisms

of Senator Hatch's

Major League Baseball contained

bill

evidenced familiarity with the arguments of

in the press release.

Enthusiasm for repealing the exemption eroded
the 104

sides

th

Congress. Despite the fact that

of this

issue,

it is

significantly

Members from both

clear that the political atmosphere

with the election of

parties

can be found on both

was re-charged with

anti-

Zimmerman, Dennis and William Cox, "The Baseball Strike and Federal Policy: An
Economic Analysis," CRS Report for Congress (January 13, 1995), p. 20-21.

324

194

government intervention sentiment as a

result

of Congress.

It is

to the benefit

of Major League Baseball.

When the
two

of the Republican takeover of both houses

also clear that this sentiment, as

it

had throughout the 1980s, redounded

President suggested that the Congress consider legislation to subject the

sides in baseball to binding arbitration, Senate Majority Leader Robert

House Speaker Newt Gingrich jointly responded,
thrown the

ball into

that

325

saying "[t]he President has apparently

We maintain our view that Congress is ill-suited to

Congress' court.

resolving private labor disputes."

This statement indicated the view of the

government intervention was to be avoided wherever

issues.

Dole and

new

majority

possible, including antitrust

Although the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee would vote narrowly

on August

3,

retaining

with regard to the minor leagues and franchise relocation, they did so knowing

full

it

1995, to approve a

bill

to

lift

baseball's

exemption

well that the majority leader had no intention of bringing

The suddenly sour mood toward
Specter and Kassebaum,

Baseball.

From the

start

may

also

it

in labor matters while

to the floor.

326

repealing the exemption, illustrated by Senators

have been inspired by the work of Major League

of the 104

th

Congress, Major League Baseball lobbyists stormed

Capitol Hill in numbers heretofore unseen. Major League Baseball's chief lobbyist, Gene
Callahan, speaking of the lobbying effort in the 104

325

Quoted

Can't

in

Guarisco, John W., "Buy

Me Some

th

Congress predicted

Peanuts

And

Buy The Team: The Scope And Future Of Baseball's

University of Illinois

Law Review

1994:3 (1994),

p.

that,

"before our

Crackerjacks, But

You

Antitrust Exemption,"

682.

Reform
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Maior League Baseball
th
Act of 1995 (Rept. No. 104-231, 104 Cong., 2d Sess.,1996), p. 4.

326

,

195

effort

over, every

is

Member of Congress

by Stan Brand and the

will

be contacted by baseball people." 327 Aided

NAPBL and an array of high priced

lobbyists,

many of whom were

former staffers to key Members of Congress, Callahan conducted a massive campaign
the

two months of the 104 th Congress

first

The success of this

effort

in

to save the exemption.

cannot be measured

easily,

but one

Member

admitted that he had withdrawn his support for a repeal of the exemption

frankly

in return for

promise of an expansion team from Major League Baseball. In a Washington Post

a

article,

an aid to Virginia Senator John Warner was quoted as saying, "we were kind of bought
off, if you will."

The

aid

went on to say

that

Boston Red Sox owner and expansion

committee chairman John Harrington had promised Warner a team
withdrawal of support for repealing the exemption. The same

in return for his

article

went on to say

"Warner had joined "several Northern Virginia Members of Congress who see
•

players' strike as a chance to score points with the owners."

In

the

March 1995,

the pressure

on Congress

to act

District

in

(January

8,

Fill

With

later,

U.S.

329

The next day

the players

The owners, disappointed by

the

New Lobbyists," The New York Times

1995), p. 10.

Lipton, Eric and

Mark Maske, "Aide Says Warner Cut Deal

Washington Post (February

for Baseball

(April

1,

1995), p.

Team," The

23, 1995), p. Bl.

Whiteside, Larry, "After injunction, major leaguers vote to play ball,"

Globe

filed

favor of the players and issued an

work immediately.

Chass, Murray, "Halls of Congress

of

the actions

of the expired labor agreement. Four days

Court Judge Sonia Sotomayor ruled

association voted to return to

329

328

was diminished by

injunction to restore the terms of the expired agreement.

328

the baseball

NLRB and a federal district court judge in New York. On March 27, the NLRB

for an injunction to restore the rules

327

that

1.

196

The Boston

ruling,

decided that a lockout would be a public relations nightmare and allowed the

players back. With the court decision, the owners released the replacement players

were poised to play

in the big leagues

who

and postponed opening day to April 26. The 1995

schedule had to be cut from 162 games to 144 games.

Where Does

the Exemption Stand

Now?

With the return of baseball, despite the lack of a new
of the exemption changed dramatically.
that

It

was

labor agreement, the politics

the strike and the resulting loss of baseball

had fueled attempts to repeal the exemption. With the return of baseball, the labor

dispute lost urgency and political salience. Indeed, for the remainder of the 104

th

Congress there were no more hearings on the exemption's repeal and, as

in the

1980s, attention shifted to the issue of franchise relocation in

In

on

November

moves of two Los Angeles teams,

professional sports.

NFL's Cleveland Browns move

the Raiders and

Rams,

and the announcement that Houston's

as well as rumors of several other possible

also experiencing a

had

1995, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust held a hearing

franchise relocations following the

respectively,

all

it

Oakland and

in the

the

St.

team would move

moves throughout

wave of relocations, with

Minnesota to Dallas. Once again, as

NFL

to

to Baltimore, the

the

to Nashville,

NFL. The

Quebec team moving

to

Louis

NHL was

Denver and

1980s, talk of removing baseball's exemption
330

was replaced by

talk

of granting limited exemptions to

all

sports.

Antitrust,
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
ofe ssional Sports
Business Rights, and Competition, Antitrust Issues In Relocation of Pr

330

th

Franchises. Hearings , (104

st

Cong.,

1

Sess.,1995).

197

In January 1996, the

sports.

full

Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on professional

While the Committee was ostensibly looking

sports, the hearing consisted

into antitrust issues

of brief references by Senator Hatch

and professional

to the destructive effects

of baseball's exemption amid the overwhelming concern of most members
of the
committee that professional sports needed a limited exemption to prevent what California
Senator Diane Feinstein called franchise musical chairs. Feinstein, whose hometown
San
Francisco Giants were blocked by Major League Baseball in their attempt to
Florida, told the hearing, "this

that

game of franchise musical

Major League Baseball's exemption from the

and why
331

sports.

I

chairs

is

why

I

move

to

strongly believe

antitrust laws should not be repealed

favor extending baseball's antitrust exemption to other major professional

Her views were shared by the majority of the committee. Even Senator Hatch

endorsed the idea of providing professional sports with

antitrust protection regarding

league rules on franchise migration.

Two weeks

after the

Senate hearing, the House Judiciary Committee held a

hearing on franchise relocation legislation.

As

in the

Senate hearing, the voices speaking

out against baseball's exemption were drowned out by those calling for exemptions to

prevent franchise migration in

in

all

vain at the hearing about his

sports.

bill

to

Representative John Conyers of Michigan, spoke

remove

baseball's exemption in labor matters. In an

opening statement, he sarcastically reminded the members of the committee that

baseball

bill,

on which

the committee had failed to act,

was

his

also within the jurisdiction

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Professional Sports: The
th
Challenges Facing the Future of the Industry. Hearings , (104 Cong., 2d Sess.,1996),

of

331

198

p. 9.

.

the committee.

In June, following the hearing, a

bill

regarding franchise migration

was

reported out of the House Judiciary Committee. 333

Despite the reprieve granted by the return of the players, Major League
Baseball
lobbyists kept the heat

on

in the

104

th

RoU

Congress.

Call , a Capitol Hill newspaper,

reported that Major League Baseball spent $630,000 lobbying Congress in the

months of 1996, which dwarfed the
time period. The

In the 105

twenty

into the

efforts

of the Players Association during the same

MLBPA reportedly spent
th

first

Congress,

century,

repeal baseball's exemption.

in the

$196,000 during the same period.

wake a of new

numerous

The new

first six

bills

334

labor agreement that will take baseball

are being considered that

labor agreement includes a

would

partially

memorandum of

understanding between the players and owners that expresses the willingness of both
parties to accede to the repeal

matters.

Both

of the exemption by Congress as

sides have agreed to forego any lobbying efforts

it

pertains to labor

on Capitol

Hill regarding

the exemption, with the exception of support for the limited repeal, throughout the

the

new

of

life

contract that expires in the year 2000 or 200 1

Baseball's antitrust exemption, despite reports to the contrary, continues to afford

significant benefits to

Major League Baseball.

not be spending millions of dollars defending

antitrust laws allows

team owners

If this

it.

were not so then the owners would

Baseball's freedom from the nation's

to control expansion, preserving the inflated values

of

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Professional Sports Franchi se
th
Relocation: Antitrust Implications. Hearings (104 Cong., 2d Sess.,1996), p. 3.
333
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Fan Freedom and Community

332

,

Protection Act of 1996 (H.R. Rept. No. 104-656. 104

th

,

334

Henry, Ed, "Baseball Lobbying Hits Major League on

1996), p. 15.

199

Cong., 2d Sess.,1996).
Hill,"

Roll Call (October 21,

existing franchises.

and

It

enables the owners to manipulate labor relations to their advantage

tightly control player

development. In addition, the exemption allows Major League

Baseball to negotiate jointly for cable television contracts, without fear of antitrust
challenge.

The other

professional sports leagues' cable

TV

deals are subject to antitrust

scrutiny.

It is

currently fashionable to suggest that the exemption

the players union has achieved so

much at

players lot has improved significantly,

antitrust

it is

is

irrelevant today because

the bargaining table. While

also true that baseball's

law continues to give the baseball owners a

counterparts in other professional sports.

200

definite

it is

true that the

exemption from

advantage over their

CHAPTER V
THE FUTURE OF BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION

Major League Baseball's singular enjoyment of freedom from government
regulation cannot be attributed to isolated causal factors.

unregulated monopoly

persistence of baseball's

not a mere historical accident originating

is

sentimentality and persisting

status

The

due to the

be explained as simply the

result

rules

in judicial

of precedent. Nor can baseball's paradoxical

of interest group

politics as usual.

However, while

the cultural significance of the national pastime has surely played a large part in

treatment by the government, the mere evolution of the

not in

itself sufficient to

of baseball

in

America

game

explain this regulatory anomaly.

—

development as encased

its

regulatory anomaly

in the interplay

—

is

in the

its

minds of Americans

and

a function of the

of institutions and

political characteristics,

is

The unique place of the business
game's

historical

This

ideas, as well as politics.

anomaly has been maintained through a succession of political environments with
institutional, ideological,

unusual

and a

fuller

distinct

understanding of it

is

gained by focusing on these changing regulatory regimes.

The developing
values,

gave

national institutions of the Progressive Era together with Victorian

birth to the baseball anomaly.

The Depression and World War

with them a distinct regulatory environment with which baseball's anomaly
consistent, then later ignored

II

brought

at first

seemed

amid more pressing concerns. The 1960s and 1970s brought

dissensus to American regulatory politics, but baseball's unregulated monopoly weathered

the period albeit with difficulty.

The 1980s and

201

early 1990s

were a period of anti-

government

Governmental excesses of previous decades were decried and

politics.

actions taken to reduce the size of the public sector.

laissez-faire attitude

some

respite

The

A conservative politics, with a

about government regulation, provided Major League Baseball with

from the

assault

on

its

unregulated monopoly.

player strike of 1994-95 signaled the end of baseball's reign as America's

national pastime. Public disgust with the business of baseball reached unprecedented
levels as a

consequence of the game's ninth work stoppage

cultural pedestal

the Congress

on which

showed

advent of the twenty

baseball had rested for a century toppled, both the courts and

signs

first

twenty years. As the

in

of altering the game's

antitrust exemption.

century and the Information

Age

is

In addition, the

transforming industry

worldwide, and the globalization of markets promises to have a profound impact on

American

industrial policy, including antitrust policy.

baseball industry will surely have

its

The

internationalization

of the

impact on Major League Baseball's unregulated

monopoly.

The Impact of Recent Court Decisions on

the Baseball

Anomaly

Settlement of the most destructive labor strike in baseball came without a single
piece of legislation being enacted into law. Indeed, only two

bills

affecting baseball's

exemption were even voted out of committee. In the 1990s, as had been the case
previous seven decades,

it

was

the judicial branch that had the greatest impact

in the

on the

debate and
baseball anomaly. Several court decisions changed the terms of the exemption

contributed to Major League Baseball's decision to

202

settle the labor dispute.

Three decisions

exemption

in the

in the courts.

1990s signaled the increasingly precarious position of the

In Postema

v.

Postema sued Major League Baseball
charged Major League Baseball with

Court

in

New York ruled that,

"immunizes baseball from
system,"

it

National League, a female umpire named Pamela

after she

restraint

was

minor league umpire. She

fired as a

of trade. In

its

decision, a U.S. District

while Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption

antitrust challenges to

its

league structure and

its

reserve

"does not provide baseball with a blanket immunity for anticompetitive

behavior in every context in which
In the cases of Piazza

v.

it

operates."

335

Major League Baseball and Butterworth

League of Professional Baseball Clubs, the court

decisions

seemed to

v.

National

further limit the

reach of baseball's antitrust exemption. Both of these cases resulted from an aborted

of the San Francisco Giants. In Piazza, a group of investors from Tampa Bay,
sought to purchase the Giants from the club's owner

franchise

due

who

father

Florida,

decided to

sell

two

principle buyers.

announced on September

investors group

of professional baseball

player,

the sale, citing the questionable character of

Fred Kuhlmann, chairman of the baseball ownership committee,
10, 1992, that Piazza

and Tirendi were being turned

down

because of the results of background checks conducted by Major League Baseball.

335

Postema

v.

National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 799

F.

336

Supp. 1475

(S.D.N. Y. 1992).
336

the

Piazza, and Tirendi are self made millionaires from Philadelphia. Before the deal

was closed Major League Baseball canceled
the

Lurie,

The two key members of the

to personal financial trouble.

were Vince Piazza and Vincent Tirendi. Piazza, the

Mike

Bob

sale

Vick, Karl, "Vince Piazza

still

trying to

Petersburg Times (March 20, 1994),

p.

make

8A.

203

a

name

for himself in baseball," St.

Piazza and Tirendi sued Major League Baseball claiming that
frustrating their efforts to

buy the Giants and move the team to

it

Florida.

acted

illegally in

They claimed

that

MLB had not evaluated their application to purchase the Giants in good faith and, further,
that

MLB had violated antitrust laws by disallowing the relocation of the Giants to

Florida.

Major League Baseball,

in

arguing for a summery judgment, claimed immunity

for their decision to cancel the sale based

District

on the game's blanket

Court Judge John R. Padova disagreed, ruling

of Judge Padova' s decision

then baseball's exemption

is

is

one case away from

exemption. U.S.

that baseball's antitrust

applies only to the reserve clause, not to issues of relocation.

If the logic

antitrust

immunity

337

broadly accepted by the legal community,

extinction.

Padova' s opinion held that

the three historic baseball decisions, Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood,

all

involved

attempts to obtain relief from the anti-competitive effects of baseball's reserve clause and

that, therefore, the

exemption

is

limited to the reserve clause.

argued that these decisions involve broader
business of baseball, which includes

Padova

relied

on Flood

in

issues,

much more

Major League Baseball had

and provide an exemption

for the

than the reserve clause.

holding that the claim for a broader exemption had been

eroded. Justice Harry Blackmun's opinion in Flood supported Padova' s argument that the

reserve clause

was

the third time in

the subject of all three of these pivotal cases.

fifty

years, the Court

is

Blackmun wrote, "For

asked specifically to rule that professional
338

baseball's reserve clause

held that, even

337

Piazza

338

Flood v.

v.

is

if Federal

within the reach of the federal antitrust laws."

Judge Padova

Baseball and Toolson granted a wider interpretation of the

Major League Baseball, 831
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).

F.

Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

204

exemption, Blackmun's majority opinion
earlier cases

in

may have had over and above

Flood took away any precedential value these
the issue of the reserve clause. Prior to Flood,

according to Padova, lower courts were bound by "stare decisis" 339 to follow the rule and

of Federal Baseball and Toolson. In Flood, the court invalidated the

result

earlier cases

results

when

ruled that baseball

of these cases by ruling

antitrust laws.

found

it

in

was indeed

interstate

that the reserve clause

is

of these

commerce, but upheld the

beyond the reach of federal

Therefore, Padova concluded that the only decisional precedent

was

to be

Flood, and Flood was unquestionably limited to the reserve clause. 340

Major League Baseball had backed up

more than

its

contention that the exemption covered

the reserve clause by citing the opinion of the Federal Appeals Court for the

Seventh Circuit

in the case

of Finley

&

Co.

v.

Kuhn. In

that case, the court found Finley's

claim that the exemption did not protect Major League Baseball from his
the commissioner'' s actions voiding trades of several of his players.

"the

rule

Supreme Court intended

of that business, from federal
his opinion,

to

The court

exempt the business of baseball, not any
341

antitrust laws."

suit challenging

ruled that

particular facet

Judge Padova did not share

this view.

In

he argued that the Seventh Circuit had misunderstood the extent to which

Flood centered on the reserve

clause.

Latin for "let the decision stand," this term refers to the judiciary's policy of relying on
the law's
precedent whenever possible. By so doing the court's legitimacy is enhanced by

339

predictability.

Closer,"
Gould, Mark T. "Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Pitch Gets Closer and
Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law 5 (1995), p. 273-289.
But You
341
Guarisco, John W., "Buy Me Some Peanuts And Crackerjacks,

340

Quoted

in

Can't Buy The Team: The Scope And

University of Illinois

Law Review

Future

Of Baseball's

1994:3 (1994),
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p.

659.

Antitrust Exemption,"

Major League Baseball avoided the possible damage
unregulated monopoly by appealing
court.

The terms of the

it

this decision

could do to

its

to a higher court and then settling the case out of

settlement are secret, but Piazza and Tirendi have stated that they

were quite pleased with the

This, however, did not end the judicial threat to

deal.

League Baseball's exemption, as Padova's bold

interpretation

Major

was adopted by another

court.

In the case of Butterworth

v.

National League, the Florida Attorney General,

Robert Butterworth, pursuant to Florida

demands

against the National

League

antitrust law, issued antitrust civil investigatory

in the

aftermath of the aborted

move of the San

Francisco Giants to Florida. The Florida charges alleged that Major League Baseball had

combined or conspired

to restrain trade in connection with the sale and purchase of the

San Francisco Giants baseball

franchise.

The Florida Supreme Court

ruled, in a 5-1 decision, that baseball's antitrust

exemption covers only matters related

to the reserve system

involving the sale or location of franchises. In

its

ruling,

and does not cover decisions

which allowed the Florida

Attorney General to proceed with his investigation, the Florida court agreed with the
court in Piazza that the decisions in Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood do not extend

the exemption

beyond the

facts

of those

342

cases.

If Butterworth

were appealed and heard

National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.
(Fla. 2d
1994). See also Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 1995 Fla. App. Lexis 10391
antitrust
state
DCA 1995). This court followed the rationale of Butterworth in reinstating
93-253, 1994 WL
claims. But see New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. NAPBL, No.

342

Butterworth

v.

summery
631 144 (U.S.D.C., E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994). This court rejected Piazza, granting
judgment based on the existence of the antitrust exemption.
206

by the Supreme Court,

it

appeals have been

by Major League Baseball.

filed

may

well result in the repeal of the exemption. Consequently, no

In addition to these direct assaults

on

the exemption, several court decisions

involving labor law have had an important impact

95 player strike caused the most serious
partially, baseball's

exemption from

effort

upon the exemption

on Capitol

antitrust law.

The 1994-

debate.

Hill to date to repeal, at least

In the debates over these partial

exemptions, opponents of even a partial repeal rebutted attempts to repeal the exemption
in labor

matters with claims that labor negotiations were already granted both a statutory

and a court-imposed
in labor

antitrust

exemption, which made the repeal of baseball's exemption

matters irrelevant.

The

statutory exemption refers to a provision of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914

by which the unilateral
challenge.

activities

of labor unions were granted immunity from

The provision was intended

to clarify the

antitrust

Sherman Act, which was not

intended to be used against unions. The Supreme Court extended the statutory labor

exemption to qualifying terms of collective bargaining agreements
Bradley Co.

v.

Local Union

Amalgamated Meat

Cutters

13,

v.

IBEW,

UMWv.

Jewel Tea Co.

Pennington

in the cases

& Local

of Allen

Union 189, and

343

In these cases the Court determined that, without extending the labor exemption to

some

bilateral

agreements, unions would be exposed to antitrust actions

in certain

circumstances. Before the Court created this non-statutory labor exemption, unions were

protected from antitrust

liability in their unilateral activities to

207

achieve their demands vis-a-

management, but they

vis

That

is

lost that protection if management

when terms went from unilateral demands

to say,

to labor-management

agreements, these demands were no longer unilateral union
subject to antitrust

labor exemption

professional sports in the case of Philadelphia World
345

In this case, the World

Hockey League

for restraint

monopoly

hockey player market. The

in the

of trade, arguing

The

agreement

in

is

good

first

applied to

Inc.

v.

Philadelphia

Hockey League sued

the National

NHL reserve clause resulted in a

NHL defended its reserve clause as a product
antitrust challenge

by the nonstatutory

application of the nonstatutory exemption required that the

is

to say,

an agreement can only be protected from

for the labor union

and resulted from a negotiation

meaningful input. The court ruled that

Hockey League

343

case.

Allen Bradley Co.

Three years

v.

which both

sides

had

standard had not been met in the World

this

later, in

in

antitrust challenge if

Robertson

v.

NBA,

346

the court struck

down

IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); UMWv.
381 U.S. 657 (1965); Amalgamated Meat Cutters

Local Union

& Local

13,

Union 189,
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
Pennington
344

to

question be the result of union self-interest and the product of good faith

bargaining. That

it

was

Hockey Club,

that the

of collective bargaining and thus immune from
labor exemption.

and therefore became

344

The court-imposed, or nonstatutory,

Inc. in 1972.

activities

The court imposed nonstatutory exemption was intended

liability.

correct this unintended result.

Hockey Club,

agreed to their demands.

Closius, Philip

J.,

"Professional Sports and Antitrust Law:

v.

The Ground Rules of

Johnson, Arthur T. and James Frey's (eds.).
Allanheld Publishers,
Government and Sport: The Public Policy Issues (USA: Rowman

Immunity, Exemption, and

Liability," in

,

1985), p.
345

&

140-158.

Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc.

SUPP. 462

v.

Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351

(e.d. Pa. 1972).

'"Robertson

v.

NBA, 389

F.

Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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F.

basketball's reserve clause, ruling that

it

was not

entitled to the nonstatutory labor

exemption for the same reasons.
In the 1976 case of Mackey

v.

NFL, a

federal appeals court clearly defined

how

the

nonstatutory labor exemption applied to professional sports. In Mackey, the court

constructed a three part standard for applying the nonstatutory antitrust exemption for
labor:

(1) the provision being challenged

must

affect only the parties to the collective

bargaining agreement; (2) the challenged provision must pertain to a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining;

and (3) the challenged provision must have been the

fide arm's-length bargaining."

result

347

In the 1990s, three court cases seemed to aid Major League Baseball in

to turn

back attempts to

limit its antitrust

9

v.

Williams?* and Brown

v.

of "bona

exemption. The cases of Powell

Pro Football Inc

nonstatutory labor exemption and,

iS0

all

dealt with the scope

in all three, federal

v.

its

NFL,

efforts

M*

NBA

of the

appeals courts held that the

imposition of terms by employers after an impasse in collective bargaining has been

reached

is

immune from antitrust

between employers and a union

liability

so long as a collective bargaining relationship

exists.

In Powell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a lower court

ruling that the nonstatutory labor

The case involved a challenge

347

Quoted

348

Powell

NBA

v.

to the unilateral imposition

until

an impasse

of player

is

restraints

reached.

by the

NFL

in Closius, p. 144.
v.

NFL, 678

Cir. 1989), cert.
349

exemption continues only

F.

Supp. 777, 788-89 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F. 2d 1293 (8

Denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).

Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N. Y. 1994), affd, 45 F. 3d 684 (2d Cir.

1995).

209

th

after collective bargaining with the football players
association

held that this unilateral action

impasse, because

it still

The

it

entitled to antitrust immunity, despite the bargaining

satisfied the three-part test established in

the owners and players in the

bargaining; and

was

broke down. The court

NFL;

Mackey.

It

affected only

concerned mandatory subjects of collective

it

had resulted from bona

fide

arm's length bargaining.

players association claimed that the player restrictions in question were not in

compliance with the third part of the

test.

They were not

the result of bona fide arm's

length bargaining. However, the court found that, because

imposed had been included
parties, they did

in the

comply with the

entitled to antitrust

all

the player restraints

1982 collective bargaining agreement signed by both
third part

of the

test

and thus the

restrictions

were

immunity so long as a collective bargaining relationship existed

between the players and owners

in the

NFL.

In Williams, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a lower

court ruling that the nonstatutory labor exemption continues after impasse as long as a

collective bargaining relationship exists

between the relevant

parties.

the unilateral imposition of a player draft and a salary cap by the

bargaining broke

down with the

basketball players association.

test for applying the nonstatutory labor

terms

in this case.

The

salary cap

exemption had been

The case involved

NBA after collective

The court found

satisfied

that the

by the employment

and the player draft were terms previously agreed to by

the players in the expired labor agreement.

Pro Football, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd 50
(1996).
1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), 518 U.S.

350

Brown

v.

_

210

F.

3d

Both Williams and Powell held
that unions

that the

exemption extends beyond impasse, and

must decertify prior to mounting an

Both of these

antitrust challenge against

cases, however, involved the unilateral imposition

management.

of terms contained

in

previous collective bargaining agreements. In the absence of its general antitrust

exemption, Major League Baseball's unilateral imposition of a salary cap, a term that had
not been a part of any previous agreement,
the nonstatutory labor exemption in 1995

may

well have been beyond the protection of

when Congress was

debating a partial repeal of

the exemption in labor matters.

Brown grew out of negotiations between the NFL and

the football players

association following the expiration of the football collective bargaining agreement in

1987. During the negotiations the

NFL

adopted a plan to permit each club to establish a

developmental squad made up of first year players
teams.

less.

The plan required teams

The union

The NFL,

resulting in a antitrust law suit filed

its

member
The

not been picked up by other

to pay developmental players $1,000 a week, no more, no

rejected the plan and eventually an impasse

the developmental squad.

and

who had

then, unilaterally

was reached on the

issue

of

imposed the plan on the teams,

by 235 developmental squad players against the

NFL

teams.

results

of the Brown case, however, may have shielded Major League

Baseball's imposition of a salary cap from antitrust

liability

because

in this case the court

ruled that the nonstatutory labor exemption both extends beyond an impasse in collective

211

bargaining and applies to the unilateral imposition of any
"good faith" offer by either side,
regardless whether that offer had been contained in a prior
agreement.

The

effect

unilateral terms

agreements

in

of Brown on baseball's exemption

is

significant.

351

Brown

imposed by management need not have been included

in prior labor

order to be protected from antitrust challenge by the nonstatutory labor

exemption. Knowing

this,

Major League Baseball's agreement with the players

Congress for the repeal of the exemption as
understandable.

The

limited

it

relates to labor matters

becomes much more

in the

same position

vis-a-vis antitrust

labor negotiations as football, basketball and hockey players. With the

professional athletes are in a relatively

weak

position in this regard.

agreement, Major League Baseball has reduced the

the

its

antitrust

Brown

law and, by agreeing to support a

decision,

political salience

partial repeal,

made

Brown

to

law and

decision,

all

With the new labor
of the exemption

all

but irrelevant by

Major League Baseball has co-opted the most potent force opposing

continued unregulated monopoly— namely, the players.

The memorandum of understanding
players hands with regard to lobbying for a

players agreed not to lobby for a

agreement expires

in

new

labor agreement ties the

more extensive repeal of the exemption. The

more expansive

that

the exemption in labor matters.

The judgment of whether

to adjudication

included in the

repeal at least until the present

2000 or 2001. Major League Baseball's unregulated monopoly

seems even more secure given

351

to lobby

exemption that both players and owners have agreed

support would only put baseball players

from

clarified that

by the

Congress seems unlikely to pass the limited repeal of

When

Congress considered similar

the term in question

NLRB,

is

indeed a "good faith" offer

and ultimately the courts.

212

legislation in

is

1995 and

subject

1996, opponents inaccurately, but effectively, argued that such a repeal was
the court decisions in Williams and Powell. Since the

Brown

made mute by

decision actually does

reduce the relevance of such a repeal, Members of Congress seem unlikely to
tamper with
baseball's exemption.

In addition to the reduced relevance of such a repeal, Congress will be besieged in

the 105

th

Congress by lobbyists for minor league baseball arguing

that a repeal

threatens to unleash a torrent of litigation, the results of which for

While the new agreement binds the owners and players

at best.

to support the specific repeal

their

of the exemption

in

them

of any kind

are unpredictable

Major League Baseball

in labor matters, the

minor leagues and

powerful lobbying organization, headed by Stanley Brand, remains free to oppose

any repeal of the exemption.

Major League Baseball,

therefore, can have

its

cake and eat

it

too with regard to

the exemption. Officially they support the limited repeal; unofficially, they can rely

efforts

of the

NAPBL to

in the drivers seat

become

stop even that. But

it

also

means

that the

with regard to the exemption's fate on Capitol

significant in the

on

the

minor leagues may be

Hill,

and

this

may

1997 renegotiations of the Professional Baseball Agreement,

which governs the relationship between the majors and the minors.

The Baseball Anomaly
As
principle.

Clinton

the 105

th

in

the 105

th

and 106

th

Congresses

Congress opened, baseball's new labor agreement had been reached

While the Republicans held on to both houses of Congress, Democrat

was

re-elected President.

House by moving

Most pundits agree

that Clinton retained the

to the right, co-opting the Republican's smaller

213

in

Bill

White

government theme, but

his re-election nonetheless represents a retreat

of the previous two

years.

In politics, the anti-government
federal government, for

mood was dampened

down of the

by the shut

which the public blamed the congressional Republicans who had

apparently thought that no one would miss
Series and the continued

government

from the intensely anti-government rhetoric

it.

In baseball, the cancellation of the

war of words between

the

owners and players softened the

anti-

had led most Americans to favor keeping Congress out of baseball's

bias that

governance. Increasingly, fans were receptive to government intervention.

mood

World

Despite these

swings, baseball's unregulated monopoly appears secure for now.

Indeed, the political equation

now tilts

several reasons. Although the players and

efforts to the support

of a

partial repeal

in the favor

of Major League Baseball

owners have agreed to

of the exemption

limit their

for

lobbying

in labor matters, the

minor

leagues are not a party to this agreement and will most certainly harness their considerable
clout to stop even a partial repeal. Despite the softening of the anti-government

the nation, there are few political incentives for

Members of Congress

Metzenbaum and

Representatives

352

Congressional zealots

Mike Synar and Jack Brooks

in

to repeal baseball's

exemption. With the exception of the major league players association, no one
upset at continued congressional inaction.

mood

like

will

Senator

be

Howard

are gone, and while

Senator Orrin Hatch and Representatives Jim Bunning and John Conyers continue the

fight,

352

they are out numbered and have no issue, such as a player

During the

strike

numerous fan groups formed

to protest the

strike,

around which to

ongoing

strike.

These

groups became vigorous supporters of the repeal of the antitrust exemption. However,
with the settlement of the strike, these groups have lost most of their momentum and do

214

rally support.

the

power

The

players will have no real leverage until the year 2000,

to opt out of the final year

of the agreement and begin bargaining

Advocates of repeal, however, see the
as helping

repeal

it

them

in the

105

th

exit

Congress. Dole had been instrumental

in the

104

th

in

partial repeal

1997," in

Congress, from making

bills.

of the exemption

In the 105

in labor

th

the language of these

leave

it

this partial repeal in labor matters has to

matters in a

player/activist.

bill

entitled

"The Curt Flood Act of

A companion bill was introduced in the

bills

contained language that raised a red

Judiciary General Counsel, Allen Coffey. Coffey believes that

bills,

which are intended to

lift

the exemption in labor matters but

with regard to franchise relocations and the minor leagues,

fact jeopardize league rules

At

to the floor,

Congress, Senator Hatch proposed the

House by Representative John Conyers. Both
mind of House

bill

353

memory of the deceased

flag in the

partial

it.

Another factor that weighs against even

do with the language of the

over again.

keeping the

to the floor. But, Dole's replacement, Trent Lott also failed to bring the

despite his earlier support for

all

of former Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole

passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee

bill,

when they have

issue for Coffey

on
is

is

may

unclear and

franchise relocations as well as the minor leagues.

in

354

the phrase "applicability or nonapplicability." In both the

Senate and House versions of the

relating to franchise relocation

bill,

the following language

is

meant to exclude

issues

and the minor leagues:

not figure to be prominent in the congressional debates on the partial repeal of the

exemption
353

in the

105

th

Congress.

Henry, Ed. "Baseball Lobbying Hits Major League on HilL" Roll Call (October, 1996),

p.

1,15.

354

Telephone Interview with Allen Coffey, General Counsel

Committee, 16 January 1997.
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to the

House

Judiciary

Nothing

in this section shall be construed to affect (1) the
applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to
professional baseball's amateur draft, the minor league
reserve clause, the professional baseball agreement, or any

other matter relating to the minor leagues;
(2) The
applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to
any restraint by professional baseball on franchise
relocation; or (3) the application

(commonly known
1961).

87-331

355

Coffey contends that

it

Law

of Public

as the Sports Broadcasting Act of

this

phrase

is

subject to interpretation by the courts and that

could be interpreted to include subjecting franchise relocation and the minor leagues to

antitrust liability.

Coffey's view

contend that the phrase

is

not widely shared. The sponsors of this language

in fact protects against the

very interpretation about which he

worried. Leaving aside the merits of Coffey's argument,

the

fire

it is

is

clear that his doubts will fuel

being ignited on Capitol Hill by the minor league baseball lobbyists

in their efforts

to avoid any legislative tampering with the exemption.

With the end of the 1997 baseball season, the Professional Baseball Agreement
between the major and minor leagues

expires.

At

that time the minors will seek a better

deal with their senior partners. In addition to their unrestricted ability to lobby Congress

on any

issue, they will enter the negotiations with a

Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, that

Hill than

Major League

Stanley Brand to the

Baseball. This

was not

governing association, the National

may

well have

more

clout

on Capitol

the case in 1990, before the arrival of

NAPBL.

The bargaining

position of the minor leagues has been augmented in the 1990s by

the increased viability of independent minor leagues. During the 1990 negotiations

355

on

the

H.R. 21, "The Baseball Fans and Community Protection Act of 1997" was introduced

216

Professional Baseball Agreement, Major League
Baseball threatened to end

with the minor leagues.

356

Knowing

that without big league subsidies

league clubs would not survive, the minors had

little

its affiliation

most of the minor

leverage with which to oppose

although they used the threat of lobbying against the
exemption to some

357

effect.

this,

In 1997

things are different.

Since 1990, independent minor leagues throughout the country
have sprung up and
are proving that such ventures can be profitable even in small rural
markets.

well

known of these

is

the Northern

League whose member club the

Darryl Strawberry before selling him to the

New York Yankees.

St.

The most

Paul Saints had

These independent

leagues and teams were a response to the 1990 negotiations over the Professional Baseball

Agreement. The agreement mandated that every minor league team
major leagues had to bring
facilities.

its

with the

affiliated

stadium up to a national standard with regard to seating and

The requirements were extensive and even

scrutinized.

For example, one requirement was

rack in each

stall.

the most minute detail

that every ladies

room had

was

to have a purse

These requirements proved expensive. Many communities were unable

them and

lost their teams.

replacing

NAPBL teams,

Independent leagues moved into many of these communities
but keeping the local team names. In Elmira,

example, Major League Baseball removed
bring the stadium up to requirements.

by Rep. John Conyers on January

6,

its affiliate

New

York, for

because the community

An independent

league

came

in

failed to

and replaced the

1997.

The New York Times (December 3, 1990),
Going Legal Route," The New York Times

356

Chass, Murray, "With the Minors,"

357

Smith, Claire, "Major-Minor Rift

(November

to afford

26, 1990), p. C2.
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p.

C2.

Elmira team. The team has prospered despite the loss of subsidies
from Major League
Baseball. These independent leagues,

Louisiana League, and as

many

which include the Northern League, the Texas-

as nine others are proving that minor league baseball can

survive without the majors. Northern League founder,

economic

viability

of independent minor leagues

without the majors, although
clubs."

He went on to

it

would require improved business management of most

is

358

aware of this and has taken steps

compete with the majors

for fan dollars.

new

rules

limit the profitability

which allow

Several aspects of the 1990

the ability

the

in

new suburban

markets."

359

leagues, which are

The expanded

territories will limit

of the minors to expand when the majors expand. Speaking of the new

owner of the

Phillies

farm club

who

downside to eliminating

in

Reading, Pennsylvania,

feel they don't

want

that competition."

360

of Major League Baseball toward the minors

said, "[tjhere are

to have the competition,

said,

a

rules,

lot

of

and there's no

Mike Veeck, commenting on

the behavior

"They constantly muscle you and

Telephone Interview with Mike Veeck, General Manager, Charleston River Dogs

Minor League Baseball Team, 19 March 1997.
359
Fatsis, Stefan, "Major Leagues Keep Minors

(November
160

interpreted as

professional teams to expand the territory they control. This

all

crowds

major league owners

358

may be

of the minors. In 1995, Major League Baseball enacted

maneuver was motivated by "the decade long growth of the minor
attracting sell out

of

to limit the ability

Professional Baseball Agreement, such as the stadium requirements,

attempts to

the

"minor league baseball could survive

say, "independent leagues are very viable."

Major League Baseball
the minors to

said,

Mike Veeck, commenting on

9, 1995), p.

Fatsis, Stefan,

(November

a Distance,"

The Wall

Street Journal

at

a Distance,"

The Wall

Street Journal

Bl, B9.

"Major Leagues Keep Minors

9, 1995), p.

at

Bl.
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control your every move."

League Baseball intended
clubs for fan dollars,

subtle.

They don't

As

When asked

to limit the ability

Veeck

of the minors to compete with big league

said, "it's like trying to

us play to win."

let

about specific examples of behavior by Major

catch mercury, everything they do

361

the 1997 Professional Baseball Agreement negotiations

circulate that

is

Major League Baseball intends

to

impose a

league teams, resulting in the loss of many single

draw

rumors

closer,

five affiliate limit

on

all

major

A farm teams across the country.

Representatives of Major League Baseball, as well as the Major League Players
Association, have in the past complained that too

much money

development. If this rumor proves true, the minors are
action than they were in 1990.

They

will

in

is

spent

on player

a better position to

resist this

have the antitrust exemption card to

play.

In 1990, a small group of minor league owners opposed baseball's antitrust

exemption. Since that time the minor leagues, through the

its ability

to be heard

on Capitol

Minor League Caucus has made
Stanley Brand and the

which would be

Hill.

has greatly improved

Stanley Brand, together with the Congressional

the minor leagues a visible force

NAPBL choose to

likely if the

NAPBL,

oppose the

antitrust

on Capitol

Hill.

If

exemption for baseball,

majors ever cut off the minor leagues, the chances of the

exemption's repeal are quite good. Prior to 1992, the

NAPBL was an organization totally

controlled by Major League Baseball with respect to the maintenance of baseball's

antitrust exemption.

own

361

in

Since the arrival of Stanley Brand, the Association has

terms of its lobbying muscle on Capitol

Hill.

At

this point, the

come

minors are

into

likely

Telephone Interview with Mike Veeck, General Manager, Charleston River Dogs

Minor League Baseball Team, 19 March 1997.
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its

a

more potent lobbying
Moynihan (D-NY)

among groups

force

on Capitol

said recently that the minors "serve

interested in the exemption.

In 1997, the

NAPBL's

An aid

Hill than the majors.

to Senator Daniel

up the most

political pressure"

362

lobbying muscle will be magnified by the

new

agreement between the major league players and owners. The provision
agreement, which limits both sides

in their

labor

in the

new

lobbying efforts to the support of a partial

repeal in labor matters, does not bind Stanley Brand and the

organization are the only powerful players in the debate

NAPBL. Brand

who

and

his

are not limited by the

new

labor agreement. For this reason, the minors are in the driver's seat in regard to the

antitrust

exemption

at least until the expiration

The newly acquired economic
will certainly

However,

it

enhance

is

viability

of the new agreement.
and

political

their bargaining position vis-a-vis

power of the minor leagues

Major League Baseball

important to note that Major League Baseball

economic cards. The
and possible, would

threat

holds most of the

of breaking away from the majors, while

entail considerable

The immediate

still

economic hardship

future of the baseball

strategically useful,

for the minors.

anomaly on Capitol

Hill appears secure as

long as Major League Baseball retains the support of Stanley Brand and the

However, because the

partial repeal

Congress for the reasons discussed
likely to

of the exemption

is

in 1997.

NAPBL.

unlikely to pass through the

earlier, the expiration

of the new labor agreement

is

touch off another dispute about the exemption between the players and owners.

Player union chief Donald Fehr has repeatedly insisted that the repeal of the exemption

362

Patrick
Interview with Cassandra Hanley, Legislative Assistant to U.S. Senator Daniel

Moynihan, 14 January 1997.
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continues to be a high priority for the players. The exemption's
future in the courts
secure for the

Butterworth

life

may

of the new labor agreement. Though, the decisions
indicate the direction

League Baseball continues

to have the

of the courts on

means

in the

One of the most

Twenty

salient features

First

Piazza and

of court

in

order to

down definitively.

Century

of the coming century

will

undoubtedly be the

globalization of economic markets of all kinds. Baseball will not be an exception to

The

internationalization of America's national pastime

is

this.

already under way. In North

America, Major League Baseball has expanded to Canada and there

is

talk about

expansion teams from Latin America joining the big leagues. Professional baseball
in

also

Nevertheless, Major

to settle such cases out

avoid the possibility of its exemption being struck

The Baseball Anomaly

this issue.

in

is

exists

numerous foreign countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic,

Australia,

and

in the far east.

The popularity of baseball

United States. Professional baseball leagues exist

It is

unclear

how

Baseball.

coming

years.

is

certainly

one example of the type of issues

The popularity of baseball worldwide means

players are increasingly recruited from other countries.

player draft only includes American players. If the draft

talent,

Korea and Taiwan.

However, the recent controversy over the signing

free agents not subject to the draft

baseball will face in the

in Japan,

the internationalization of baseball will affect the unregulated

monopoly of Major League
of foreign

in the far east rivals that in the

The problem with this
is

is

that the

not expanded to international

then wealthy owners could clean up on the international free agent market.

221

that

The

of antitrust law becomes severely muddled when the world economy

issue

considered.

The

assault in the United States

on

antitrust policy

school approach to economic regulation could cut both ways

economy. Conservative commentators argue
cooperate

in

that

American

by devotes of the Chicago
an increasingly global

industries

must be allowed to

order to compete with foreign companies that are not hamstrung by domestic

antitrust laws.

On the

other hand, the advantage of foreign competitors

of government subsidies and

state

American trade policy

in the

is

often the result

sponsored monopolies intended to bolster the national

economy. The existence of state sponsored monopolies

from

in

is

in

Japan and elsewhere may push

opposite direction. Instead of merely unburdening businesses

antitrust law, a return to the associationalism

of the 1920s might be

in order for the

purpose of steering American industry through the maze of international competition.

The

issue

of worldwide

antitrust

topics in international relations today.

and external competitiveness

and trade policy

363

is

one of the most hotly debated

In the U.S., the conflict between internal fairness

in the global

market continues to be a dilemma. In baseball,

the most likely potential international competitor for Major League Baseball

where baseball has become a national obsession,

if

is

Japan,

not the national pastime. But several

recent developments in Japanese baseball indicate that they will not be able to exploit non-

western trade policy

order to cut into the American baseball market.

in

Antitrust policy

cultural norms.

a western invention that does not

In Japan, antitrust law

occupiers after World

363

is

See Fox Eleanor

War

M,

II.

The

was imposed on

Law

easily with

the country by

its

Asian social and

American

imperial government of pre-war Japan had a long

'Toward World

Journal of International

fit

Antitrust and

Market Access," American

91:1 (January, 1997), p. 1-25.
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history

of state control of the economy.

Traditionally, the Japanese

government promoted

and managed key industries and then turned them over to private firms to run.
This
practice

was seen

Because the

as necessary in order to protect the viability of Japanese businesses.

tiny island nation lacks the natural resources to be self sufficient,

forced to rely on international trade in order to provide

its

it

has been

citizens with basic necessities.

This external reliance has traditionally prompted the Japanese government to prop

up

its

industries through

government subsidies and

state

sponsored monopolies. The

imposition of Western concepts of antitrust conflicted with this established practice and

although Japan continues to have antitrust laws on the books, enforcement
best.

Japan continues to exempt certain industries from the

antitrust

laws

is

in

selective at

order to assist

Japanese industries in being competitive on the global market.
Professional baseball in Japan has operated free from the strictures of antitrust

regulation since

its

The Japanese government has never enforced

inception in the 1930s.

the antitrust laws against the

two professional

Central and Pacific Leagues operate very

baseball leagues in the country. Japan's

much

like the

American and National Leagues

with respect to policies that might be considered restraints of trade. The freedom of
Japanese baseball owners to

skirt antitrust

laws

in

Japan seems to indicate that Japanese

baseball could in the future cut into the American baseball market by utilizing

its

competitive advantages, especially with government subsidies. Recent developments

Japanese baseball, however,

may

in

364

mitigate against this scenario.

Law on
See Braver, Andrew F., "Baseball or Besoburo: The Implications of Antitrust
International and
Baseball in America and Japan," New York Law School Journal of

364

Comparative Law 16

(1996).

223

Although Japanese culture leads players to subordinate themselves to the
needs

and good of the team, the

ability

of Japanese baseball owners

to use this cultural affinity

to run a disciplined cartel has diminished in recent years. Japan

is

often recognized as a

nation that has been successful in importing American technologies and industrial
methods

without allowing American cultural and social norms to erode Japanese traditions. In
their ability to

fact,

import Western methods while retaining Japanese philosophies of individual

subordination have been crucial to Japan's ability to become a major player in international
trade.

Baseball, however, has been a bit different.

To
They

of baseball, the Japanese imported more than the game.

bolster the business

also brought over

raised the profile

many of the

of baseball

in that

players.

American players

in

Japan have greatly

country and they have also raised the level of play.

One of the unintended consequences of importing American players, however,

has been an

erosion of traditional Japanese attitudes about the balance between individualism and team

play.

Japanese players, seeing the Americans come to Japan and earn

of Japanese players, are becoming more concerned with getting
storied Japanese

engage

work

ethic

is

of the Japanese

who

The
rarely

365

players.

influence of American ideas in Japanese baseball has been evident in the last

several years. In 1985, "the importance of the

365

their fare share.

being eroded by the example of the "Gaijin,"

in the rigorous training

The

five times the salary

team over the

This term refers to foreign born players, which

players.

224

in

individual, at least in the area

most cases means American born

of player contracts, may have. .become a thing of the past
.

was

the year

become a

when Japanese

players formed a union.

in

Japanese baseball."

The Japanese

366

That

players union has since

force to be reckoned with in collective bargaining. In 1993, the union

succeeded

in obtaining

a system of free agency, increasing both player salaries and the

movement of players between teams.
The advent of the Japanese

players union

may

well have the same effect

Japanese owners unregulated monopoly as the American players association

Major League Baseball's monopoly. In both
parity, so far as negotiations are

strictures

of antitrust law

regulation of baseball

in

concerned,

viable.

professional athletes in labor negotiations

policy in professional sports

more

the

having on

countries, the rise of labor to positions of

may

well bring the

game of baseball

both countries. If that happens, international

would become

is

on

within the

antitrust

In fact, the uniquely favorable position of

may make an

internationally recognized antitrust

viable than such policy

would be

in

more conventional

industries.

The

baseball anomaly will not likely be altered in the 105

the long term prospects for repealing the exemption are good.

League Baseball Players Association's opposition

th

or 106

The

th

Congresses, but

intensity

of the Major

to the exemption guarantees that

it

continue to be an issue in baseball's labor negotiations. The erosion of Major League

366

Braver,

Andrew

"Baseball or Besoburo: The Implications of Antitrust Law on
International
and Japan,'' New York Law School Journal of

F.,

Baseball in America

Comparative Law 16 (1996),

p.

451.
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will

Baseball's ability to exploit

eventually allow

enough

its

cultural significance in defending the

critical

mass to

build

up

in

it

is

will

opposition to the exemption.

While baseball's anomalous exemption may eventually
relations,

exemption

fall

367

with regard to labor

very likely that the aspects of the exemption which protect the minor

leagues and the ability of Major League Baseball to control franchise migration will be
codified and expanded to

all

major professional sports within the next decade. The

lobbying muscle of minor league baseball and the destructiveness of franchise migration on

local

communities and economies

explicit statutory

structure

is

exemptions

both an outdated

rights to control their

367

will likely

in these areas.

relic

become

baseball

mass and bring about

In this way, baseball's unique governance

and a harbinger of future

own careers,

With regard to appropriate
anomaly

will eventually reach critical

is

policy.

In terms of the players

struggling to enter the twentieth century.

collective policies within professional sports leagues, baseball's

the

norm

in professional sports in the

twenty

first

century.

American Demographics 18
See Dortch, Shannon, "The Future of Baseball,"

1996).
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